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Abstract 
This dissertation is composed of a literature review, Chapter 1, an in-depth analysis of 
data used in the dissertation, Chapter 2, and three main essays, Chapters 3-5, on 
relative concerns, social interactions and unintended consequences. To uncover the 
nature of social interactions, Chapter 3 studies how rural residents form social 
networks, and what explains the recent gift spending escalation. Chapter 4 focuses on 
a typical market that carries significant social stigma – paid blood plasma donation in 
China. I explore the role of peer interactions in the networks. Building upon it, 
Chapter 5 evaluates how in utero exposures to frequent and costly social events for the 
impoverished families impacts early child nutrients intake and health status. 
 
      Chapter 1 
This chapter reviews the recent literature on inequality and income distribution in rural 
China utilizing panel datasets. On the basis of the review, this chapter identifies new 
research areas with existing panel datasets and my new household panel dataset, i.e., 
the IFPRI-CAAS, which could shape future research. 
 
      Chapter 2 
The tradition of keeping written gift record in many Asian countries offers researchers 
an old-fashioned but underutilized means of data collection for development and 
social network study. This chapter documents a long-term spontaneous household gift 
record I collected from the field. I discuss the data collection and network structure, 
highlighting its unique features for studies at household and dyadic link level. 
  
      Chapter 3 
The growth rate of gift and festival spending in some developing countries has been 
much higher than that of consumption and income. I test three competing explanations 
of the phenomenon—peer effect, status concern, and risk pooling—based on the 
IFPRI-CAAS and the gift network data. I find that gift-giving behavior is largely 
influenced by peers in reference groups. Status concern is another key motive for 
keeping up with the Joneses in extending gifts. In contrast, risk pooling does not seem 
to be a key driver of the observed gift-giving patterns. I also show that large windfall 
income triggers the escalation of competitive gift-giving behavior. 
 
      Chapter 4 
Despite the resultant disutility, people are still engaged in behavior carrying social 
stigma. Empirical studies on stigma behavior are rare, largely due to the formidable 
challenges of collecting data on stigmatized goods and services. Combining the 
IFPRI-CAAS and the gift network data, I examine frequent blood sales, widely 
regarded as a stigmatized behavior and the driving force of public health crises. Using 
a novel spatial identification strategy, I find social interactions with heterogeneous 
intensities affect plasma sales decisions. Peer effects are directional and work through 
preference interactions that reduce stigma. Families with unmarried son are more 
likely to sell plasma to offset costs of getting married in a tight marriage market, such 
as a bigger house, a higher bride price and a more lavish wedding banquet. 
 
      Chapter 5 
Participating in and presenting gifts at funerals, weddings, and other ceremonies held 
by fellow villagers have been regarded as social norms. However, it is more 
burdensome for the poor to take part in these social occasions than the rich. Because 
the poor often lack the necessary resources, they are forced to cut back on basic 
consumption, such as food, in order to afford a gift to attend the social festivals. Using 
the IFPRI-CAAS and the gift dataset, this chapter shows that children born to mothers 
in poor families who are exposed to a greater number of ceremonies during their 
pregnancies are more likely to display a lasting detrimental health impact.
 v 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 
 
Xi Chen is a Ph.D. candidate in applied economics at Cornell University. His areas of 
interest are Development Economics, Health Economics, Social Interactions and 
Networks, Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Methods. 
 
He has experience in development studies ranging from research assistance at the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) to field work in Rural China to 
consulting for the United Nations University World Institute for Development 
Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) and the Cornell Institute for Social and 
Economic Research (CISER). Meanwhile, he has been offering referee service to 
academic journals of China study, inequality and regional science. 
 
Both his B.S. in finance (2004) and M.S. in agricultural economics (2007) were earned 
from Nanjing Agricultural University, China. 
 vi 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
I am especially grateful to my supervisors in the U.S., Ravi Kanbur, Robert Frank, 
David Sahn and Xiaobo Zhang, for encouraging me and guiding me through the last 
few years, which have deeply changed my world under any perspective. I will always 
look back at the time of the PhD study with a lot of emotion. I want to sincerely thank 
my supervisor Funing Zhong in China, who motivated me to pursue an academic 
career. All my supervisors have set up perfect role models for me in advising students 
in the future. 
 
I owe much to my parents across the Pacific for all their sacrifices and firm support as 
always that made this dissertation a reality. Though being apart for most of the last 
five years, I want to express my heartfelt appreciation to my wife Bin with whom I 
shared the ups and downs of my life and study. 
 
I cherish all the joys Cornell and Ithaca have offered me. Some friends are still there, 
some left before me. I would like to hug them one by one. The memories of time spent 
together are one of the most precious gifts of the PhD study.  
 
I am also grateful to financial support from the National Science Fund of China 
(NSFC) (approval numbers 70525003 and 70828002),  Doctoral Research Grant from 
the Institute for the Social Sciences (ISS) at Cornell University, C. V. Starr Research 
Grant for East Asian studies, Cornell Graduate School Research Travel Grant, and 
data collection support provided by the International Food Policy Research Institute 
(IFPRI), the International Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (ICARD) at 
the China Academy of Agricultural Sciences (CAAS), and Guizhou University. 
 vii 
 
My research also benefited from helpful discussions and invaluable comments from 
Douglas Almond, Terri Ballard, Abhijit Banerjee, Chris Barrett, Jim Berry, Andrew E. 
Clark, Alan de Brauw, Marcel Fafchamps, Francisco Ferreira, Jason Fletcher, James 
Foster, Ira Gang, Jennifer Hunt, Arie Kapteyn, Shanjun Li, Daniel Lichter, Tim 
Mount, Albert Park, Prasada Rao, Scott Rozelle, Stephen Smith and Liming Wang. 
I take all responsibility for the remaining errors and omissions. 
 
Comments and suggestions from conference audiences and seminar participants at 
Cornell (2008-2012), CES (2010), CEA/Europe (2009, 2010), CEA/China (2009), 
AAEA meetings (2009, 2011), IAMO Forum (2010, 2011), Manchester University 
(2010), the LABOR Xiamen conference (2010), HKEA meetings (2010), NBER 
China Group Meeting (2011), AAEA meetings (2011), UNU-WIDER Poverty and 
Behavior Economics Conference (2011), SAEA meetings (2009, 2011), Cornell 
Population Center Encore Conference (2011), IFPRI Seminar (2011), ASSA meetings 
(2012), FAO Symposium (2012), Yale (2012), RAND (2012), GWU (2012), Rutgers 
(2012), Queensland (2012) and Dalhousie (2012) and so on are acknowledged. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 viii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
CHAPTER 1: THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AND WELL-BEING IN 
RURAL CHINA 
1.1 Introduction and Overview .................................................................................. 1 
1.2 Panel Data Sources for China .............................................................................. 4 
1.3 Panel Data Assessment .......................................................................................... 6 
1.3.1 Comparisons among Major Datasets ................................................................ 6 
1.3.2 Relevant Data Issues ....................................................................................... 11 
1.4 Main Findings from Panel Data ......................................................................... 17 
1.4.1 Rising Income Inequality and Economic Development ................................. 18 
1.4.2 Spatial Inequality and Decompositions .......................................................... 23 
1.4.3 Income Inequality and Other Dimensions ...................................................... 25 
1.4.4 Income Inequality and Health ........................................................................ 28 
1.5 Areas for Further Research ................................................................................ 30 
1.5.1 New Research Areas with Existing Panel Data Sets ...................................... 30 
1.5.2 New Research Areas with New Panel Data Set ............................................. 32 
1.6 Conclusions .......................................................................................................... 37 
REFERENCES .......................................................................................................... 42 
 
CHAPTER 2: GIFT AND SOCIAL NETWORK STRUCTURE IN RURAL 
CHINA 
2.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 48 
2.2 Unique Features for Gift-Exchange Record Data ............................................ 50 
2.2.1 Features for Studies at Different Levels ......................................................... 51 
2.2.2 Tackling Measurement Errors ........................................................................ 53 
2.3 Data Collection for IFPRI-CAAS Project ......................................................... 56 
2.3.1 Three-Wave Census Survey ........................................................................... 56 
2.3.2 Gift-Exchange Records Collection ................................................................. 57 
2.4 Household Ceremonies in Rural China ............................................................. 59 
2.4.1 The Overall Trend .......................................................................................... 59 
2.4.2 Major Ceremonies .......................................................................................... 61 
2.5 The Recent Gift Spending Escalation ................................................................ 63 
2.6 Gift Exchange and Informal Insurance ............................................................. 67 
2.7 How is Gift Network Structure Determined? ................................................... 68 
2.8 Conclusions .......................................................................................................... 69 
APPENDIX ................................................................................................................ 72 
REFERENCES .......................................................................................................... 91 
 
Chapter 3: PEER EFFECTS, RISK POOLING, AND STATUS SEEKING 
3.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 94 
3.2 Gift Giving in Rural China ................................................................................. 96 
3.3 Data Collection ..................................................................................................... 98 
3.3.1 Three-Wave Census Survey ........................................................................... 98 
3.3.2 Gift-Exchange Records Collection ................................................................. 98 
3.4 Risk Pooling and Network Formation: An Analytical Framework .............. 101 
 ix 
3.5 Peer Effect Identification .................................................................................. 104 
3.5.1 Reference Groups ......................................................................................... 104 
3.5.2 Correlated Effects ......................................................................................... 105 
3.5.3 The Reflection Problem ................................................................................ 107 
3.6 Empirical Strategy ............................................................................................. 108 
3.6.1 Model Specification ...................................................................................... 108 
3.6.2 Dependence of Dyadic Observations ........................................................... 111 
3.7 Empirical Results ............................................................................................... 114 
3.7.1 Determinants for Gift Spending per Occasion ............................................. 114 
3.7.2 Determinants for Changes in Gift Spending per Occasion .......................... 115 
3.8 Concluding Remarks ......................................................................................... 118 
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................ 132 
 
CHAPTER 4: SPATIAL IDENTIFICATION OF STIGMA BEHAVIOR 
THROUGH SOCIAL NETWORKS 
4.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 136 
4.2 Plasma Donation in Rural China ..................................................................... 141 
4.3 Conceptual Model .............................................................................................. 144 
4.4 Data and Empirical Strategy ............................................................................ 147 
4.4.1 Data Collection ............................................................................................. 147 
4.4.2 Reference Groups ......................................................................................... 150 
4.4.3 Conventional and Spatial Identifications of Peer Influence ......................... 152 
4.4.4 Measures of Relative Concern ...................................................................... 158 
4.4.5 Empirical Strategy ........................................................................................ 163 
4.5 Empirical Results ............................................................................................... 165 
4.5.1 Main Results and Robustness ....................................................................... 165 
4.5.2 The Potential Mechanism of Peer Effects .................................................... 171 
4.5.3 Some Evidence on Negative Health Outcomes ............................................ 173 
4.6 Conclusions ........................................................................................................ 175 
APPENDIX .............................................................................................................. 178 
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................ 206 
 
CHAPTER 5: COSTLY POSTURING 
5.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 212 
5.2 Social Spending and Food Consumption ......................................................... 215 
5.2.1 Literature on Social Spending ...................................................................... 215 
5.2.2 Patterns of Social Spending in Rural China ................................................. 217 
5.2.3 The Squeeze Effects of Social Spending on Food Consumption ................. 220 
5.3 Quantifying the Effect of Social Spending on Child Health Outcomes ........ 221 
5.3.1 Fetal Origins Hypothesis .............................................................................. 221 
5.3.2 Measuring Reference Groups and Relative Status ....................................... 225 
5.3.3 Quantifying the Effect of Social Shocks on Child Health Outcomes .......... 228 
5.3.4 Main Empirical Results on the Squeeze Effects ........................................... 231 
5.3.5 Robustness Checks and Other Findings ....................................................... 233 
5.4 Conclusions ........................................................................................................ 237 
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................ 260 
1 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AND WELL-BEING IN RURAL CHINA: A 
SURVEY OF PANEL DATA SETS, STUDIES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 
 
 
1.1 Introduction and Overview 
China has been experiencing unprecedented growth over the past thirty years, 
with a commensurate increase in average living standards. However, the strategy of 
“Let some people get rich first” has resulted in a huge income gap between urban and 
rural, east and west, coastal and inland China. There are mounting concerns that the 
growing inequality hinders sharing of the fruits of economic development. In 
addition, social unrest that accompanies worsening inequality may slow down 
economic transition and hinder future growth. 
Most poor people still live in rural China. According to the China National 
Bureau of Statistics (NBS), in 2009 the rural population of China was 0.72 billion, 
taking up 54 percent of the total population. The official ratio of urban-rural per 
capita income amounts to 3.33:1. Recent household level data show that within-
village inequality has grown from 0.22 in 1978 to 0.44 in 2009 (or even above 0.50 in 
some studies). Inequality seriously questions whether the impressive achievements in 
poverty reduction can equally benefit the general public in rural China. With unequal 
access to education, health care, the rural financial system, and non-farm work 
opportunities in rural China, retaining our focus on rural inequality and farmers’ well-
being are crucial in maintaining economic growth and social stability in 
contemporary China. 
2 
 
Rural and urban household surveys for China are largely independent. In this 
chapter, inequality and income distribution in rural China will be addressed. Two 
other sources of rising inequality in China, namely inequality between urban and rural 
areas and inequality within urban areas are not touched upon in this review. 
Nevertheless, it is worth emphasizing the importance of rural inequality in 
influencing the other two sources of rising inequality in China. For instance, it is 
found that much of the increase in the rural-urban gap appears to be the result of a 
growing difference in incomes between rural households in the coastal and interior 
provinces. Meanwhile, in standard datasets such as the Urban Household Survey 
(UHS) sponsored by the NBS, faster growing suburban areas are getting reclassified 
as urban areas and included in the urban inequality index. Massive migration from 
rural to urban areas caused by rural inequality might also influence urban inequality 
and the rural-urban gap. 
Studies on rural inequality were initiated in the early 1990s when distributional 
snapshots with cross-sectional data became available. Extensive literature has been 
accumulated on the evolution of inequality in rural China since the onset of reforms 
in the late 1970s. The primary attention has been given to estimating the level of 
inequality and its changes over time, identifying the underlying sources of the 
inequality and its changes, and exploring aggregate (disaggregate) level effects of 
inequality. Since the late 1990s and the early 2000s, a second wave of inequality 
studies has begun to dominate the discussion as more and more panel datasets in 
China have become available. To our knowledge, this chapter is the first 
comprehensive review of studies on income distribution and well-being that use 
available longitudinal datasets from rural China. 
Given the early focus of inequality studies using aggregate data and the fact that 
later available household survey datasets are not of a census type, research has largely 
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been silent in exploring the mechanisms of inequality and evaluating its real welfare 
impacts. However, people do not live on an isolated island. Though important in 
grasping an overall picture of the inequality situation in China, the urban-rural, east-
west, and coastal-inland framework does not address the community level 
interactions between the rich and the poor and the resulting feeling of inequality and 
deprivation. It is especially the case when a rural community populated with the 
absolute poor is severely closed, both geographically and culturally. The rise of 
within-area inequality might increase the absolute poor residents' level of anxiety and 
hatred, as their happiness is largely anchored in comparisons to other members of 
their community. In addition, it has been well documented that both the poor and the 
rich may have been underrepresented in the official surveys. Fortunately, a newly 
initiated census-type household survey project might enable us to fundamentally 
change this situation. 
The chapter is organized as follows. In part two, we begin by summarizing 
available panel datasets for rural China that can help explore issues on inequality and 
income distribution. In part three, comparisons among panel datasets are conducted. 
Major data issues that might act as obstacles to research and policy enforcement are 
then analyzed. Part four reviews the trend and spatial decompositions of rural income 
inequality, its major determinants, and its relationship with household welfare. 
Dimensions other than income inequality, such as income mobility and income 
polarization, are categorized and reviewed respectively. A newly established branch 
of discussions on inequality and health is summarized, which sheds light on our 
proposal for datasets of special features. On the basis of the review, Part five proposes 
new research areas with previous panel datasets and a new area with a new panel 
dataset. Part six is the conclusion. 
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1.2 Panel Data Sources for China 
In China, five major household level panel datasets are used to explore rural 
inequality and distribution, which include RCRE (Research Center for Rural 
Economy), RHS (Rural Household Survey), CHNS (China Health and Nutrition 
Survey), CHIPS (Chinese Household Income Project Survey), and CAPM (Chinese 
Academy of Preventative Medicine). These panel data sets include both balanced and 
unbalanced panels, and the majority of them are unbalanced because of sample 
rotation or attrition. 
To compare levels of inequality from a country as vast as China, it is crucial that 
the samples be representative of the same population, and, ideally, of all China. In 
principle, RHS and RCRE are the best datasets to meet this requirement, and both 
surveys are effectively implemented by sectors in the central government, which are 
the NBS and the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) respectively. The RHS is an annual 
China rural household survey dating from the early 1980s. It is of high quality in 
many respects, including both sampling methods and the unusual effort made to 
minimize non-sampling errors. It covers 31 provinces, 7,100 villages, and 68,190 
households. However, in-depth analysis of the RHS has been limited to selected sub-
samples of provinces, and only for a few years (such as Ravallion and Chen, 1999; 
Tsui, 1998b). The full sample RHS data has not yet been publicly released and 
systematically analyzed. Similarly, the RCRE is an annual China rural household 
survey from the mid-1980s. It is also nationally representative, covering 31 provinces, 
360 villages, and 24,000 households. Likewise, all households covered by the RCRE 
are asked to keep detailed diary records of household information. 
Different from the RHS and RCRE, the CHNS, CHIPS, and CAPM are 
organized by research institutions with relatively limited geographic coverage and/or 
smaller samples. The CHNS is an ongoing international collaborative project between 
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the University of North Carolina (UNC) and the Chinese Center for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CCDCP). It is designed to examine the effects of the health, 
nutrition, and family planning policies, and programs implemented by national and 
local governments, and to see how the social and economic transformation of Chinese 
society is affecting the health and nutritional status of its population. It covers a 
seven-year household panel dataset in nine provinces, 100 villages, and 2000 
households. Daily dietary intake is carefully measured in the dataset. The CHIPS 
covers around 20 provinces and 4,000-9,000 households, which is mainly sponsored 
by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). Three surveys have been 
conducted in 1988, 1995, and 2002, which include detailed current and retrospective 
information on households’ income and consumption and their components. The 
CAPM is a 2-year social survey of 25 provinces, 138 villages, and around 8,000 
households in rural China between 1978 and 1989. The first survey focuses on the 
relationship between nutrition and cancer; the second wave also involves multilevel 
socioeconomic questionnaires. 
Besides the above-mentioned data, some datasets are collected for special 
research purposes. For example, MORDUCH, used in a study by Morduch and 
Sicular (2002), is a small random sample survey of 259 farm households in 16 
villages in an eastern China county. The survey follows households from 1990 to 
1993. The survey was tailored to deliver consistent information on income and other 
economic, social, and political variables. Another census-type household panel 
survey, the IFPRI-CAAS, is collected by the International Food Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI) and the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences (CAAS). The 
dataset focuses on three administrative villages in a western China county. The 
survey reveals detailed information on household incomes and expenditures 
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(including detailed information on social spending). Information is collected for each 
household member. 
Given the limited availability of household panel data, macro level panel 
datasets are a popular tool. For instance, the RSESS-NBS (Rural Social and 
Economic Survey Service of the NBS) includes time series (1985–2002) and cross 
provincial (28 provinces) data from rural China. The RSESS-NBS can be found in 
books such as Poverty Monitoring Report of Rural China and China yearbook of 
rural household survey. Compiled aggregate level data can be found on the websites 
of some research institutions. For example, researchers in IFPRI compiled a dataset 
mainly from China Statistical Yearbook, China Rural Statistical Yearbook, China 
Fixed Asset Investment Yearbook, China Education Expenditure Statistical Yearbook, 
relevant World Bank publications, and China Transportation Yearbook. The dataset 
provides information on key economic indicators in 29 provinces from 1952 to 2001. 
Another convenient way to obtain a long-term aggregate panel data is through two 
statistical yearbooks, the Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years 
of China and Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials on 55 Years of China. 
Some long-term indicators in those two yearbooks have been adjusted to make them 
the most comparable over time. 
 
1.3 Panel Data Assessment 
1.3.1 Comparisons among Major Datasets 
Before the 1990s, more aggregate level panel datasets were available than 
household level panel data. The overall household inequality was understated, since 
inequality within rural and urban areas of each province was suppressed. 
Analogously, when we analyze trends and the role of contributing factors to 
inequality such as township and village enterprises, conclusions are valid only insofar 
7 
 
as most rural inequality arises from differences in mean incomes across these units. 
Moreover, they could not say anything about the evolution of household level 
inequality within those areas. 
Since then, a few household level data sets have come on stream. Compared to 
aggregate datasets, household panel data can construct a rich, comparable panel of 
villages that might be used to address a host of econometric and empirical issues that 
trouble researchers (Benjamin et al., 2005a). Moreover, with access to household 
level data over time, by exploiting the household dimension of the panel, we can link 
the evolution of household level welfare to initial conditions in the village. 
The first concern is on geographic representation. Among all panel datasets, the 
RHS-NBS covers the broadest areas over the longest time period. In investigating the 
role of geographic factors for inequality, most of the panel datasets in Table 1.1 are 
able to track a panel of villages, even where there has been household attrition. This 
guarantees geographic comparability over the complete time period. However, 
discrepancies still exist between datasets, for example, in the rate of growth of farm 
income between the RCRE and the CHNS. It might reflect the kinds of villages that 
are selected, with more “suburban” villages possibly included in the CHNS. The 
CHNS villages may have more acreage in vegetables and other cash crops, and have 
been less exposed to a sharp drop in grain prices that occurred after 1995. 
The second concern lies in the availability of historical household data. Ideally, 
to analyze the evolution of inequality in contemporary China we should have a 
nationally representative household survey over the entire period. Among all sets of 
panel data employed to analyze rural inequality and income distribution in China, the 
RHS-NBS can be ideally representative. Unfortunately, while such household surveys 
have been conducted throughout the second half of the last century, they are available 
to researchers only for the post reform period and in any case sporadically, for 
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restricted years with varying but limited coverage. Only aggregate data is published 
and available for public use,1 and details of the construction of the RHS-NBS income 
estimates and Gini coefficient is sketchy. As a result, inequality measures based on 
the full sample are not comparable with results derived from its sub-sample and other 
data sources. Besides, the publicly available aggregate RHS-NBS data does not 
include information on housing, subsidies, and income in kind.2 In this sense, the 
major utilized household level datasets such as the RCRE, CHNS, and CHIPS are 
good complements that provide the aforementioned information. 
Thirdly, each micro dataset has its own special focus. For example, the RCRE 
data has been collected from many fixed villages annually. The RHS-NBS data has an 
even longer time period and is nationally representative. The CHNS data is 
specialized to conduct nutrition and health research. The CHIPS data has more 
detailed information on household income. The CAMP data has gathered detailed 
information for nutrition, health, and medicare research. 
Deficiencies of major data sets still exist. First, almost no panel datasets 
available (including the RHS-NBS and RCRE) contain detailed enough information 
at the individual level. However, since the 1990s, driven to some extent by growing 
policy concerns, considerable work on intra-household allocation has begun around 
the world. To catch up, we need to improve the quality of our panel data at the 
individual level and correct policy instruments that may have a gender differentiated 
impact. Second, refusal rates are likely to be higher among households with a high 
opportunity cost of time or many illiterates, but neither the RCRE nor the NBS report 
refusal rates. Further, by design the RHS-NBS, RCRE, and CHNS are not successful 
                                                 
1 The main aggregate results can be found in: Statistical Year Book of China, Rural Statistical Year 
Book of China, Yearbook of Household Survey, annual/quarterly statistical analysis report, and 
relevant research papers. 
2 The RHS-NBS began to value in-kind components of income at approximate market prices since 
1990. 
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in accurately estimating household incomes from family-run business.3 A richer set of 
questions should be included in the surveys to track this important source of income. 
Underestimation of this income source might induce a significant underestimate of 
income inequality due to non-agricultural income growth, especially at the top end of 
the distribution (Benjamin et al., 2005a).4 Finally, while the CHNS contains more 
details that can facilitate the exploration of the robustness of conclusions to 
definitions of “income”, it does not have detailed expenditure data. 
The fourth point relates to treatment of income. Income in the RCRE and RHS-
NBS data are both defined as income earned from all enumerated sources, including 
both cash and imputed values for in-kind income from various sources.5 Much of the 
difference between levels and trends of income among datasets can be explained by 
differences in the valuation of home-produced grain. For instance, relative to the 
RCRE, the NBS treatment of the in-kind component is likely to result in an 
underestimate of incomes and consumption prior to 1990, and an overestimate of the 
growth in incomes or consumption for 1987 to 1999 period. Given that grain income 
was valued at a price still systematically related to the quota price after 1990, 
Benjamin et al. (2005a) find a strong positive correlation between the size of the gap 
between the two income series and their estimate of the ratio of the market-to-quota 
                                                 
3 Both the RCRE and CHNS surveys simply ask respondents for total revenue and expenditure from 
family businesses, while the distinction between fixed and variable costs is often lost in the 
enumeration process. In general, this is among the most difficult sources of income to enumerate 
accurately. Considerable efforts were placed in the CCAP 2000 survey by careful enumeration of 
balance sheets of family businesses. However, the CCAP 2000 is only a cross-sectional dataset. 
4  Another interpretation for the underestimation of income inequality is that the much higher 
valuation of in-kind income in the RCRE data for the years 1993-1995 helped dampen the effect of 
dis-equalizing growth in wage and business incomes. The effect is temporary. However, once farm 
prices begin to fall, we see the sharp increase in inequality associated with falling farm incomes in 
the RCRE data. 
5 For instance, income from farm-household production, forestry, animal husbandry, handicrafts, gifts 
as well as labor earnings and income received as a gift are included. Borrowings from (or loans to) 
informal and/or formal sources are excluded. 
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price.6 Two other differences in the income series lie in the treatment of taxes and 
fees and depreciation on fixed assets. Studies using the NBS usually subtract both, 
while typical studies applying the RCRE (e.g. Benjamin et al., 2005a) do not subtract 
taxes due to their focus on the earning ability of households. However, they 
depreciate assets themselves due to the arbitrariness of recorded depreciation 
expenses in the RCRE. 
Furthermore, there has been concern expressed over the ability of respondents to 
recall past income. Records collected from the CHIPS data may rely on respondents’ 
recall. The single-interview approach and respondents’ recalling of past incomes may 
have errors, thus the correlation among incomes across years will embody errors in 
measurement. For instance, individuals may report the same incomes or the same 
proportion of incomes in different years, which will end up with more inertia in the 
income distribution data and understate the true income mobility. By contrast, the 
RHS-NBS data and the RCRE data are less likely to suffer from recall error, since 
each selected household maintains a diary over the entire year as well as two 
transaction books. The survey has been conducted on an annual basis. An assistant 
interviewer living in the county seat is supposed to visit each household every two 
weeks (or every month for the RCRE) to check the books. The unusual rigor applied 
to the collection, checking and processing of the RHS-NBS data and the RCRE data 
means that they are less likely to suffer from a variety of non-sampling errors 
common to household surveys in many other datasets. 
Finally, the definition of household membership is important to note. For 
households in the RHS-NBS and the RCRE, household size is based on registration, 
but it excludes migrants. However, household membership in the CHNS data is 
                                                 
6 Benjamin et al. (2005a) estimate the ratio of the market-to-quota price, which was as high as 1.46 in 
1995, and then fell below 1 by 1997. After 1997, the NBS series has been directly related to the 
market price, and they observe some convergence in the income and consumption series. 
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defined more on the basis of economic attachment (residency) than registration. 
Household heads and family members who send remittances are included. An 
increasingly serious omission over time occurs as the number of people who work 
and live outside grows. To tackle this problem, the CHIPS 2002 included a subsample 
of rural migrants living in urban areas, while most datasets still exclude this 
increasingly important group. 
In China where the market is imperfectly and unevenly developed, studies have 
discussed a variety of data and methodological issues for comparisons of inequality. 
 
1.3.2 Relevant Data Issues 
1.3.2.1 Measurement Errors 
Inequality measures, such as the level of inequality, factor decomposition of 
inequality, and its change over time, are seriously affected when income or 
consumption is measured with error (Ravallion and Chen, 1999). Special attention 
should be paid to whether the underlying income concept includes income items such 
as imputed rents for owner-occupied dwellings, imputed incomes from home 
production, and in-kind income. Besides, allowing for inter-regional cost of living 
differences and evaluating consumption rather than expenditures (e.g. consumer 
durables) is important. When studying rural-urban inequality, attention should be paid 
to the reclassification of rural areas as urban. An adjustment of the NBS urban-rural 
inequality data and strictly follow a panel of rural villages over time is required. 
Valuing Consumption of Own Production 
A significant portion of rural household activity is directed towards production 
for a household’s own consumption, and it tends to account for a high share of 
income for the poor. Its undervaluation due to the downward price bias from the 
market-clearing level leads to an overestimate of inequality. Meanwhile, prices used 
12 
 
by provincial statistics departments diverged progressively from market prices over 
time, which also lead to an overestimate of the rate of increase in inequality. 
The process of imputed price adjustment for the RHS-NBS in the 1980s and 
1990s serves as an example (World Bank, 1992; Khan et al., 1993; Ravallion and 
Chen, 1999).7 Besides, Benjamin et al. (2005a) find that some localities used the 
same weighted average quota and above quota sales’ price calculated in 1990 to value 
in-kind income between 1991 and 1995, which might give an additional source of 
downward bias in income and consumption growth between 1991 and 1995. 
To correct these deficiencies, Chen and Ravallion (1996), Tsui (1998b), 
Ravallion and Chen (1999), and McCulloch and Calandrino (2003) apply sub-
samples of the NBS data and show that all credible estimates of inequality in rural 
China should correct those biases. For instance, to reflect the increased marketization 
of the economy, following Chen and Ravallion (1996),8 Tsui (1998b) and McCulloch 
and Calandrino (2003) revalue the grain kept for personal consumption. However, 
this revaluation can only be implemented for grain due to the lack of relevant 
information for other goods. 
A similar adjustment is conducted in the RCRE data, where grain produced for 
self-consumption or stored was valued at prices reflecting the quota price. Because of 
lower than market quota prices through the mid-1990s, income from grain production 
and consumption out of home production are both likely to be biased downward. 
                                                 
7 From 1991 to 1996 the NBS instructed survey teams to use an “average contract price” to value 
non-marketed grain from own production. This average contract price was the weighted average of 
the quota price and the above quota price for sales over quota to the local grain bureau. Both of these 
prices were administratively determined. Survey teams were further instructed to use weighted 
average market prices only if there were no local administrative prices (meaning no local crop 
procurement). It was not until 1997 that the NBS instructed survey teams to value all non-marketed 
agricultural commodities at market prices. 
8 Chen and Ravallion (1996) find that after revaluation of income in kind from gain production, a 
much larger share of the (albeit smaller) increase in rural inequality was due to grain income than 
past data would have suggested. 
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Benjamin et al. (2005a) revalue households’ non-marketed grain at average village 
market prices. 
Price Differences 
Inflation/deflation is adjusted for time-series data to convert income and 
consumption into constant dollars (Yuan). McCulloch and Calandrino (2003) use the 
CPI index from the China Statistical Yearbook to deflate nominal variables. 
However, the published CPI uses an (unknown) mix of market and official prices, 
rather than market prices, to value certain goods which may underestimate the rate of 
increase of consumer prices and therefore overestimate the improvement in real 
terms. 
Spatial differences may also be important. Prices in some parts of the country 
may be systematically different from those elsewhere, in which case estimates of 
inequality can be biased. However, most of the past literature has ignored spatial 
differences, for example, in the cost of living. Two exceptions include Chen and 
Ravallion (1996) and Tsui (1998b), who construct provincial-level spatial and inter-
temporal spatial deflators for four and two provinces respectively. Recently, research 
interests have been extended to explore the rural-urban gap. However, it should be 
noted that adjusting for inflation over time using separate urban and rural consumer 
price indices does not incorporate the spatial difference at any one point in time. A 
constructed set of spatial price deflators documented by Holz and Brandt (2004) is 
widely used to adjust cross-sectional differences in urban and rural prices across 
provinces, and between rural and urban areas. Overall, adjusting spatial price 
differences might minimize the problem of overestimation of inequality and the 
exaggeration of the contribution of spatial disparity regarding price differences. 
Durable Consumption and Income 
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Housing services and durables are usually relatively equally distributed at the 
beginning, but more unequal with different rates of accumulation of housing and an 
increasing share of consumption as an economy develops. Especially as durables and 
housing reflect consumption decisions linking permanent income, it is important to 
consider how they are treated in the construction of consumption and income. 
The impact of durables and housing on inequality is significant. The NBS data 
on consumption expenditure include one-off expenditure on durables in the year in 
which the purchase decision was made. However, durable goods, by definition, last 
for a number of years. Meanwhile, owing to the infrequent purchases of consumer 
durables, the estimated unit values of durable goods might be based on the records of 
a few households and the prices may not be representative. A similar problem is 
encountered in relation to housing expenditure as it is difficult to include imputed 
rental values. The NBS only include all housing expenditure in the year in which the 
spending takes place, as a result of the limited rental market for housing in rural 
China. 
Scholars have made lots of efforts in calculating and adjusting consumptions of 
durable goods and housing. Khan and Riskin (1998) and Khan et al. (1999) construct 
a revised measure for urban and rural China based on the asset valuations available in 
the primary survey data. Chen and Ravallion (1996) include five percent of the 
recorded dwelling value for housing and 10 percent for durables in total consumption. 
Improving upon Chen and Ravallion (1996), Tsui (1998b) adopts the available NBS 
price data for consumer durables, which consist of average retail price information 
collected by the urban survey teams of the NBS. 
Utilizing the RCRE, Benjamin et al. (2005a) and Brauw and Rozelle (2008) also 
consider inflating the value of the stock of housing and durables to reflect the increase 
in prices of durable goods. McCulloch and Calandrino (2003) approximate the rental 
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value of the stock of durables in each year in rural Sichuan, and they also impute the 
rental value of housing expenditure using information about rents in the local area. 
1.3.2.2 Sample Attrition Bias 
Attrition bias is present in panel data collection for several reasons. First of all, 
in some data sets, such as the RCRE, RHS-NBS, and CHIPS, whole villages drop out 
because they are annexed into a city. In some other cases when panel datasets are 
based on written records collection, sample attrition may reflect the fact that 
maintaining diaries of their households’ incomes and expenditures makes it difficult 
for illiterate households to participate and the opportunity cost of keeping records for 
the rich are high. Some rich residents might leave their villages for an entire year, 
some people might show unwillingness to make efforts, and some people do not want 
to reveal their personal information. To the poor, attrition may also be endogenous to 
shocks (Lokshin and Ravallion, 2001). It is difficult to distinguish such households 
from those that change too much to keep in the panel or those who were replaced by 
the surveyors for certain reasons (Ravallion and Jalan, 2001). However, to the poor 
endogenous attrition may be minimized, since sampled households in the RHS-NBS 
are paid to participate. Khor and Pencavel (2005) find that unmarried, younger and 
older people are less likely to be represented in the CHIPS 1995. Benjamin et al. 
(2005a) and Brauw and Giles (2008) compare cross sections of the RCRE and RHS-
NBS with overlapping years of the CHNS and CCAP 2000 that are not based on diary 
record. 
Comparing with other surveys in which households are known to be randomly 
sampled, a disproportionate number of households at both ends of the income 
distribution are excluded from the NBS, CHNS, and RCRE data, which might lead to 
an underestimate of income inequality (Benjamin et al., 2005a). Sometimes the 
numbering of the replacements is not properly handled, since a considerable amount 
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of replacements are assigned the same ID number of the survey units as those that are 
replaced (Shen and Yao, 2008). To check the accuracy of the original ID and the 
continuity of the RCRE, Hoken et al. (2006) develop data matching methods, 
construct new panel databases and test the sample attrition biases. They demonstrate 
that a large number of spurious continuities of panel survey appear to exist in the 
original ID. To compensate for sample attrition, the 1997 CHNS includes all newly-
formed as well as additional households in original communities to replace 
households lost. Faced with more severe attrition such as a drop out of an entire 
community, a new community in the original province would be added (Chen, 2005). 
1.3.2.3 Units of Measurement 
In evaluating inequality, per capita estimates are usually imputed to all members 
within a given household. Higher levels of aggregate analyses base their units of 
measurement at the village, township, county, or provincial level, which 
underestimate inequality because it ignores the internal inequality arising from 
differences in welfare among households within these administrative units. This 
simplified treatment also forms a poor basis upon which to evaluate the contribution 
of cross-unit inequality to the total. This issue has not been effectively addressed in 
studying inequality in rural China as individual consumption or income data are 
rarely available. 
To deal with the problem of equalizing all family members within each 
household, estimates of household income and consumption expenditure were 
divided by the number of adult equivalents in the households using the World Health 
Organization adult equivalence scale (McCulloch and Calandrino, 2003). This scale is 
derived from detailed studies of the nutritional requirements of males and females of 
different ages in developing countries. Meanwhile, income or consumption should be 
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adjusted by household size, as the relative need of different sized households is 
different. Chen and Ravallion (1996) provide an example of integrated adjustments. 
The unit of measurement also affects the estimated effect of inequality on 
growth. The dependence of growth rate at household level on the initial log of 
indicators such as capital stock can induce spurious effects after aggregation process 
(Ravallion, 1998). Even when the growth rate is linear in the initial capital stock, a 
term for the change in inequality will be found in the residual of the usual aggregate 
growth rate regression. More complex forms of nonlinearity and alternative 
functional forms for the inequality measure relevant to the micro-level externality can 
yield further spurious effects of measured inequality. 
1.3.2.4 Adjustment for Income Volatility 
The impact of income and consumption volatility on inequality has received 
limited attention in the literature. Compared to urban income, volatility of rural 
income is substantially higher in China. At present, poor rural households either have 
no access to capital markets or only have access at prohibitively high borrowing rates, 
which limits their ability to smooth income. Thus, it is vital to adjust for rural income 
volatility when constructing measures of inequality to obtain a more realistic 
inequality estimate and to build a more comparable basis for rural-urban inequality. 
Previous studies on income volatility in rural China (Jalan and Ravallion, 1998; Li et 
al., 2005) do not make direct adjustments to welfare measures. Whalley and Yue 
(2006) use the CHIPS for rural residents to construct measures of certainty equivalent 
income and calculate summary distributional measures for the modified income data. 
 
1.4 Main Findings from Panel Data 
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1.4.1 Rising Income Inequality and Economic Development 
From 1987 to 1999, income distribution improved by most measures during the 
early part of the period, as average incomes rose substantially with only a modest 
increase in inequality. However, the distribution worsened significantly over the late 
1990s and the early 2000s, with rising inequality and falling absolute incomes, 
especially at the bottom end of the income distribution (Benjamin et al., 2005a). This 
situation was attributed to collapsed agricultural income and uneven growth of non-
farm income due to the contribution of non-farm family businesses. Within the non-
farm incomes category, local income was relatively disequalizing, while income from 
outside the village was relatively equalizing (Benjamin et al., 2005b). Almost no 
studies using household data show the recent trajectory of rural income inequality. 
1.4.1.1 Determinants of Income Inequality 
Studies on determinants of income inequality can be categorized into two major 
branches, inequality by income sources and assets and inequality by geography. The 
first category emphasizes declining agricultural income, disequalizing non-farm 
income (especially family businesses), egalitarian land distribution, and physical and 
human capital. Inequality determinants classified by geographic hypotheses are 
briefly summarized and followed by an extensive review of spatial decompositions. 
Besides the above-mentioned two branches, crucial events and development strategies 
in rural China can explain some of the inequality trend, including urban-biased 
development policy, rural industrialization, rural financial development, fiscal 
decentralization, market fragmentation, globalization processes, grassroots 
democracy, and the role of political power and connections. 
Determinants of Rural Inequality by Income Sources and Assets 
In general, changing structure and composition of income generates higher 
inequality (Tsui, 1998a), which recently has been followed by more specific studies 
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on different components of income and their contributions to inequality. It is unclear 
whether equality of farm income due to the current egalitarian land distribution policy 
is necessarily good for overall income inequality, since more inequality of farm 
income might actually reduce overall income inequality (Benjamin et al., 2006). 
However, Chen (2005) verifies the negative role that farm income plays in inequality. 
Within farm income, grain production plays the most important role in rising 
inequality, and non-farm income plays the secondary role, while other farm incomes 
have a decreasing effect on inequality (Ravallion and Chen, 1999; Benjamin et al., 
2005b). Wan and Zhou (2005) conclude that cropping pattern is more crucial than 
labor and human capital inputs based on disequalizing income from non-farm family 
businesses and the failure of non-farm labor markets in constituting rising income 
inequality. 
Decomposing inequality into land category, farm assets and human capital 
shows several things: first, farm assets are inequality-reducing over the period 
because of their diminishing rate of return cross section and over time (Ravallion and 
Chen, 1999); and second, constraints on farm size implicit in the Chinese 
administrative allocation of land together with agricultural goods price change may 
ease its contribution to overall inequality (Wan and Zhou, 2005; Benjamin et al., 
2006). Although land inequality grew from 1987 to 2002, it is still low by developing 
country standards (Benjamin et al., 2005b). However, land area is a poor measure of 
land endowment, given the usual negative correlation between land capacity and farm 
size. Higher return over time to good quality farm land is inequality-increasing 
(Ravallion and Chen, 1999). Thus, spatial decompositions based on cultivated area 
alone exaggerate differences in land across space. Third, education is found to have 
little effect on inequality (Wan and Zhou, 2005) but is gaining importance (Wan, 
2007). The Rising intra-regional and urban-rural differential distribution of education 
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and entrepreneurial attributes leads to more intra-regional and urban-rural inequality 
(Benjamin et al., 2002; Guo, 2007). Improving education and off-farm job market 
simultaneously leads to success in family businesses and labor markets (Benjamin et 
al., 2002). 
Determinants of Rural Inequality by Geography 
When encompassing weather, infrastructure, and other natural resources, 
geography would account for a very significant share of total rural inequality. Using 
provincial level data, Wan (2007) finds that location and location-related factors 
comprise the largest contributor to total regional inequality, although its percentage 
contribution has decreased over time. Utilizing household survey data, Ravallion and 
Chen (1999) find that the differences in income between those living in mountainous 
rural areas and those on the plains have been an important source of rising inequality. 
However, Benjamin et al. (2005a) rule out geography as the most important factor for 
understanding the dispersion of incomes; rather, the prevailing inequality is due to 
inequality between neighbors within a village. 
Determinants of Rural Inequality by Developmental Strategy 
Firstly, urban-biased development policies help us understand the picture behind 
spatial rural inequality. Before the economic reform, the role of the state sector was 
important in the interior. However, since then growth of the non-state sector in the 
interior provinces has been much slower as more resources have gone to support a 
larger population tied to the state sector. It has handicapped the growth and labor 
demand in the rural secondary and tertiary industry. In contrast, much faster growth 
in the non-state sector in coastal provinces has helped provide a wide array of job 
opportunities for both rural and urban areas there. The unbalanced spatial job creation 
and fragmented capital market have significant negative effect on rural inequality 
(Zhang and Tan, 2007). Due to the still fragmented factor markets, fast growing 
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international trade and foreign capital investments have been concentrated in the 
more developed coastal region rather than vast inland areas, leading to further 
aggravating regional rural inequality (Zhang and Zhang, 2009). 
Evidence shows that most of the rising inequality in rural industrialization is 
spatial and has increasingly contributed to regional inequality (Wan, 2007; Chen, 
2005). However, income from rural industry does not contribute to the rise in local 
inequality because wages from rural industry, mostly labor intensive sectors, were 
equalizing. Growing spatial inequality can also be attributed to uneven opportunities 
represented by the uneven development of TVEs and other markets (Guo, 2007).  
How does rural financial development influence income inequality? Theoretical 
predictions on the finance-inequality nexus are inconclusive and mixed, including an 
inverted U-shaped relationship (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990) and a negative 
linear relationship (Banerjee and Newman, 1993), both from provincial panel data 
(Liang, 2006) and household panel data (Wan and Zhou, 2005). 
China’s current fiscal system is largely decentralized compared to her 
centralized governance structure. Due to large differences in initial economic 
structures and revenue bases, the implicit tax rate and fiscal burden to support the 
functioning of local government vary significantly across jurisdictions. The regressive 
nature of the rural taxation system explains why the fiscal decentralization 
exacerbates the rural-urban gap and gaps among rural areas, and it has been 
confirmed by studies using China County Public Finance Statistical Yearbook 
(CCPFSY) (Zhang, 2009) and rural household data (Khan and Riskin, 1998; 
Benjamin et al., 2006). 
Does grassroots democracy help mitigate income inequality in rural China? Shen 
and Yao (2008) utilize village and household level RCRE to find that village 
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elections reduce inequality, and their role is not played through more income 
redistribution, but through more pro-poor public investment. 
Political power and connections captured by party membership, presence of a 
past or present cadre, or the class labels given to families in the late 1940s and early 
1950s are found to facilitate access to uneven opportunities and the resulting rural 
inequality (Morduch and Sicular, 2002). 
1.4.1.2 Rising Inequality and Household Welfare 
Rising income inequality might offset welfare gains in the economic reform. The 
relationship holds controlling for own resources in the household level specification, 
which casts doubt on the effect of an imperfect credit market. At the village level, 
Benjamin et al. (2006) explore growth and its potential linkage to various initial 
conditions. First, low inequality enhances growth in non-farm incomes and tilts the 
village away from agriculture; second, higher inequality is associated with higher 
overall tax rates and more regressive taxes, lower levels of revenue and expenditures, 
insufficient provision of public goods, and poorly developed factor markets. 
Asset and consumption inequality are sometimes employed to complement the 
measure of income inequality. Ravallion (1998) finds a significant harmful effect of 
asset inequality on consumption growth. However, the effect is lost in an aggregate 
growth regression. At the provincial level, rising income inequality is identified to be 
an obstacle to a steady-state level consumption. Wan (2005) finds slow conditional 
convergences for total grain, fine grain, edible oil, poultry, aquatic product, and sugar, 
and divergences for animal fat and red meat. Testing nonlinear dynamics of 
household incomes and expenditures simultaneously over time shows negative effect 
of inequality, especially on mean income (Ravallion and Jalan, 2001). 
Absolute poverty has fallen dramatically in China in the past 30 years’ reform, 
and rural areas account for the bulk of the decline in poverty. However, rising 
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inequality within the rural sector greatly slows poverty reduction (Yao et al., 2004; 
Ravallion and Chen, 2007). Yao et al. (2004) provide a poverty reduction simulation 
under different inequality scenarios and growth rates. It shows that even under the 
most optimistic scenario, China will still have a large number of rural poor until 
2015, but even under the pessimistic assumption of income and inequality growth, 
China can still manage to cut its impoverished population. However, Yao’s combined 
data (the RCRE and CHIPS) are from different households. Employing the RSESS-
NBS Data, Huang et al. (2008) find that changes in the incidence of poverty are not 
only related to overall economic growth, but also depend on the sources and 
distribution of income growth. 
 
1.4.2 Spatial Inequality and Decompositions 
Many key policy issues on inequality and income distribution show themselves 
in a disaggregated fashion, and the individualistic tendency in the inequality 
measurement is reinforced by the use of decomposable inequality measures (Kanbur, 
2000). Spatial inequality and decomposition reflects one of the major concerns. 
Spatial inequality is often defined at regional, provincial, and county level. Some 
papers cover a single level, others two or three. Relevant studies use proxy variables 
such as per capita income, GDP per capita, gross value of industrial and agricultural 
output or one of its components, consumption, collective income, or even grain 
output as indicators of living standard. Most of the studies in this field limit their 
analyses to a snapshot, without a time profile (e.g. Cheng, 1996; Gustafsson and Li, 
1998; Hussain et al., 1994; Knight and Song, 1993; Lee, 2000; Tsui, 1993; Griffin 
and Zhao, 1993; Hu, 1997; Wu, 2000), however, it is rarely seen after 2000. 
Among those applying panel data, most of them use provincial level data to 
decompose spatial inequality. The results include greater consumption equality 
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between 1952 and 1987 (Lyons, 1991), U-shaped inter-provincial income inequality 
between 1978 (or 1985) and 1993 (or 1994) (Duncan and Tian, 1999; Fujita and Hu, 
2001), and increasing inter-regional inequality but decreasing intra-regional 
inequality between 1985 and 1994 (Fujita and Hu, 2001). Concerning the contribution 
of inter-regional inequality to provincial inequality, the results show 14–35 percent 
between 1978 and 1993 (Jian et al., 1996; Kanbur and Zhang, 1999), 38–41 percent 
between 1986 and 1992, and 50-60 percent between the mid-1980s and 1996 (Wan, 
2007). 
Fewer studies employ county or village level panel data. Howes and Hussain 
(1994) and Peng (1999) use county data between 1985 and 1991 to find that inter-
county inequality increased by 37 percent and 20–26 percent respectively. Rozelle 
(1994) employs one-province village panel data between 1983 and 1988 and 
concludes an increase in inequalities among villages, towns, and counties. 
Meanwhile, even fewer studies (Tsui, 1998a; Gustafsson and Li, 2002; 
Gustafsson et al., 2007; Ravallion and Chen, 1999; Chen, 2005; Benjamin et al., 
2005b; Morduch and Sicular, 2002; Wan and Zhou, 2005; Guo, 2007) explore spatial 
inequality in China with household panel data. According to Gustafsson and Li 
(2002), only 4 in 16 papers summarized use household data, let alone household 
panel data. 
Tsui (1998a) finds that inter-provincial inequality only accounts for 6–12 percent 
of total rural inequality between 1985 and 1990. Guo (2007) further finds that the 
major part of inequality has changed from inter- to intra-village level from 1986 to 
2000. Benjamin et al. (2005b) confirm that the province and village respectively only 
explain 10 percent and 30-40 percent of rural inequality. Most inequality in rural 
China is within villages. 
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Overall, only a few studies use household panel data that cover most provinces 
in China over time, and no study summarized above simultaneously uses data at 
county level, provincial level, and regional level. As a special case, Gustafsson and Li 
(2002) provide a comprehensive study between 1988 and 1995. They show that in 
rural China inter-county inequality increased from 43 percent to 47 percent of total 
inequality. Among inter-county inequality, intra-provincial inequality stayed at 18 
percent of total inequality, while inter-provincial inequality changed from 25 percent 
to 29 percent. Among inter-provincial inequality, intra-regional inequality dropped 
from 13 percent to 6 percent of total inequality, while inter-regional inequality 
increased greatly from 12 percent to 23 percent. While income inequality within rural 
counties increased from 1988 to 1995, the uneven income increase across counties 
was also important for the growth of rural inequality. However, in Gustafsson and Li 
(2002) the particular counties are not identical, which poses some problems for 
interpretation. 
Two other points should be noted. First, robustness of decomposition should be 
addressed. Morduch and Sicular (2002) demonstrate how sharply different 
conclusions can emerge for different decomposition rules. Second, it is dangerous to 
use data of limited coverage to project the magnitude and change of income 
inequality in rural China as a whole (Gustafsson and Li, 2002) as income has grown 
at noticeably different rates in different parts of rural China during the economic 
reform. 
 
1.4.3 Income Inequality and Other Dimensions 
1.4.3.1 Income Inequality and Mobility 
If a society is characterized by a great deal of income mobility, income 
inequality derived from the comparison of income in a single year may be misleading 
26 
 
as an indicator of longer run income inequality. Studies on income mobility are 
crucial complements to the measure of income inequality, as more and more rural 
residents are moving from west to east and from inland to coastal regions. Even if 
people stay where they are, institutional transformation may still bring a drastic 
change to their relative positions. 
There are two categories of income mobility: macro mobility answers how much 
income mobility exists in the economy and how has it changed over time;9 micro 
mobility defines which individual or group experiences movements, of what 
magnitudes, and what these movements are correlated with.10 
Very few studies are on the macro mobility in rural China. Wang (2005) and 
Ying et al. (2006) both find that major income mobility indicators (e.g. time 
independence, positional movement and income mobility as equalizers of longer-term 
incomes) fall over time in rural China. However, income mobility helped equalize 
longer-term incomes relative to initial incomes in rural China in the 1990s (Wang, 
2005). Nee (1994) finds that positional movement in rural China was higher in 1983-
1989 than in 1978-1983, which he explains by “institutional change resulted in a 
dramatic shake-up of the rural stratification order.” 
The only study on micro mobility in rural China we are aware of is Zhang et al. 
(2006). Using the RCRE in rural China from 1987 to 2002, Zhang et al. (2006) finds 
the possibility for the poorest 25 percent to climb up to higher income status 
increased. However, the upward mobility of those of the middle-income has gradually 
become stagnant. The richest five percent and 10 percent are the biggest winners 
                                                 
9  Six concepts are quantified to measure macro income mobility: time-independence, positional 
movement, share movement, non-directional income movement, directional income movement, and 
income mobility as an equalizer of longer-term incomes (Fields, 2007). 
10 Two types of micro mobility studies have been conducted. Unconditional micro mobility examines 
individual correlates of income change as one of the correlates is controlled at a time. Conditional 
micro mobility gauges the effect of one correlate controlling for the role of others. 
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during the process. Zhang et al. (2006) also breakdown the change of income 
inequality between the wealthy and the poor into two parts: the income change of 
those remaining in the wealthy group and the poor group persistently, and the change 
due to the shift of income status of those who move upward to the wealthy group or 
downward to the poor group, the latter of which was accompanied by an increasing 
contribution of income mobility to inequality. To identify factors which may 
influence the probability of moving upward, downward, or holding position, they find 
that the household dependent population ratio, human capital endowment, land rental 
market participation, and party membership have significant effects on income 
mobility in rural China. 
1.4.3.2 Inequality and Polarization 
While inequality measures are conceived to assess the expected divergence or 
disparity among incomes, polarization measures are sensitive to the level of 
identification of individuals by their income levels. Intuitively, a higher level of 
between-group inequality is related to the polarization phenomenon. This gives 
additional information that inequality measures fail to capture. 
Concern over growing polarization has been prominent in policy discussions 
since the economic reform, when the rural-urban gap has been an important 
dimension in polarized China (Li, 1996). Utilizing rural and urban components from 
1983 to 1995, Zhang and Kanbur (2001) test three typical polarization indices against 
two standard measures of inequality, which do not show distinct results. An 
alternative polarization index is also developed to offer more insight. It is found that 
rural-urban polarization is more serious in levels but modestly decreasing compared 
with a dramaticly increasing inland-coast polarization trend. Wan (2007) finds that 
the fast increase in regional inequality is accompanied by worsening polarization. 
28 
 
Araar (2008) breaks down the polarization index by population groups and 
income sources over the period 1986-2002. For policy purposes, those 
decompositions can help target the apparent poor groups of population and propose 
corrections on existing distributive policies. Araar’s results show that even if 
inequality has increased sharply during the last two decades, the pure polarization 
component has remained constant or even decreased on average. 
 
1.4.4 Income Inequality and Health 
Public health studies find a relationship between income inequality and adult 
health outcomes in developed countries. Specifically, there seems to be a correlation 
between social hierarchy and mortality as well as a correlation between social 
hierarchy and morbidity. Existing evidence from China shows similar results. 
Ling (2008) examines the role of relative income and income inequality on 
anthropometric health outcomes as well as health related behaviors. Reverse 
causation is dealt with by exogenously introducing statutory retirement age and 
employing retired samples. The elderly are rapidly aging and most vulnerable to the 
economic reform. Normally, the elderly in China have mainly relied on 
intergenerational transfers within families. Besides income shocks due to economic 
restructuring, the health outcome and status competition of the working people may 
reallocate resources from elderly dependents in households. In addition, the relative 
incomes of the elderly may be crucial in determining their health. The confluence of 
these trends and the Elderly Dependency Ratio (EDR) is found to affect their health 
outcomes such as high waist circumference, overweight or obese, and underweight. 
Meanwhile, it leads to unhealthy behavior, such as smoking cigarettes or pipes in the 
past, possibly to cope with stress. 
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Ling (2007) also conducts a separate study on the relationship between relative 
deprivation and anthropometric health outcomes for infants and children and still 
finds strong and consistent evidence of the effects of relative deprivation on health. 
Both Ling (2007) and Ling (2008) predict that relative deprivation and unequal 
growth affect the “social gradient of health” in China by potentially increasing the 
prevalence of obesity among the rich, while concurrently being unable to reduce the 
prevalence of underweight among the poor. 
Li and Zhu (2006) find an “inverted-U” relationship between Self-Reported 
Health Status (SRHS)11 and community level income inequality. They also confirm 
that high inequality increases the probability of health-compromising behaviors such 
as smoking and alcohol consumption. Meanwhile, Li and Zhu (2006) find that 
relative status has a strong positive effect on self-reported health status, but its 
protective effect decreases with inequality and is finally offset by extremely high 
inequality. 
Summarizing health outcome indicators utilized, Ling (2007, 2008) attempts to 
circumvent biases and errors in the SRHS in Li and Zhu (2006) by anthropometric 
measures including self-reported dietary intake and other objective indicators. Errors 
in self-reported responses lead to imprecise measures. Li and Zhou (2006) adopt 
objective health measures such as Physical Functions (PF) and Activities of Daily 
Living (ADL). Their PF measures include indicators such as heart, lungs, and 
stomach conditions, and blood pressure. The ADL, only available for individuals over 
fifty, measures whether the individual is physically restricted or unable to perform 
daily activities, such as taking a bath, eating and drinking alone, or putting on clothes. 
To capture health behavior, Ling (2008) uses self-reported measures of past and 
                                                 
11 The SRHS is a subjective measure of individual health, which suffers from measurement errors. 
However, studies show that the SRHS is highly correlated with subsequent mortality, even when 
more objective health measures are controlled (Deaton and Paxson, 1998). 
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current smoking behavior, while Li and Zhou (2008) use current drinker and drinking 
frequency as well as past and current smoking behavior. 
 
1.5 Areas for Further Research 
The research on inequality and well-being starts the early 21st century in a 
vibrant state, with the new conditions raising new questions, and old questions anew. 
We will put forward important areas with existing panel data that are underdeveloped. 
A new data set is highlighted followed by a promising direction for future research. 
 
1.5.1 New Research Areas with Existing Panel Data Sets 
1.5.1.1 Factors Influencing Rural Inequality 
Is geography one of the most important factors for rural inequality? Existing 
provincial level panel studies find this to be true, especially when weather, 
infrastructure, and other natural resources are encompassed. However, studies 
utilizing household survey data rule out geography as the most important factor and 
conclude that the prevailing inequality is within village. If within-village inequality is 
crucial, we should turn our attention to determinants of within-village inequality, such 
as village-level institutions, village produce and labor market development, rural 
industrialization, informal mutual insurance, and distribution of household 
endowments. One important avenue for future research is to assess causal linkages 
between village growth and inequality considering a comprehensive set of factors. 
How does financial development influence income inequality? Theoretical 
predictions on the finance-inequality nexus are inconclusive. Empirical evidence with 
provincial panel data shows a negative role. However, if we believe that the financial 
market is not neutral to every rural resident, as poor residents own low amounts and 
types of collateral, the relationship between rural finance and inequality might be 
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nonlinear. Meanwhile, there has been no household level empirical test in rural 
China, the relationship is still undecided and awaits further exploration. 
Education distribution is likely to improve at a slower pace than market 
institutions and opportunities, which might disproportionately benefit the better 
educated. Is education unequally distributed among generations (cohorts), or is there 
considerable inequality of education within age groups? The answers to these 
questions have crucial implications for how education and income distribution 
evolve. 
1.5.1.2 Rural Inequality Decomposition 
Most studies do not net out spatial dimensions of income composition other than 
confirming the significant contribution of non-farm income to inequality. For 
example, wage income from local and non-local sources are usually lumped together, 
while total wage income is sometimes combined with income from family-run 
businesses. Grouping imperfectly correlated incomes together conceals important 
aspects of emerging inequality and their links to household attributes and the external 
economic environment with which these households interact. 
1.5.1.3 Effects of Inequality on Growth 
In studying the link between inequality and growth, household level estimation 
has been conducted and a set of instruments have been used to address measurement 
error. Explanations ruled out include imperfect credit market, artificial relationship 
due to the means to aggregate data, and measurement error . Although we observe a 
negative impact of higher village inequality on household economic growth, we 
cannot rule out the existence of an unobserved third factor correlated with both initial 
inequality and subsequent growth. Further, we do not know whether the link between 
inequality and growth is in the short run or long run. 
1.5.1.4 Income Inequality and Mobility 
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Is more mobility always better than less mobility, no matter to what extent? As 
we know, rural China is now experiencing a rapid transformation with incomplete 
social security. Too much mobility may reduce welfare through making rural 
residents feel more at risk given their insufficient ability to smooth income and 
consumption. 
To better understand macro income mobility in rural China, future studies might 
be directed to answering two questions: how much income mobility is there with 
different mobility measures, and how does macro mobility change over time for each 
of these measures? In parallel, to improve our knowledge of micro income mobility, 
further discussions are on two aspects. First, how do changes in income differ from 
changes in log-income and position concerning unconditional micro mobility? How 
has income mobility profile changed over time in the course of China’s rapid 
economic growth? Second, what are the conditional determinants of income change 
and how do these determinants change over time? 
1.5.1.5 Inequality and Health 
Studies have identified the impacts of income inequality on health outcomes and 
health related behaviors among older adults in rural China. Although reverse 
causation is dealt with by exogenously introducing statutory retirement age in urban 
China and employing sampled population above the statutory retirement age,  
scholars are still concerned about reverse causation in urban China, and that 
unhealthy behavior may cause subsequently lower socio-economic status. 
 
1.5.2 New Research Areas with New Panel Data Set 
Can popular community level inequality indices capture the large picture of rural 
inequality? A second thought on how to bridge the gap between inequality and the 
inequality spectrum will reveal an untouched area with far reaching implications. 
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1.5.2.1 Neoclassical Utility and Relative Concern 
A longstanding assumption in economics is that an agent’s utility depends solely 
on the absolute level of well-being.12 However, Smith implicitly put forward the idea 
in The Wealth of Nations in 1776 that people should be endowed with the ability 
to appear in public without shame. Since Veblen’s seminal work in 1899, a few 
people started to argue that utility or happiness depends in part on the comparison of 
one’s own consumption to that of others, and it was first formally modeled by 
Duesenberry (1949) in his relative income hypothesis. Since the 1970’s, compelling 
evidence on relative concern has been accumulated (Easterlin, 1974; Sen, 1983; 
Frank, 1985; Van de Stadt et al., 1985). 
Most people have a highly localized reference group with which they compare 
themselves, and people tend to make comparisons with others similar to themselves 
but above them (Runciman, 1966; Frank and Levine, 2008). Among others, the 
comparisons are more saliently based on relative consumption as well as relative 
income. 
Evidence from designer-label goods consumption in Bolivia (Kempen, 2003), 
festivals’ budgets in India (Banerjee and Duflo, 2007), “splendid” funerals in Ghana 
(The Economist, 2007), relative deprivation and migration in Mexico (Stark and 
Taylor, 1991), bride-prices and dowries in south Asia and Africa (Rao, 1993; Dekker 
and Hoogeveen 2002), marriage payments in Bangladesh (Anderson, 2007), and 
community level consumption in Nepal (Fafchamps and Shilpi, 2008) show strong 
support for relative concern over consumption. 
Relative income in the reference group also matters. Relative income is of 
greater importance in determining an individual’s access to local resources are scarce 
in a backward community. Moreover, unequal income distribution in a society may 
                                                 
12 The permanent income hypothesis and the life cycle hypothesis are two typical examples. 
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lead to instability in social capital,13 poor health outcomes as well as health-
compromising behaviors through rising mistrust and stress or declining social 
cohesion (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Wilkinson 1997; Li and Zhu, 2006; Ling, 2009). 
Deaton (2001) even argues that relative deprivation defined in terms of the relative 
weight of all incomes of people within the reference group who are better off can be 
positively linked to mortality. Relative deprivation over the income dimension much 
better predicts the US states mortality rates than either the income or Gini 
coefficient.14 The ordinary inequality measures do not explicitly distinguish 
idiosyncratic deprivation each agent perceives and inequality in a society, leaving out 
rich implications drawn from the agent level (Chen et. al., 2010). 
While Heffetz (2007) argues that relative concern over conspicuous spending is 
only relevant for the richest half of the U.S. population, the evidence above has 
clearly shown that it also matters in developing countries. Fafchamps and Shilpi 
(2008) further notice that isolation from market, typical for developing countries, is 
associated with a significant increase in relative concern. However, the empirical 
studies of an impoverished context, particularly in developing countries, are 
inadequate. 
1.5.2.2 Relative Concern in Rural China and the Proposed Research Data 
Rural western China is an ideal region to observe relative concern, because the 
dense population guarantees close social contacts among local residents and 
facilitates a sound definition of reference group. Vast mountainous landscapes and 
thousands of years of rural culture lead to isolation from the market. Meanwhile, 
status seeking and face-saving have been centerpieces throughout Chinese history. 
                                                 
13 Kawachi et al (1997) summarize plausible mechanisms linking income inequality and outcomes, 
which include erosion of social capital and stressful social comparisons. 
14 However, the analysis is based on the state level and needs to be improved. 
35 
 
Recently, drastic socioeconomic transformation from a rural society to an 
industrialized one has spurred a great divergence in social classes, high-income 
mobility, and competitions for status. It becomes difficult to define clearly Chinese 
farmers’ social reference groups, since they are now more and more divided by their 
diversified occupations as well as income sources, social networks, and entitlements. 
The escalation in conspicuous consumption is particularly reflected in housing, 
gift exchange, and household ceremonies, but there are no salient increases in 
productive investment that would secure durable increases in welfare (Brauw and 
Rozelle, 2008; Brauw and Giles, 2008). Incomes allocated to gift giving, dowry, bride 
price, and funerals are thought of as vehicles for social prestige that might challenge 
social status (Yan, 1996; Liu, 2000). Such spending also facilitates social networks, 
which may be relied upon for mutual assistance, personal financing, or other forms of 
help. 
On the other hand, the welfare consequences of “positional externalities” 
associated with status seeking are severe for Chinese households living close to 
subsistence. The highly ritualized practices of gift giving compel villagers to offer 
gifts to avoid isolation from local networks. Since farm income is limited and grows 
slowly and nonfarm income is highly unequal and favorable to the rich, for poor 
residents large portions of income facilitating gift exchange cannot be compensated 
with limited labor resources. For example, field records show oral evidence that 
inflows of remittances to some households set in motion status contests with adverse 
consequences to others through their engagement in blood sales over the long term 
(Brown et al., 2010). Worse still, more severe isolation from outside, combined with 
more unequal market access, usually lead to more pervasive status seeking activities. 
Studies on the effect of relative deprivation need detailed information on 
household social spending in major events and other interested behaviors that 
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previous data sets do not have. More importantly, social network information that 
helps identify reference groups is missing in the literature. In addition, most of the 
data sets do not have accurate factor market information, such as wage rate, interest 
rate, bride price, and land rental rate. 
Further, household panel data is needed to capture dynamic behaviors of status 
competitors. Panel data might also alleviate the simultaneity issue and omitted 
variable bias that may arise in a cross-section. Considering the panel data sets 
available, only a small portion of households in each village are interviewed. Among 
the interviewed, households in the tails of income distribution are tended to be 
overlooked. Although such datasets are helpful for measuring overall rural inequality, 
they are less useful for discerning inequality in a village. More importantly, despite 
its high costs and the resulting limited coverage, conducting a census-type panel 
survey provides a feasible way through which we acquire a complete picture of 
relative deprivation without relying on sampling. An ideal dataset further requires 
relative isolation from the outside market. 
Therefore, an extensive in-depth panel dataset for only a few communities 
complements and improves upon the previous panel data. The IFPRI-CAAS is an 
example that satisfies the aforementioned major requirements: (1) three waves of 
census-type panel survey; (2) detailed information on social network, social status, 
and social behavior; (3) a geographically isolated region; (4) a large share of ethnic 
minorities that diversify social norms under study. These data features help us go 
beyond the immediate explanations of many important behaviors that are labeled with 
poverty, as poverty cannot really answer why not all poor people engage in these 
behaviors. Facilitating identification of social interactions, these features aid in 
understanding the heterogeneous patterns in behaviors that might improve policy 
targeting. 
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Applying the first two waves of the IFPRI-CAAS, Chen and Zhang (2009) 
explore the causality between social norm, status seeking, and blood donation 
behavior. First, they find preliminary evidence that social status seeking, intensified 
through positional spending and relative deprivation, drives more blood donation. 
Relative deprivation complements the measure of income inequality. Second, social 
norms matter through social pressure and imitation in networks. Further, contrary to 
the well-received idea, shocks do not consistently induce blood donation, suggesting 
the link between blood income and other needs that deserves further research. 
Following the first two waves (2005 and 2007) of the IFPRI-CAAS, we 
conducted the 2010 wave in which extensive data collection on long-term gift 
exchange and social network was also implemented. Employing two identification 
strategies, i.e. instrumental variable and network-based identification, to control for 
the effect of social interactions on stigma behavior, Chen et al. (2010) estimate the 
impact of concern for relative income using all three waves of the IFPRI-CAAS. 
Apart from the income effect, Chen et al. (2010) find that social influences and 
relative concern are two key determining factors. First, the poor are faced with more 
pressure to raise social status, thereby donating blood. The pressure to donate blood is 
especially salient for households with more unmarried sons, suggesting tightening 
tension in the unbalanced marriage market. Second, the disutility associated with 
blood donation drops as more people in a reference group participate. A person’s 
preference on stigmatized behavior is largely shaped by the behavior of peers. 
 
1.6 Conclusions 
China’s rapid economic growth over the last thirty years has equipped her with 
the world’s second largest economy. China has also witnessed a huge increase in 
average living standards. However, resource distribution is getting more and more 
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unequal between urban and rural, east and west, coastal and inland China. There are 
mounting concerns that the growing inequality might hinder sharing of the fruits of 
economic development, and the resulting social unrest may slow down economic 
transition. 
However, it is firstly a miracle in human history that China has succeeded in 
sustaining fast growth and declining poverty for the last three decades. Meanwhile, it 
is also a miracle that China could successfully manage a stable society and smooth 
development when the Gini coefficient has already hit the widely accepted critical 
point in the early period. The study of income distribution and well-being in this fast 
transforming society is vital to understand this success, which might pave the way for 
improved policy-making and more harmonious growth, and substantially contribute 
to economics. 
According to China’s official statistics, the rural population of China still 
accounts for more than half of the total population. With unequal access to education, 
health care, the rural financial system, and non-farm opportunities, combined with 
low returns to agriculture, focusing on rural inequality and social class divergence are 
of utmost importance in maintaining economic growth and social stability in 
contemporary China. 
Most previous studies of rural inequality and well-being in rural China use 
cross-sectional data, focusing on their levels, trends, and sources of inequality. The 
primary analyses have been built on macro data up until late 1990s. The last decade 
has witnessed a second wave of inequality studies dominated by micro panel datasets.  
This chapter serves as one of the first comprehensive reviews of studies on those 
critical issues that use available longitudinal datasets from rural China. Most 
importantly, the fast but unequal economic growth suggests that relative concern 
based on resource distribution matters greatly to well-being for people of different 
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backgrounds, albeit largely neglected in the current policy discourse and academia. 
Highlighting it as an urgent direction to be explored, our unique dataset and research 
project may initiate the third wave of upgraded studies on distribution and well-being. 
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Table 1.1 Major Panel Datasets for Income Distribution Studies in Rural China 
Data Source Category household Village Province Sample Period Main Characteristics Literature 
Micro Level Panel Data 
RCRE Planned 
panels 
 
24,000 360 31 1986-present 
(except 1992, 
1994) 
diary book + visiting; nationally 
representative; 1/3 sample attrition over 
the period 1986-1999; collected on an 
annual basis; from fixed rural survey 
sites 
Benjamin et al. 
(2005a, 2006); Wan 
and Zhou (2005); 
Araar (2008); Brauw 
et al. (2008); Zhang et 
al. (2006) 
RHS-NBS Planned 
panels 
 
68,190 7,100 31 1981-present 
(annually) 
sample rotation on a 5-year basis; 
diary book + visiting; detailed 
household income and consumption; 
nationally representative; micro data 
publicly unavailable; collected on an 
annual basis; the only data source 
covering a reasonably long time period 
Ravallion (1998) 
Chen and Ravallion 
(1996) 
CHNS Planned 
panels 
1920 / 
2160 
96/108 9 1989, 1991, 
1993, 1997, 
2000, 2004, 
2006 
a 3-day observations in each survey on 
detailed nutrition and health 
information; poor income and 
expenditure information; rural and urban 
samples; county names not revealed 
Benjamin et al. (2002, 
2005b); Ling (2008); 
Li et al. (2006); Wang 
(2005) 
CHIPS Retrospective 
panels 
4178 / 
7888 / 
9200 
- 18/22 1988, 1995, 
2002 
no linkage at household (but village) 
level among waves; recall data for 
income in years between nearest waves; 
detailed information on household 
income components; include a 
subsample of rural migrants; combine 
rural and urban samples 
Khan and Riskin 
(1998); Yao et al. 
(2004); Chen (2005); 
Khor and Pencavel 
(2006); Ying et al. 
(2006); Brauw and 
Rozelle (2008); Brauw 
and Giles (2008) 
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CAPM planned 
panels 
7,950 130 / 
138 
25 1983, 1989 detailed information on nutrition, health, 
and medical research 
Nee (1994) 
MORDUCH Planned 
panels 
259 16 1 1990-1993 Special attention to consistent 
definitions of income 
Morduch and Sicular 
(2002)  
IFPRI-CAAS Planned 
panels 
805 / 834 / 
872 
3 1 2004, 2006, 
2009 
census-type household survey; detailed 
information on social spending, 
stigmatized behavior and health 
outcomes; 3-day observation on food 
and nutrition intake; 10-year 
spontaneous gift-exchange records for 
all households in three natural villages; 
geographically isolated; multi-ethnic 
populated 
Brown et al. (2010); 
Chen et al. (2010) 
Macro Level Panel Data 
RSESS-NBS Macro Panels - - 28 1985–2002 provincial level panel data Huang et al. (2008) 
IFPRI Macro Panels - - 29 1952-2001 longer provincial level panel data Fan et al. (2005) 
RHS Statistic Macro Panels - - 28 1982-1998 provincial level panel data; detailed sub-
categories of food consumption 
Wan (2005) 
CCPFSY Macro Panels 1860 counties 1993-2000 detailed information on public sector at 
the county level 
Zhang (2009) 
Note: There are no inadvertent or pseudo panels other than planned panels and retrospective panels. Only rural samples in each wave of the CHIPS are 
included. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
GIFT AND SOCIAL NETWORK STRUCTURE IN RURAL CHINA 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Written record for gift exchanges has been kept in many Asian countries, such as Thailand, 
Vietnam, China and Korea. The purpose is to record gifts one receives from hosting social events 
and pay back accordingly when fellow residents hold social events in the future. Across Asian 
countries, major social events vary but commonly involve wedding, funeral, childbirth and so on. 
Widely spread gift record-keeping tradition offers researchers a means to collect valuable 
datasets for development studies and social network analysis (SNA) in sociology. More 
importantly, this type of data has a number of unique features lacking in previous network 
datasets. However, to our knowledge, long-term spontaneous gift record has not been utilized in 
economics studies. This paper attempts to draw researchers’ attention to this underutilized data 
source. 
The analysis is ordered into three parts: advantages of gift record data over previous dataset; 
gift spending patterns in major social events in rural China; gift network pattern and 
determinants. 
I begin with discussion on how the dyadic gift record better fits studies at different level and 
of different purposes: household level network engagement and well-being as well as link 
formation. Unique features of gift record that address five critical issues in the literature are laid 
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out. 
I then describe the IFPRI-CAAS project entitled Relative Concern, Social Networks and 
Well-being, a three-wave census-type household survey conducted in 18 remote villages in rural 
western China between 2004 and 2009 and a ten-year household gift exchange data we collected 
during the third wave in early 2010. One of the primary aims of the project was to gather 
quantitative data on the evolution of social networks and to understand how concern for relative 
standing and social network structure affect well-being. 
The overall trend of household ceremonies is documented and major ceremonies are 
compared, emphasizing lavish spending on social events and its recent escalation. Our initial 
evidence rules out social exclusion hypothesis and points to status seeking and marriage market 
pressure. Moreover, though risk-sharing, such as mutual assistance in labor, information, 
production tools and informal credit, might not be the cause of gift escalation, it should play an 
important role in maintaining gift exchanges in the long run. 
Gift network structure is evolved over long-term gift exchanges. I further explore its 
demographic and socioeconomic determinants. Blood relatives’ network size, economic status, 
age structure, marriage market pressure, ethnicity and economic inequality are found to affect 
major network structure indicators. 
Though only patterns of gift network and its associations with other social behavior are 
documented, this paper may help improve our initial understanding of networks. Our insights on 
unique features of gift record data can hardly be general enough for others to follow, but the 
proposal of gift record collection in this paper might help future studies to overcome some of the 
important issues. 
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The paper is organized as follows: in Section II I discuss the unique features of gift record 
data, in Section III I describe the gift data collection process as well the corresponding census 
survey, in Section IV household ceremonies in rural China are documented, in Section V, VI and 
VII I respectively analyze the recent gift spending pattern, its association with informal insurance 
and determinants of network structure, and in Section VIII I conclude. 
 
2.2 Unique Features for Gift-Exchange Record Data 
The standard economics literature has been resorting to approaches founded on the principle 
of centralized human interaction in the market, anonymous agents, and uniform prices through 
which individuals coordinate (Goyal, 2009). For instance, the literature quantifying welfare 
impact of social embeddedness (see a review by Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2005) measures social 
networks through membership in communities, ethnicity, gender, and geographic neighborhood 
and so on (Narayan and Pritchett, 1999). However, the differences in connections among 
heterogeneous agents (i.e. sizes, intensities, distributions and locations) through which social 
interactions flow, rather than memberships themselves, have an essential bearing on behavior 
(Murgai et al., 2000; Genicot and Ray, 2000). 
Social network research calls for a new dataset that considers the following key issues: 
First, the reflection problem in identifying peer effects (Manski, 1993); Second, economists still 
largely ignore the role of indirect social ties.15 The studies of dyad relationships had dominated 
economics for a long time before allowing triad relationships, which in turn has brought in many 
interesting social concepts within the bounds of economic models (Akerlof, 1976; Basu, 1986). 
However, empirical studies incorporating indirect ties are scant; Third, the snapshot feature of 
                                                 
15 As H. L. Mencken put, a wealthy man is one who earns $200 a year more than his wife’s sister’s husband, which 
challenged the only pattern of direct ties. 
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most network data studied determines that the dynamic evolution of links and networks are not 
well explored (Jackson, 2007; Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007); Finally, agent and link sampling 
biases as well as measurement errors further hinder us from studying network impacts. 
Fortunately, a census dataset on spontaneous gift-receiving records during major social 
occasions can aid us in understanding the mechanism of social interactions via taking care of the 
abovementioned key issues. Meanwhile, gift exchanges are widely seen in ceremonies linking 
households economically and socially but rarely studied in the literature. 
 
2.2.1 Features for Studies at Different Levels 
2.2.1.1 Household Network Engagement and Well-being 
Conventional economics has been studying household decision making. To explore 
household behavior in social networks, the most straightforward way is to sample households, 
from where information on social links is collected. In the literature, sampling individuals are 
seen in three types: (1) census type survey of all individuals (also known as sociometric 
network)16; (2) random sampling (also known as egocentric network); (3) quasi-random 
sampling (also called Snowball sampling)17. Only approaches (1) and (2) have been utilized in 
the economics literature. Though most studies follow (2) due to its much lower costs, random 
sampling suffers from significant loss of information on the network structure. As a result, much 
knowledge accumulated by sociologists in social network analyses (SNA) (e.g. Wasserman and 
Faust, 1994), cannot be directly applied to datasets in economics, substantially missing 
potentially interesting interdisciplinary questions. 
                                                 
16 For instance, see De Weerdt (2004), Dekker (2004) and Goldstein and Udry (1999). 
17 It starts from a set of initial respondents, and surveyors enlarge the sample by adding in those individuals 
mentioned by previous respondents (Goodman, 1961). In this way, sampling of relationships and individuals are 
simultaneously done. However, individuals following the first one are not randomly selected, which affects 
population inference (Heckathorn, 2002). 
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If our goal is to understand the impact of network engagement, complete information on 
network connections is required. However, random household sampling cannot provide us 
information on network structure, total resources devoted to the network, and one’s position in 
the network. This flaw can be obviated when we have census survey data and network data for 
all agents.  
2.2.1.2 Link Formation 
When studying formation of social ties, sampling links is the immediate step following 
sampling individuals. Most studies include all the links (they could collect) among individuals in 
the sample (known as matching within sample), while a few randomly sample relationships 
(known as random matching). Santos and Barrett (2008a) questions the reliability of using 
matching within sample to infer network formation, but they also find that random matching 
performs poorly under certain conditions.18 In other words, it is not apparent that one strategy is 
always superior to the other. 
From the perspective of preserving network information, matching within sample is 
desirable. However, this sampling strategy is only preferred when sampling ratio is high, which 
does not fit usual network datasets. Fortunately, our gift record dataset in rural Guizhou obviates 
this flaw due to its census feature, which guarantees the coexistence of best possible features: 
high sampling ratio, unrestricted network size, and much information on network structure. 
Studies usually survey links at one point of time. The snapshot feature of the network data 
determines that the dynamic evolutions of links and networks cannot be well explored (Jackson, 
2007; Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007). For instance, our long-term gift-exchanges in three typical 
villages spread between isolation and openness amid the fast growing Chinese economy enable 
                                                 
18 Santos and Barrett (2008a) finds that matching within sample is much less efficient than random matching when 
sampling ratio is low or when links are formed uninterestingly random. However, random matching also performs 
poorly when there is no restriction on the size of networks. 
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us to explore the dynamic evolution of social networks.19 
A common econometric issue when studying dyadic link formation is non-independent 
observations, due to the presence of node-specific characteristics common to all links containing 
that node. Conventional OLS estimation generates consistent coefficient but inconsistent 
standard errors. Specifically, standard errors can be much underestimated.  
Fortunately, two major approaches have been developed to deal with the issue. One way is 
to correct standard errors or p values, such as using the Quadratic Assignment Procedure (QAP) 
to adjust p-values (Simpson, 2001), adjusting dyadic standard errors (Fafchamps and Gubert, 
2007) or multi-way clustering (Cameron et al., 2006). To release the assumption that the error 
terms of two dyads containing no mutual members are uncorrelated, Chen et al. (2012a) cluster 
the observations according to time periods. A second method uses node fixed effect to purge out 
the unobserved attributes (De Weerdt, 2004). A detailed review of these methods can be found in 
Chen et al. (2012a). 
 
2.2.2 Tackling Measurement Errors 
2.2.2.1 Missing Relations Linking Outside 
In the literature, link sampling process is usually accompanied by missing ties with outside 
agents (De Weerdt, 2004; Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007), since these agents are usually not 
included in the sample.20 Therefore, inference from sample to population might be with error 
when significant non-random differences between identified links and missing links exist. This is 
                                                 
19 Specifically, the inflating social spending for higher social status and extended network motivates people to 
follow, while the rapid economic development drives people to the market and rely less on informal social 
insurance. However, unequal market access (e.g. remittance, job opportunities and windfall income) exacerbates 
inflating social spending. 
20 In De Weerdt (2004), one third of links, mostly formed with agents outside, are lost, while in Fafchamps and 
Gubert (2007) nearly 80% of the network members are not in the sample and lost. 
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probable, as there is large literature on lower covariance in shocks and the motive of cross-
village insurance. Meanwhile, seemingly isolated agents might actually be linked to others out of 
sample. In all these situations, misleading results can be expected (Udry and Conley, 2005). 
In our study, however, cross-village links between the sampled villages with gift record data 
and the other surveyed villages nearby are captured. In other words, all these gift senders and 
receivers are matched using information from three-wave household survey.  
2.2.2.2 Implicitly Ranking Relationships 
When limiting the maximum links to be identified by each respondent (e.g. Fafchamps and 
Gubert, 2007), there is a risk of implicitly ranking relationships. Sometimes the “maximum 
number” strategy is difficult to be implemented when respondents refused to rank people they 
regard as equivalently close to them. Meanwhile it is possible that names listed do not reflect 
their importance without respondents’ thinking twice. Therefore, outcomes highly depend on 
specific contexts of the different surveys and might be unable to replicate. Even if we survey for 
complete relationships, stronger ties usually have higher probability of being identified, while 
weaker ties are usually left out. It can be a problem when we explore information networks than 
informal insurance networks, since weak ties matter more in the former case (Granovetter, 1974). 
In our gift data, there is no limit for household gift links, and strength of relations can be 
precisely reflected in terms of money. Gift spending is mainly recognized as an informal 
insurance against lumpy ceremony expenditures incurred. 
2.2.2.3 Real or Potential Links 
Depending on different contexts, real links (Dekker, 2004, Krishnan and Sciubba, 2005 
Conley and Udry, 2010; Udry and Conley, 2005) and potential links (De Weerdt, 2004; 
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Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007; Santos and Barrett, 2008b) have been the target of attention.21 The 
“real” relationships in the literature were largely recalled by respondents themselves, while there 
are no spontaneous records in their daily life that are referred to. However, in the gift record data 
there normally is no recall error. According to the Chinese custom, all gifts are recorded on the 
day of ceremonies with at least two people on site counting and checking them. 
2.2.2.4 Ambiguities between Sending and Receiving 
The literature on social network usually does not explicitly distinguish resources received 
from resources provided in survey questions. For instance, Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) 
measures ties in Philippines by asking respondents in a one-question framework who they could 
rely on in case of need or to whom they provide help when called upon to do so. Similarly, De 
Weerdt (2004) asked “Can you give a list of people, who you can personally rely on for help 
and/or that can rely on you for help in cash, kind or labor” in a Tanzanian sample. These 
questions do not separate giving help from receiving help. Santos and Barrett (2008b) use data 
from Ethiopia where a link is measured asking people who they could rely on to ask for cattle as 
a gift. It is still difficult to separate relationships which involve only receiving from those 
involving both giving and receiving. 
In contrast, our gift exchange data clearly distinguishes gift senders and gift receivers. 
Besides, the feature of ten-year gift record can further separate agents who have been only 
receiving or sending gifts from agents who have been involving in both gift giving and receiving.  
2.2.2.5 Projection Bias in Self-Reporting and Proxy-Reporting 
Given biases on respondents’ self-reporting, some studies instead rely on proxy-reporting. 
However, proxy-reported peer behavior is often correlated with respondents’ behavior due to 
                                                 
21 Real links are preferred when we explore past decision-making, while potential links are more suitable when we 
study forward-looking behavior. 
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projection bias. In an informal insurance network, respondents may have more precise 
information on their closer fellow residents in the network, while projection bias can be large for 
more distant residents. In an information network, such as technology adoption network, 
innovative technology adopters tend to over-report the incidence of adoption in their social 
network. 
Confirming that proxy‐reporting errors are correlated with respondent attributes, Hogset and 
Barrett (2010) finds that self‐reporting and proxy‐reporting generate different regression results 
on peer behaviors, questioning the use of proxy‐reporting. However, throughout the paper they 
assume that self-reporting reflects the truth, which may not be necessarily applied to other cases. 
For example, when we survey a household’s gift spending, self-reporting may suffer from 
multiple biases due to respondents’ strategic actions. Specifically, the poor might over-report gift 
expenditure to complain their huge social burden, while the rich may tend to hide their real 
income by under-reporting gift expenditure. The opposite may also be true when the poor treat 
enumerators as officials, thus under-report gift spending to compete for subsidies. The rich may 
prefer to over-report to show status.  
Nonetheless, in our gift record data all written records are based on gifts people received, 
which simultaneously avoid subjective aspects of both self-reporting and proxy-reporting. 
 
2.3 Data Collection for IFPRI-CAAS Project 
2.3.1 Three-Wave Census Survey 
The household information for this study comes from three waves of census-type household 
survey conducted by us in 18 natural villages in rural Western China.22 Located in the central 
                                                 
22 This survey was jointly conducted by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Chinese Academy 
of Agricultural Sciences (CAAS), and Guizhou University. 
57 
part of the poorest Guizhou province, the 18 natural villages on average is at the median level in 
Guizhou. It is both geographically and ethnically diversified. Due to its isolation from outside, 
local residents know each other well. Most residents’ kinship networks are confined in these 
natural villages. More than 20 ethnic groups are living in the area, including Han, Miao, Buyi, 
Gelao, and Yi. In total, ethnic minorities comprise about 20% of population. 
801, 833 and 872 households were respectively surveyed in 2005, 2007 and 2010. All three 
waves include detailed information on villages, household demographics, income, consumption, 
transfers, expenditures and incomes related to gift-giving, ceremony organizations and blood 
donation. Most information was collected for each household member, including those who were 
working outside the county at the time of survey. In the follow-up survey in 2010, major health 
indicators were collected for all family members in the 18 natural villages. Among them, a 3-day 
on-site observation on food and nutrition intake was implemented for all family members from 9 
out of 18 natural villages. 
 
2.3.2 Gift-Exchange Records Collection 
Gift-receiving records are usually kept for a long time in order to pay back accordingly 
when celebrations in other families are held (Yan, 1996).23 Upon verifying the availability and 
ruling out significant selection of gift record book during our pilot survey in August 2009, during 
2010 survey gift-receiving records for major social occasions (i.e. male members’ wedding, 
female members’ wedding, funeral, coming-of-age ceremony, child birth ceremony, and house-
moving ceremony) occurred in the last decade were collected from all households in three out of 
eighteen villages that we conducted the three-wave census survey (Table 2.1). 
                                                 
23 Yan (1996) writes, “Ritualized gift giving is also associated with the custom of making and preserving gift lists. 
Gift lists are homemade books on red paper (funeral gift lists are made on yellow paper) inscribed with a traditional 
Chinese calligraphy brush. They serve as a formal record of all gifts received by the host of a family ceremony.”  
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The unique Karst landform keeps the three villages isolated from the outside society. 
Among them, village 1 is the remotest (10 kilometers away from the county seat with poor road 
access), and the local custom is well preserved. In contrast, village 3 is only 2.5 kilometers away 
from the county seat. It is the most vulnerable to external changes, such as the recent social 
spending inflation. In between, village 2 is populated with Buyi ethnic minority, who preserve 
the Catholic culture and ceremony tradition different from the major Han villages (e.g. village 1 
and village 3). In major public ceremonies in village 2 people generally participate in the events 
(e.g. Halloween and Christmas) without bearing huge burden on gift exchange.24 Since the 
surveyed villages are populated with Han group and ethnic minorities, we are able to explore 
social connections between ethnic groups. 
We identified 335 households composed of 160 households from the three villages and 175 
households from the other fifteen villages covered by our large scale survey. In total, 8074 gift 
links during 2000-2009 are identified, and 4611 cross-county / township gift links were recorded. 
Nearly all households’ gift-receiving records for the ceremonies between 2005 and 2009 were 
included in this study, since less than 5 percent households reported gift book loss or damage to 
us.25 Meanwhile, we collected gift-receiving records for some ceremonies between 1994 and 
2004 to analyze its trend. 
The centerpiece is gift link identification. Instead of embedding many enumerators in 
survey villages, the field work can be achieved by very few enumerators but continuous efforts 
for an extended period of time. Gift record collection requires repeated household visit to 
identify names and other information. 
                                                 
24 A major difference in this aspect between public celebrations in India and household ceremonies in China can be 
found in Rao (2001) and Chen (2011b). 
25 We consulted major ceremonies with village leader and local residents to verify before going to individual 
families. Meanwhile, this prior information helped each household recall and find gift books for us. 
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If all family members are illiterates, a group of two or three educated relatives usually help 
record and check gift-giving on the celebration days. However, names on the records are usually 
nicknames which might not be precisely identified. To solve this problem, we brought the whole 
list of names for the 18 villages to each household to help identify and check the names on the 
records.26 We also joined local public gatherings to identify some hard nicknames. 
Information on kinship and relatedness among villagers was also collected and matched to 
each gift link. As many other traditional rural communities, the three villages are all organized 
by long-term coordination of major clans. Taking one of the three villages as an example (Figure 
2.1), households in the same clan usually live closer to each other (due to the land owned by their 
common predecessor) with more intense gift exchanges. 
 
2.4 Household Ceremonies in Rural China 
2.4.1 The Overall Trend 
Our paper presents a typical case in rural China where diversified traditional household 
ceremonies are preserved and gift connections maintained. The overall network centralities for 
both gift-sending and gift-receiving have been decreasing (Figure 2.2(a)), since local residents 
have been more widely involved in gift exchanges and ceremony hosting. However, average 
household centrality has been rapidly increasing (Figure 2.2(b)) due to the fact that households 
are more intensely exchange gifts in ceremonies. Meanwhile, the increasing Freeman/Flow 
betweenness Centrality in Figure 2.2(c) show that people tend to send gifts to more active 
households in the network, as they locate between more pairs of households and therefore are 
more powerful in mobilizing resources in the rural community. 
                                                 
26 Meanwhile, the name list made it easier to identify people who did not send gift to each family I visited and their 
relationships with the families, which are very important to the understanding of network formation. 
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Exchanging in-kind gifts during ceremonies has been a long- term tradition. In wedding 
ceremonies, apart from the usual large expenses on cash gift, people send dumplings, pork, wool, 
woolen blankets, bed sheets, quilts, kitchen supplies, candles, wine, basins and pillows to the 
new couple to symbolize a sweet life or to help purchase necessities. During funeral ceremonies, 
people send less cash but more in-kind gifts and non-cash help. The in-kind gifts include corn, 
lamb, pork, woolen blankets, quilts, edible oil, wine as well as other sacrificial offerings. In 
celebrating come-of-age occasion, people send rice and children's wear, while in child birth 
ceremonies people additionally give wool, eggs and fruits. When friends and relatives move their 
houses, furniture, stoves and curtain are usually sent as gifts. 
In-kind gifts are more widely seen in the following conditions: one, in impoverished 
villages residents need in-kind gift to compensate cash shortage; two, in some household 
celebrations that are saliently featured by reciprocal assistance, such as funeral and house-
moving, people send in-kind gift to show their closeness to hosts in addition to large amount of 
cash gift; three, poor market access in remote regions make in-kind goods scarce and relatively 
more attractive. 
However, in recent years cash gift has become more and more intense relative to in-kind 
gifts (Figure 2.3). While evidence from the western culture demonstrates that sending cash to 
friends is associated with stigma (Waldfogel, 2002), it is quite interesting that our observation in 
rural China is the opposite, i.e., people tend to measure closeness according cash gift. The 
pressure from social network may drive people to follow others in sending cash, which has been 
replacing in-kind goods to measure closeness among fellow residents. Meanwhile, significant 
differences are found in both likelihood and intensity between in-kind and cash gifts (Table 2.2). 
The contrasting pattern for cash and in-kind gift is more salient for the more open villages. 
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Different ethnicities demonstrate different network intensity for cash gifts but not for in-kind 
gifts. For instance, during 1994-2009 the Catholic village has witnessed both fewer and less 
intense cash ties among residents than other Han villages. Nonetheless, the patterns are not 
saliently different for in-kind gift network in Han villages versus minority villages. 
 
2.4.2 Major Ceremonies 
Based on resemblance for each pair of ceremonies, three comparisons are conducted. 
Firstly, male weddings are one of the most publicly participated social occasions during 
which hosts invite as many guests as possible. The size of wedding ceremonies signals how rich 
one family is to the fellow residents. However, when females get married only closest relatives, 
friends and neighbors are invited. Brides’ families have little motive to show how rich they are. 
The contrasting pattern between female wedding network (Panel (a) in Figure 2.4) and male 
wedding network (Panel (b) in Figure 2.4) illustrates this point. Figure 2.5a shows that the out-
degree and in-degree centralities for male wedding network is smaller than female wedding, 
meaning that people more widely exchange gifts during male weddings. Only two female 
weddings were held in the past ten years, though many girls were married out. One major reason 
is that unbalanced sex ratio triggers asymmetric marriage market competition from grooms’ 
families. Another important point is that the patrilineal society with son preference makes 
wedding ceremony mainly an event for grooms’ families in the purpose of extending network 
and achieving higher social status. 
Second, childbirth is more of a private ceremony, in which the closest relatives and friends 
are invited. The extremely poor households may combine it27 with wedding ceremony due to the 
fact that organizations of such events are extremely costly for them, and gifts they receive will be 
                                                 
27 People usually do not celebrate birthday in rural China except for the elderly. 
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a huge burden to pay back later. Compared to childbirth, come-of-age, a ceremony solely for 
sons, is more formally and widely held in the community. The contrasting pattern between 
childbirth network (Panel (c) in Figure 2.4) and come-of-age network (Panel (d) in Figure 2.4) 
demonstrates this point. Figure 2.5b presents that the out-degree and in-degree centralities for 
come-of-age ceremony is smaller, suggesting wider participation. One reason is that a family 
faces higher pressure in the marriage market when a son grows up. Taoists are invited to host a 
ritual followed by a large banquet, signaling the growing up of a son to the fellow residents as 
well as the potential matchmaker. 
A third comparison is between house-moving and funeral. It is quite often that only closest 
friends, relatives and neighbors are invited to a house-moving ceremony. No much assistance in 
its preparation is needed. However, a funeral lasts for at least three days and requires much 
assistance. A more fundamental difference between the two occasions might be that funeral 
serves as a status signal for both dead and alive, while house-moving only sends status signal for 
this generation. The contrasting pattern is verified by a comparison of network map between the 
two occasions (Panel (e) & (f) in Figure 2.4). Figure 2.5c further suggests that funerals are more 
and widely participated, since both its in-degree and out-degree centralities are significantly 
smaller than house-moving. 
Comparing six major occasions over recent years, funerals and male weddings have been 
the most widely held, while female weddings and child births ceremonies have been the least 
widely held. Meanwhile, people most widely exchange gifts in come-of-age ceremonies and 
male weddings, while they have sent gifts the least widely during female weddings, house 
moving and child birth ceremonies. The gift-sending network centralities decline for nearly all 
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ceremonies, especially for female weddings and funerals, while gift-receiving network 
centralities decline the most for funerals and childbirths. 
 
2.5 The Recent Gift Spending Escalation 
Though believed to facilitate informal insurance, increasingly large proportion of resources 
devoted to gifts and festivals spending, especially in impoverished areas, may have negative 
impact on well-being (Chen, 2012b). Thus, we are interested in understanding why so many 
resources have been spent on gifts and festivals and why the expenditure has been escalating in 
recent years. Fortunately, the rich gift record data, combined with panel household information, 
provide us with a chance to explore the mechanism. 
First, three indicators, relative centrality in the network (also known as network activeness 
or social visibility in the literature), household gift expenditure for major occasions and share of 
gift expenditure, embody network engagement of different aspects: centrality focuses more on 
the density of links; gift expenditure addresses strength of the links; share of gift expenditure 
further adjusts for income size and measures gift-exchange burden across households. 
As discussed in the overall trend of household ceremonies in rural China, network 
centralities for both gift-sending and gift-receiving have been decreasing. Consistently, the 
average household centrality has been rapidly increasing. The trends of both household and 
network centralities suggest more frequent and evenly distributed gift exchanges overtime. 
Utilizing gift record data, Table 2.3 presents rapid growing gift expenditure per occasion as 
well as inflating sizes of major social events in terms of number of households attending. In the 
three-wave survey, respondents were also asked to recall their average gifts to direct relatives, 
friends, and neighbors during major ceremonies between 2001 and 2006. After adjusting for 
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inflation, the median gift per occasion jumped from 42 RMB to 67 RMB for direct relatives and 
from 21 RMB to 35 RMB for friends and neighbors. The gift expenditure per occasion increased 
more dramatically for villages closer to the county seat. All major ceremonies demonstrate 
booms in the number of guests. Combining both dimensions, it suggests that total household gift 
expenditure has increased quickly in recent years. From organizers’ perspective, total 
expenditures in major ceremonies amount to several times of their per capita income, especially 
weddings for grooms’ families (Table 2.4). 
Next only reciprocal ties are used to acquire a closer view of gift escalation. Reciprocal ties 
are defined as gift exchanges in both directions between a pair of households during 2000-2009. 
If we further understand reciprocal ties as reciprocal financial assistance within each category of 
ceremony, it might provide us with more accurate and comparable account of gift escalation. In 
the gift record, reciprocal ties are usually confined to within two years, while they are scant for 
time duration longer than six years. 
Figure 2.6a presents inflation rates for reciprocal ties. In terms of mean gift inflation per 
year (RMB), male wedding ranks the highest, followed by house-moving and funeral. 
Meanwhile, in terms of annualized gift inflation rate, funeral ranks the highest, followed by male 
wedding. Concerning the relationship between time gap (gift repaying - gift receiving) and gift 
inflation, Generally, gift inflation (in terms of RMB and inflation rate) is the highest when a gift 
is repaid shortly afterwards, while it lowers as time gap increases. Figure 2.6b decomposes gift 
inflation into major social occasions. Funeral has the highest immidiate inflation rate of 300% if 
it is paid back in the same year, followed by an immediate inflation of 70% for male wedding. 
The annualized gift inflation vanishes faster for funerals and male weddings than other 
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ceremonies. However, we should be cautious in interpreting this result, since the figures can be 
driven by extreme values when divided into small categories. 
Figure 2.7 presents share of gift expenditure categorized by four income quartiles and year. 
The poorer a household is, the higher share of income is devoted to social spending, and the 
higher growth rate of gift expenditure share is between 2004 and 2009. Using the first two waves 
of our survey, Brown et al. (2011) show that gift spending far exceeds annualized growth in per 
capita income and other consumption in recent years, also suggesting a rapid increase in the 
share of gift expenditure. 
Why has gift spending escalated? One hypothesis is social exclusion, meaning that gift 
giving may serve as an exclusion strategy. On the one hand, the larger the risk sharing network, 
the better the group can diversify their income risks; on the other hand, if the group includes too 
many households with persistently low income, the relatively high income households would 
rather not share risks with them but exclude them. However, the transition matrixes based on the 
three-wave survey data (Table 2.5a and Table 2.5b) do not reflect much rigidity in the three 
natural villages. Meanwhile, Table 2.6a and Table 2.6b respectively summarize changes in 
network participation and activeness. Much fewer households drop out of gift exchange activity 
or become less active, while their inactive counterparts significantly join or become more active 
in the network. In other words, there is no convincing evidence on social exclusion. 
An alternative hypothesis is the concern for relative standing, which can be motivated by 
income inequality as well as social pressure. Unequal income distribution is widely seen in 
contemporary China where the Gini coefficient has been far surpassing 0.4 (Chen, 2011a), while 
in our surveyed communities it is even larger than 0.5 (Table 2.1). The enlarging income gap 
motives people to climb social ladders. Social pressure can be originated from tightening 
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marriage market with unblanced sex ratios. The pressure to compete in the marriage market 
motivates households with unmarried son to actively engage in social events, which signals to 
matchmakers and brides’ families (Brown et al., 2011; Wei and Zhang, 2011). 
Windfall & non-earned income are suspected to trigger more gift spending, and their growth 
rates coincide with the gift growth rate (Figure 2.8). It has been well recognized that windfall 
income is often spent differently compared to regular income. In rural China, Chen et al. (2012a) 
find that the recent growth in gift spending is enhanced due to more opoortunities to get access to 
lumpy windfall income, such as resettlement subsidy (targeting dilapidated houses and 
vulnerable habitats) and land acquisitions subsidy (targeting villages close to the county seat 
affected by urbanization development program). Households with these windfall incomes are 
found to spend more on gift exchange while spillover to other households in the networks. 
Moreover, remittance from family members working in developed regions may intensify 
gift spending. Table 2.3 shows booming gift spending in ceremonies after 2005, and Table 2.4 
shows that ceremony organization has become more costly since 2004-2005. This trend 
coincides with the research finding that China passed the Lewis turning point of unlimited labor 
supply after 2003 (Zhang et. al., 2010). The passage of the turning point means significant rising 
wages in the labor market and potentially higher remittance. 
Apart from remittance and large windfall income, the smaller sized official subsidies have 
been more and more widely seen over the past five years. For instance, direct grain subsidy was 
implemented since 2005, and it targets grain growing area rather than yield. The subsidy, 
influencing household decisions in our 2nd and 3rd wave, may be disproportionally spent on gift 
and festival spending. Overall, the decisions to distribute windfall income and subsidies are 
made by officials and affect household gift expenditure. 
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2.6 Gift Exchange and Informal Insurance 
Gift exchanges and the resulting social networks might be associated with the concern for 
risk-pooling, including labor exchanges and informal credit. Though in this paper we do not 
attempt to explore the complex causality between social events engagement and risk-sharing, an 
initial analysis of correlations is also informative. 
Table 2.7a summarizes major forms of mutual assistance. In the local rural community, 
labor exchanges during busy seasons and house building, though irrelevant for half of the 
families, are more often than other forms of resources exchange. During the period of assistance, 
hosts normally spend much money in providing delicious meals. Nowadays, people are prone to 
hire relatives / friends / neighbors with cash wage during harvest time and house building period, 
rather than exchanging labor with each other, which is especially prevalent in villages with easier 
market access. Nonetheless, Table 2.7b shows a significant correlation between centrality in a 
network and frequency of labor exchange, job information exchange and assisting elderly/kids 
care. Meanwhile, households with higher share of gift expenditure (usually the poor households) 
have poorer access to these informal resources exchanges. 
Table 2.8a shows that more than half of the rural residents surveyed are in debt, and people 
generally rely on relatives when faced with cash shortage. Most loans do not carry an interest, 
especially those offered by relatives and neighbors. Households of higher centrality and those 
spend more on gifts are associated with more debt accumulation, and significant loans have been 
granted by relatives. Meanwhile, they are more likely to ask relatives / friends / neighbors for 
help when faced with cash shortage. Surprisingly, households more central to the network 
significantly resort to donating blood when faced with cash shortage (Table 2.8b). This suggests 
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that blood donation might be complementary to other means in coping with cash shortage, or 
high network centrality may be achieved at the cost of more social spending and higher chance 
of blood donation. The latter possibility is further explored in Xing et al. (2009). 
 
2.7 How is Gift Network Structure Determined? 
The Network structure depicted in Figures 2.1-2.4 has been built upon all gift exchanges. 
Each group member plays a role in its formation. Having discussed social norms, risk-sharing 
motives, status concern, windfall income that may affect gift expenditure, one step further we are 
curious about whether anything can be said about the demographic and socioeconomic 
determinants of the long-term gift network structure. In order to do so, we introduce some key 
network concepts and measures. Bonacich Centrality is a function of the (direct and indirect) 
connections of the actors in one's neighborhood. The more connections the actors in one’s 
neighborhood have, the more central one is. Popularity measures links that one receives from 
peers, while influence measures links that one sends out to peers. Closeness gauges distance of 
the respondent to all others in the network, utilizing both direct and indirect links. The four 
measures embody network information from four dimensions, and altogether they are most often 
used in describing important network features. A detailed review of these measures is included in 
the Appendix. 
Estimation results from treating all years’ gift exchanges as one network are presented in 
Table 2.9a. First, Households with larger blood relatives’ network attend more ceremonies and 
thus have higher centrality and influence, but they do not have higher closeness, since their blood 
relatives may not be at the center of networks. However, richer households perform more 
actively in gift networks in all four dimensions, one difference is that the latter can choose to 
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whom they send gifts; second, concerning demographic characteristics, it is salient that 
households with older head have higher influence over neighbors. However, households with 
(more) senior member(s) tend to be inactive in sending gift. Consistently with our marriage 
market argument, households with (more) unmarried son(s) are often pushed to be active in gift 
exchanges; third, ethnic minorities exert less influence in gift spending, and they are away from 
the heart of the networks; fourth, households once organized events are more popular and tend to 
reciprocate; fifth, unequal communities tend to motivate their members to be more central, more 
influential and closer to the networks, which is consistent with our status seeking argument. 
In Table 2.9b, within estimations are conducted treating each year’s gift exchanges as a 
network. Time-invariant characteristics are dropped out. Given that, we still confirm the roles 
income inequality, blood relatives’ network size and demographic structure play in shaping the 
four network dimensions. However, age structure seems to work on closeness, rather than 
influence. 
 
2.8 Conclusions 
The tradition of celebrating household social events and keeping gift record in many Asian 
countries offers researchers a great potential to collect valuable datasets for development and 
social network study. More importantly, this type of data has a number of unique features 
compared with previous network datasets. However, to our knowledge, spontaneous long-term 
gift record has not been utilized in economics studies. 
This paper attempts to draw researchers’ attention to this widely available but under-
explored dataset. I begin with a discussion on how the dyadic gift record can be better fitted into 
studies at different level and of different purposes: household level network engagement and 
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well-being as well as link formation. Unique features of gift record that address five critical 
issues in the literature are then laid out. 
Based on the discussion, the data collection process for the IFPRI-CAAS Project is 
introduced, which incorporates a census-type in-house panel survey and a corresponding long-
term gift record collection. The overall trend of household ceremonies in rural China is 
documented and major ceremonies are compared using the gift record data. I emphasize lavish 
spending on social events and its recent escalation. Based on an analysis of income distribution 
and long-term mobility, the social exclusion hypothesis is ruled out. Further, the evidence points 
to potential status seeking and social pressure. Mutual assistance in labor, information, 
production tools and informal credit is found associated with intense gift spending. Though risk-
sharing might not be the cause of gift escalation, it should play an important role in promoting 
gift exchanges in the long run.   
Gift network structure is evolved over long-term gift exchanges. One step further, I explore 
its demographic and socioeconomic determinants. Blood relatives’ network size, economic 
status, age structure, marriage market pressure, ethnicity and economic inequality are found to 
affect major network structure indicators. 
Our insights on unique features of gift record data can hardly be general enough to follow, 
as they are based on the experience of only one project. Nevertheless, it is hoped that the 
proposal of gift record collection in this paper helps future studies to overcome some of the 
potential issues. Moreover, though only patterns of gift network and its associations with other 
social behavior are documented, this paper may help improve our initial understanding of 
networks, especially in underdeveloped regions. Future research projects are underway, which 
involves deriving spatial instruments from the gift network structure to identify other social 
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behaviors, exploring causality of gift spending escalation, and evaluating its impact on basic 
well-being. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
72 
APPENDIX 
Measures of Network Structure 
In this appendix, we summarize a series of comprehensive social structure measures, 
including in-degree centrality, out-degree centrality, closeness centrality, betweenness centrality 
and Bonacich centrality. The centrality of an individual in a network captures the idea of power 
and prominence in a certain social structure (Freeman, 1979; Bonacich, 1987). 
In the following measures, we assume the network g  has n individuals. 
Degree centrality  The individual level degree centrality ( )i gη  is each individual’s number 
of direct links 
1
( )
n
i ij
j
g gη
=
= ∑ . There are two types of degree centrality that convey quite different 
information, namely in-degree centrality and out-degree centrality. In-degree centrality measures 
number of links one receives from peers, so it captures one’s popularity. Out-degree centrality 
measures number of links one send to peers, and it describes one’s influence. To compare 
networks of different sizes, the normalized degree centrality of an individual i in network g is 
defined as the degree of the individual divided by the maximum possible friends individual i can 
have, i.e. ( )( ; )
1
i
d
gC i g
n
η
=
−
. It ranges from 0 to 1. Higher degree centrality corresponds to more 
ties, more dominance of the resources in the network, and hence lower dependence on other 
individuals. Degree centrality for the entire network g  is defined relative to the maximum 
attainable centrality, 
'
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where *i  is the node that achieves the highest degree centrality in network g . 
Closeness centrality  Closeness centrality is calculated based on proximity. ( , ; )d i j g  is the 
geodestic distance (i.e. length of the shortest path) between individual i and j in network g . 
( , ; )
j i
d i j g
≠∑  denotes the geodesic distance from node i to all other n-1 individuals in network 
g . The individual level closeness centrality is given by the inverse of the sum of geodesic 
distance 1
( , ; )
j i
d i j g
≠∑
. To compare different networks, the normalized closeness centrality for 
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individual i is defined as 1( ; )
( , ; )c
j i
nC i g
d i j g
≠
−
=
∑
, where n-1 is the maximum possible distance 
between two individuals in network g  and the minimum possible geodesic distance from 
individual i to all other n-1 individuals. The normalized measure ranges from 0 to 1, and it equals 
one when individual i is directly connected to all other n-1 individuals in the network. The higher 
total geodesic distance, the lower closeness centrality it would be. Closeness centrality for the 
entire network g is defined relative to the maximum attainable differences between closeness 
centrality for node *i  and the others. 
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where *i  is the node that achieves the highest closeness centrality in network g. 
Betweenness centrality  The standard individual betweenness centrality is measured as  
#( ; )
#bt j l
shortest paths between j and l through iC i g
shortest paths between j and l<
       
=  
     ∑
 
where j and l denote two given individuals in network g . Betweenness centrality measures how 
advantaged an individual is in a network because of locating between other pairs of individuals. 
Higher betweenness centrality gives an individual the capacity to broker contacts among other 
pairs. To compare between different networks, Normalized betweenness centrality is defined as 
( ; )( )
( 1)( 2) / 2
bt
nbt
C i gC g
n n
=
− −
 
Bonacich centrality  Bonacich centrality is mainly based on the adjacency matrix G  of 
network g, in which an entry in a square corresponding to a pair {i, j} denotes whether there 
exists a link from i to j. In adjacency matrix G , entries in the main diagonal is set to be 0. 
kG denotes the k-th power of the matrix, where 0G I= . In kG , an entry kijg  measures the 
amount of walks of length k that exist between players i and j in network g .  
Define a matrix ( , )M g ασ , which is well-defined when ασ  is sufficiently small. Its entry 
0
( , ) ( )k kij ijkm g gασ ασ
∞
=
= ∑  measures the total amount of walks in g from i to j where walks of 
length k are weighted by ( )kασ .  
74 
1
0
( , ) [1 ] ( )k k
k
M g G Gασ ασ ασ
∞
−
=
= − = ∑
 
Given parameter ασ , Bonacich centrality vector is defined as 1( , ) [1 ]bC g G Jασ ασ
−= − , 
where Bonacich centrality of node i 
1
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= ∑ . It is straightforward to observe 
that Bonacich centrality is no smaller than 1. 
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In our analysis, Bonacich centrality with positive attenuation factors generated by the 
UCINET software are adopted, as we accept the idea that being connected to neighbors with 
more connections makes one powerful. However, in some sociology literature negative 
attenuation factors are used since they argues that neighbors without many connections to others 
make ego more powerful. The two results differ, especially for households whose ties are mostly 
with households of high degree. 
Comparison Among Network Structure Measures  The degree centrality and closeness 
centrality are equal for two extreme cases, star network and cycle network, while they are valued 
differently in this range. The major shortcoming for the two centrality measures is that it 
excludes the case when actions of a person influence actions of their neighbors which in turn 
feedback on the initiator. The degree centrality only takes into account the immediate ties each 
node has. An individual might be centrally tied to a large number of others, but those others are 
disconnected from the network as a whole. The closeness centrality solely depends on the length 
of the shortest paths between nodes in network, while it is possible that ties are not perfectly 
reliable and other paths of different lengths may take effects. Fortunately, the direct and indirect 
influences in a network are captured by Bonacich centrality. Moreover, all these centrality 
measures except Bonacich centrality are parameter-free (Calvó-Armengol et al., 2009). Finally, 
Bonacich centrality has behavior foundation that is derived from Nash equilibrium of a non-
cooperative game, while other centrality measures are mainly geometric in nature (Ballester et 
al., 2006). 
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APPENDIX TABLE 
       
Definition and Measures of Network Structure (Engagement) 
Indicators Definition Calculation 
Popularity 
(Intensity) 
also called in-degree, measures number 
(intensity) of links the respondent receives from 
peers  
Known as in-degree centrality, ijg is a binary (continuous) variable 
denoting (intensity of) the link from j to i. 
1
( ; ) /( 1)
n
d ij
j
C i g g n
=
= −∑  
Influence 
(Intensity) 
also called out-degree, measures number 
(intensity) of links the respondent sends out to 
peers 
Known as out-degree centrality, ijg is a binary (continuous) variable 
denoting (intensity of) the link from i to j
 1
( ; ) /( 1)
n
d ij
j
C i g g n
=
= −∑  
Closeness distance of the respondent to all others in the network 
( , ; )
j i
d i j g
≠∑  denotes the geodesic distance from i to all other n-1 
individuals in network g . 1( ; )
( , ; )c
j i
nC i g
d i j g
≠
−
=
∑
 
Betweenness 
how advantaged an individual is in a network 
because of locating between other pairs of 
individuals 
# 2( ; ) (
# ( 1)( 2)bt j l
shortest paths between j and l through iC i g
shortest paths between j and l n n<
       
=  )
     − −∑ 
 
Centrality 
(Bonacich) 
Respondent’s centrality, weighted by the 
centrality of those to whom he or she sends ties 
k
ijg  is the amount of walks of length k that exist between i and j in 
network g . ασ is decaying parameter for indirect ties 
1 0
( ; , ) ( )
n
k k
b ij
j k
C i g gασ ασ
∞
= =
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Figure 2.1 The Clan System and Gift Exchange Network in one of the Three Villages 
 
Source: Authors’ social network data. 
Notes: Those bigger dots of the same color show households in the same clan. Dots to the boundaries show households from other villages. The dots 
(households) are based on actual geographic locations. 
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Figure 2.2 Gift Network Centrality 
(a) In-degree and Out-degree Centrality 
 
(b) Household Mean Centrality (by Village and Year) 
 
(c) Betweenness Centrality 
 
                Source: Authors’ gift exchange data from three natural villages. 
Notes: Network centrality is also known as network activeness or social visibility in the literature. Centrality measures 
are calculated using UCINET 6. 
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Figure 2.3 In-kind and Cash Gift Network in Three Villages 
 
 
                 (a)                                                                                  (b) 
 
 
                (c)                                                                                   (d) 
 
 
                                            (e)                                                                                   (f) 
 
Note: (a), (c) and (e) show in-kind gift network, while (b), (d) and (f) show cash gift network. 
From the top to the bottom shows gift-giving network in Village 3 ((a) and (b)), Village 1 ((c) 
and (d)), and Village 2 ((e) and (f)). 
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Figure 2.4 Gift Networks for Social Occasions in One of the Three Villages 
 
 
 
(a) Female Wedding                                               (b) Male Wedding 
 
 
(c) Childbirth                                                           (d) Come-of-age 
 
 
(e) Funeral                                                              (f) House Moving 
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Figure 2.5 Gift Network Centrality by Occasion 
 
(a) Female Wedding and Male wedding 
  
 
(b) Childbirth and Come-of-age 
  
 
(c) Funeral and House Moving 
  
Notes: Left Figures show out-degree centrality (influence), while right Figures show in-degree centrality 
(popularity). 
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Figure 2.6a Annualized Mean Gift Exchange Inflation (RMB) and Inflation Rate (100%) 
for Reciprocal Households (2000-2009) 
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
m
e
an
 g
ift
 in
fla
tio
n 
pe
r 
ye
ar
 (
R
M
B
)
childbirth comeofage femalewed funeral malewed moving
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
m
e
an
 o
f a
n
nu
al
iz
e
d 
gi
ft 
in
fla
tio
n
 r
a
te
childbirth comeofage femalewed funeral malewed moving
 
Source: Authors’ gift exchange data from three natural villages. 
Notes: [1] All gifts have been adjusted for inflation based on China Statistic Year Book published by NBS. 
[2] The left figure is in terms of mean gift inflation per year (RMB), while the right figure is in terms of annualized 
gift inflation rate (100%). 
 
 
Figure 2.6b Annualized Gift Inflation Rate and Time Gap by Occasion 
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Figure 2.7 Share of Gift Expenditure Relative to Income 
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by income quartiles and year
Share of Gift Expenditure
 
Source: Authors’ survey data. 
Notes: 1: live with less than $1 per day; 2: live with less than $2 per day; 3: live with $2-$4 per day; 4: live with $6-
$10 per day. The poverty lines are adjusted according to 2005 PPP rate 
from http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp. 
 
 
Figure 2.8 Windfall Incomes, Remittance and Gift Expenditure 
(Per capita RMB, 2004-2009) 
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Table 2.1 Summary Statistics by Natural Village (2009) 
   Village 1 Village 2 Village 3 Total 
Total number of households 48 27 80 155 
Total population 203 96 295 594 
Distance to the county seat (km) 10.0 11.0 2.5 7.8 
Per capita cultivated land (mu) 0.87 0.16 1.10 0.71 
Share of flat land (%) 40.0 20.7 80.0 53.4 
Male head of household (dummy) 93.5 94.8 91.6 92.8 
Education of household head (years) 2.87 3.06 3.98 3.44 
Minority head of household (dummy) 2.9 90.1 5.9 18.9 
Share of household members aged 11-29, unmarried (%) 15.9 15.7 14.7 16.6 
Share of household members aged 60 and above (%) 14.2 17.9 12.5 14.1 
Income inequality in 2004 (Gini) 43.7 41.9 41.6 44.2 
Income inequality in 2006 (Gini) 46.3 52.9 42.7 48.9 
Income inequality in 2009 (Gini) 46.5 61.7 50.9 55.2 
                             Source: Authors’ survey data for three out eighteen villages where we collected gift records. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.2 Testing for Differences between In-kind and Cash Gift-giving (1994-2009) 
Year Differences in the Probability of Ties Differences in the Intensity of Ties Village 3 Village 1 Village 2 Village 3 Village 1 Village 2 
1994-2009 
0.048 / 
0.040 
[0.009]*** 
0.067 / 
0.039 
[0.012]** 
0.040 / 
0.078 
[0.121] 
2.934 / 0.144 
[0.000]*** 
2.255 / 0.184 
[0.010]*** 
1.284 / 0.142 
[0.020]** 
1994-2000 1.202 / 0.463 [0.123] 
0.602 / 0.118 
[0.157] - 
2001-2005 1.948 / 0.083 [0.028]** 
0.990 / 0.050 
[0.030]** 
0.874 / 0.046 
[0.072]* 
2006-2009 2.608 / 0.121 [0.000]*** 
2.178 / 0.189 
[0.020]** 
1.301 / 0.160 
[0.037]** 
Notes: Values in the square brackets denote p-value. The standard errors are adjusted by Bootstrap SE for the 
difference (paired samples), which constructs more conservative t-tests. When our measure of tie-strength is binary, 
the mean is the Probability of all ties that are present. When our measure of tie-intensity is valued, the mean is 
indicated by the average intensity of the tie across all the relations (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). 
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Table 2.3 Gift Spending and Sizes of Ceremonies (2000-2009, per Occasion) 
Year 
Come-of-age Male Wedding Female Wedding Funeral 
Mean 
gift 
(RMB) 
Gift 
SD 
Mean 
# 
guests 
Mean 
gift 
(RMB) 
Gift 
SD 
Mean 
# 
guests 
Mean 
gift 
(RMB) 
Gift 
SD 
Mean 
# 
guests 
Mean 
gift 
(RMB) 
Gift 
SD 
Mean 
# 
guests 
2000-
2004 28.8 18.1 35.5 41.7 31.1 31 41.6 31.1 22 23.5 17.2 31 
2005 25.1 12.3 34 45.9 36.1 38 - - - 28.7 17.4 49 
2006 27.6 8.0 41 55.4 49.2 34.3 58.1 24.7 31 21.8 13.3 61.9 
2007 46.6 27.8 46 50.5 25.9 40 53.3 44.1 26.3 - - - 
2008 - - - 53.6 34.8 35.5 59.7 29.2 36 85.4 80.7 56 
2009 73.3 51.6 51.5 90.6 61.3 37.3 68.4 39.7 45 37.9 33.2 75.5 
Source: Authors’ gift exchange data from three natural villages. 
Notes: All gifts spent have been adjusted for inflation based on China Statistic Year Book published by NBS. “-” 
means no ceremony occurred during that year. 
 
 
 
Table 2.4 Median Funeral Expenditures (RMB) in Major Ceremonies (1996 – 2009) 
year Come-of-age Wedding  (Groom's Family) 
Wedding Ceremony  
(Bride's Family) 
Funeral 
expenditure 
1996 - 4500 (3.00) 3157 (2.10) 2688 (1.79) 
1997 - 3852 (2.84) 3100 (2.29) 3471 (2.56) 
1998 - 5211 (3.85) 3025 (2.23) 3170 (2.34) 
1999 - 3634 (2.64) 3829 (2.79) 4328 (3.15) 
2000 - 6250 (4.85) 2929 (2.27) 4393 (3.41) 
2001 - 7371 (5.81) 5644 (4.45) 3388 (2.67) 
2002 - 7347 (5.20) 4536 (3.21) 3402 (2.41) 
2003 - 7891 (6.22) 5143 (4.05) 4655 (3.67) 
2004 - 10423 (8.24) 4243 (3.35) 6150 (4.86) 
2005 3208 (1.95) 9486 (5.76) 7633 (4.63) 5156 (3.13) 
2006 3387 (2.62) 11805 (9.14) 7502 (5.81) 6175 (4.78) 
2007 4284 (2.75) 8569 (5.50) 4927 (3.16) 8096 (5.20) 
2008 8046 (5.50) 13983 (9.56) 5833 (3.99) 7561 (5.17) 
2009 8154 (5.51) 15066 (10.18) 7766 (5.25) 7151 (4.83) 
Source: Authors’ survey data. 
Notes: Using Recall data from the 2007 survey and 2009 survey. 
[1] All spending have been adjusted for inflation based on China Statistic Year Book published by NBS. All values 
are in RMB. [2] Recall data on organizing come-of-age ceremony were only collected since 2005. [3] Numbers in 
brackets denote expenditure as times of per capita income. 
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Table 2.5a Transition Matrix (2004 – 2006) 
t t+1 Lowest 20% Lower 20% Mid 20% Higher 20% Highest 20% 
Lowest 20% 0.27   0.24   0.26   0.13   0.11 
Lower 20% 0.21   0.27   0.19   0.20   0.13 
Mid 20% 0.22   0.24   0.18   0.21   0.16 
Higher 20% 0.17   0.18   0.23   0.22   0.20 
Highest 20% 0.13   0.11   0.14   0.20   0.42 
Source: Authors’ survey data. 
Notes: Shorrocks' MET - the Prais index: 0.913   (SE: .02064661; CI: [0.872 , 0.953]) 
Atkinson et al. Mobility Ratio: 0.389   (SE: .02293795; CI: [0.344 , 0.434]) 
The rows denote income quartiles in the initial period, while the columns denote income quartiles in the later period. 
 
Table 2.5b Transition Matrix (2006 – 2009) 
t t+1 Lowest 20% Lower 20% Mid 20% Higher 20% Highest 20% 
Lowest 20% 0.35   0.21   0.24   0.13   0.07 
Lower 20% 0.18   0.35   0.21   0.16   0.10 
Mid 20% 0.17   0.15   0.34   0.23   0.11 
Higher 20% 0.11   0.14   0.23   0.27   0.25 
Highest 20% 0.10   0.16   0.14   0.20   0.40 
Source: Authors’ survey data 
Notes: Shorrocks' MET - the Prais index: 0.823   (SE: .02649932; CI: [0.771 , 0.875]) 
Atkinson et al. Mobility Ratio: 0.326   (SE: .0276683; CI: [0.272 , 0.380]) 
The rows denote income quartiles in the initial period, while the columns denote income quartiles in the later period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 86 - 
Table 2.6a Numbers of Households Join / Drop Out of the Gift-Exchange Network 
Panels hhs 
(base year) 
Active hhs 
(base year) 
Among them: Active 
hhs (end year) 
inactive hhs 
(base year) 
Among them: inactive 
hhs (end year) 
Definition for “Active”: centrality>0 
04-06 222 80 70 142 67 
06-09 233 150 119 83 23 
04-09 221 80 71 141 40 
Definition for “Active”: centrality>0   (hhs from outside villages excluded) 
04-06 124 61 58 63 27 
06-09 123 94 91 29 12 
04-09 123 61 60 62 14 
Definition for “Active”: per capita gift expenditure(RMB)>0 
04-06 222 189 179 66 15 
06-09 233 221 210 28 7 
04-09 221 188 176 66 13 
Source: Authors’ gift exchange data from three natural villages. 
Notes: The centrality measure is normalized in UCINET 6. 
 
Table 2.6b Households Being Very Active (or not) in the Gift-Exchange Network 
Panels hhs 
(base year) 
Very active hhs 
(base year) 
Among them: very active 
hhs (end year) 
Not very 
active hhs 
(base year) 
Among them: not 
very active 
hhs (end year) 
Definition for “Very Active”: household centrality>mean(centrality) in the base year 
04-06 222 66 57 156 70 
06-09 233 148 109 85 24 
04-09 221 66 54  155 46 
Definition for “Very Active”: household centrality>mean(centrality) in the base year 
(hhs from outside villages excluded) 
04-06 124 48 45 76 29 
06-09 123 92 81 31 13 
04-09 123 48  43 75 19 
Source: Authors’ gift exchange data from three natural villages. 
Notes: The centrality measure is normalized in UCINET 6. 
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Table 2.7a Labor/Information/Production Tool Exchange among 
Neighbor/Friends/Relatives 
Categories Labor exchange 
(busy season) 
Labor exchange 
(house building) 
Job info 
exchange 
Production 
tool exchange 
Elderly/kids 
care 
Most often 5.9% 6.2% 3.9% 4.7% 1.8% 
Very often 14.8% 19.5% 11.2% 13.9% 11.2% 
Somewhat often 12.1% 15.4% 11.9% 14.7% 12.9% 
Not at all often 12.4% 11.5% 11.3% 12.4% 15.9% 
Rare or never 54.8% 47.5% 61.7% 54.4% 58.3% 
Total 
(days) 
Median 0 0 - - - 
p75 5 5 - - - 
Mean 3.62 4.86 - - - 
Std. 
Dev. 
7.4 15.6 - - - 
Source: Authors’ survey data 
 
 
Table 2.7b Correlation between Network Engagement and Resources Exchange 
            Resources 
Exchange 
Network Engagement 
Labor exchange 
(busy season) 
Labor exchange 
(house building) 
Job info 
exchange 
Production 
tool exchange 
Elderly/kids 
care 
HH total gift 
expenditure 
0.050 
(0.43) 
-0.030 
(0.65) 
-0.070 
(0.23) 
0.050 
(0.43) 
0.002 
(0.98) 
Centrality -0.127** (0.04) 
-0.158*** 
(0.01) 
-0.116** 
(0.05) 
0.007 
(0.91) 
-0.121** 
(0.05) 
Share of gift expenditure 0.108* (0.06) 
0.161*** 
(0.01) 
0.113* 
(0.05) 
-0.052 
(0.37) 
0.195*** 
(0.00) 
Source: calculation based on Authors’ survey data. 
Notes: [1] p-values are presented in the parentheses. The first row in each cell presents pairwise correlation 
coefficients. [2] All five columns indicating resources exchange set the possible values into five categories: 1=most 
often, 2=very often, 3=somewhat often, 4=not at all often, 5=rare or never.   
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Table 2.8a Household Debt and Credit (end of 2009) 
Percentage of families with debt (%) 57.1 
Percentage of families grant a loan (%) 6.0 
Percentage of families with debt & grant a loan (%) 3.1 
The median amount of debt (RMB) when incurred 6,000 
The median amount of loan (RMB) when granted 5,000 
Major sources of debt (%)  
      Relatives 70.9 
      Neighbors 4.0 
      Rural credit union 25.1 
     Usury 8.6 
     Others (e.g. non-local friends, fertilizer retailers)      1.8 
When borrowing from relatives  
      Percentage of zero interest 89.8 
      Median monthly interest rate (%) when charging interest 1.0 
When borrowing from neighbors  
      Percentage of zero interest 70.0 
      Median monthly interest rate (%) when charging interest 2.0 
When borrowing from formal rural credit union  
      Median monthly interest rate (%)  1.0 
When borrowing from usury lenders  
      Median monthly interest rate (%) 3.0 
When borrowing from others  
      Median monthly interest rate (%) 0.0 
Major ways to deal with credit constraints in 2009 (%)  
      Borrowing from relatives, neighbors and friends 45.3 
      Selling assets 40.6 
      Working out or receiving remittance 26.1 
      Applying for a loan   7.4 
      Borrowing from usury lenders 2.0 
Source: Authors’ survey data. 
Notes: [1] “Major sources of debt (%)” categories stock value at the end of 2009, while “Major ways to deal with 
credit constraints” categories flow value during 2009. Meanwhile, the latter only includes households faced with 
credit constraints, which accounts for 90.1% of the surveyed households. 
 
Table 2.8b Correlation between Network Engagement and Informal Credit 
    Credit 
Insurance 
Network 
Engagement 
Debt 
(end of 
2009) 
Debt 
from 
relatives 
Debt from 
neighbors 
Interest 
rate 
Cash shortage 
coping: relatives / 
friends / neighbors 
Cash 
shortage 
coping: 
blood sales 
HH total gift exp 0.232*** (0.00) 
0.143*** 
(0.01) 
0.053 
(0.36) 
-0.038 
(0.61) 
0.115** 
(0.05) 
-0.088 
(0.13) 
Centrality 0.132** (0.03) 
0.180*** 
(0.00) 
0.110* 
(0.07) 
-0.112 
(0.15) 
0.122** 
(0.04) 
0.160*** 
(0.01) 
Share of gift exp 0.088 
(0.13) 
0.013 
(0.83) 
0.034 
(0.56) 
-0.029 
(0.70) 
0.053 
(0.36) 
-0.045 
(0.44) 
Source: calculation based on Authors’ survey data. 
Notes: p-values are presented in the parentheses. First row in each cell presents pairwise correlation coefficients. 
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Table 2.9a Determinants of Network Structure (All Years’ Gift Exchanges as A Network) 
 R1 R2 R3 R4 
 log Centrality log Popularity  log Influence log Closeness 
Ceremony organizer 0.71 5.21*** 0.53*** 0.00 (0.77) (0.07) (0.14) (0.00)  
Per capita income (log) 0.67*** 0.06* 0.05** 0.00** (0.22) (0.04) (0.02) (0.00) 
Blood relatives’ network size 0.12** 0.01 0.04*** 0.00 (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Marriage status 0.63 0.25 0.04 0.01 (1.15) (0.21) (0.11) (0.01) 
sex 0.31 0.06 -0.12 -0.01 (1.05) (0.20) (0.10) (0.01) 
edu -0.07 0.01 0.01 0.00 (0.10) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) 
cadre 1.43 -0.04 0.15 0.00 (0.99) (0.18) (0.10) (0.01) 
Share of youth 1.47 0.20 0.61*** -0.01 (1.26) (0.12) (0.23) (0.01) 
Share of the elder -0.05 -0.19 -0.49* 0.00 (1.37) (0.13) (0.25) (0.01) 
age 0.01 0.01 0.02*** 0.00 (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Household size 0.32 0.02 0.08** 0.00 (0.20) (0.02) (0.04) (0.00) 
Minority status 0.70 -0.05 -0.61*** -0.04*** (0.73) (0.13) (0.07) 0.00  
Gini coefficient 16.49*** 1.50 2.64*** 0.25*** (6.09) (1.13) (0.59) (0.03) 
Machine (#) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Land size (mu) 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.00 (0.10) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) 
Cow (#) -0.08 0.02 0.04 0.00 (0.29) (0.05) (0.03) (0.00) 
Horse (#) 0.14 -0.21 0.12* 0.01*** (0.73) (0.14) (0.07) (0.00) 
Cumulated large disease 
(lag) 
-0.06 -0.07** 0.02 0.00 
(0.36) (0.03) (0.04) (0.00) 
Cumulated livestock death 
(lag) 
-0.70* 0.02 -0.05 -0.01** 
(0.41) (0.08) (0.04) (0.00) 
r2 0.29 0.60 0.61 0.78 
N 264 264 264 264 
Notes: Pooled cross-sectional estimations. All network structure indicators as the dependent variables are 
normalized. Village fixed effect is controlled. All four columns treat gift exchanges over recent years as one 
network. For a detailed review of network structure measures used here, please refer to the Appendix. 
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Table 2.9b Determinants of Network Structure (Each Year’s Gift Exchanges as a Network) 
 R1 R2 R3 R4 
 log 
Centrality 
log Popularity log 
Influence 
log 
Closeness 
Ceremony organizer 0.44 2.03*** 0.09 -0.02 (0.59) (0.13) (0.18) (0.01) 
Per capita income (log) 0.40** 0.06 0.01 0.01* (0.17) (0.04) (0.05) (0.00)  
Blood relatives’ network size 6.64* 1.82** 1.00 0.02 (3.85) (0.82) (1.19) (0.01) 
Marriage status 0.74*** 0.02 0.01 0.01 (0.26) (0.11) (0.11) (0.01) 
Share of youth 1.05 -0.06 -0.32 0.11*** (0.83) (0.18) (0.26) (0.02) 
Share of the elder 0.72 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07*** (0.92) (0.20) (0.29) (0.02) 
age 0.08* 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)  
Household size -0.04 0.00 -0.05 0.00 (0.14) (0.03) (0.04) (0.00)  
Gini coefficient 15.80*** 0.35 6.88*** 0.04 (2.99) (0.64) (0.93) (0.06) 
Machine (#) -0.07 0.06 -0.66 -0.04 (1.36) (0.29) (0.42) (0.03) 
Land size (mu) 0.04 0.00 0.05*** 0.00 (0.06) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00)  
Cow (#) 0.33 0.06 0.06 0.03*** (0.25) (0.05) (0.08) (0.01) 
Horse (#) 0.22 -0.12 -0.37 0.06*** (0.72) (0.16) (0.23) (0.02) 
Cumulated large disease (lag) -0.63* 0.13 -0.28** -0.05*** (0.38) (0.08) (0.12) (0.01) 
Cumulated livestock death 
(lag) 
0.16 0.10 -0.05 -0.04*** 
(0.44) (0.09) (0.13) (0.01) 
r2 0.29 0.50 0.21 0.76 
N 652 652 652 652 
Notes: Household fixed effects estimations. All the dependent variables are normalized. Village fixed effect and 
year fixed effect are controlled. All four columns treat gift exchanges during each year as a complete network. For a 
detailed review of network structure measures used here, please refer to the Appendix.
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CHAPTER 3 
 
PEER EFFECTS, RISK POOLING, AND STATUS SEEKING: WHAT EXPLAINS GIFT 
SPENDING ESCALATION IN RURAL CHINA? 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
It has been widely documented that many of the poor spend a significant portion of their 
limited income on social spending, such as splendid funerals (The Economist 2007; Mango et al. 
2009), extravagant bride-prices and dowries (Rao 1993; Brown 2009), and lavish festivals 
(Banerjee and Duflo 2007), at the expense of their basic nutrition intake (Subramanian and 
Deaton 1996; Thomas and Strauss 1997; Chen and Zhang 2010). Peer pressure, status concerns, 
and risk pooling are three notable explanations for this observed puzzle in the literature. 
Many of the poor live in a closely knit community. Their behavior is deeply influenced by 
their peers in the reference group. Peer effects can generate both positive and negative 
externality. On the positive side, peer pressure may facilitate technology adoption and social 
learning (Benabou 1993; Hoxby 2000; Glaeser and Scheinkman 2001; Conley and Udry 2010). 
However, peer pressure can also induce socially undesirable behavior, such as juvenile 
delinquency (Haynie 2001). It is therefore likely that one’s gift-giving behavior is influenced by 
peers as well. 
Gift giving may also signal wealth and social status. If a higher social status is associated 
with greater rewards, such as higher likelihood of marriage for offspring, then concerns for status 
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may intensify gift-giving competition. The competitive pressure is especially large for the lower 
tail of the distribution (Deaton 2001; Watson and McLanahan 2011; Brown, Bulte, and Zhang 
2011) because of the unfavorable marriage market conditions for the poor. 
Gift-giving behavior has accompanied human beings for thousands of years. Facing various 
natural and human-made shocks, people have used gift giving as a means of smoothing shocks 
and mitigating risks. For example, funerals are very costly in many developing countries. It is 
hard for a family to come by the means to pay funeral expenses by itself. As a result, it is quite 
common that people extend gifts when attending funerals. The pooled resources can largely 
defray the funeral expenses. In this sense, the gift expenditures to others can be regarded as 
insurance premiums (Rosenzweig 1988; Coate and Ravallion 1993; Townsend 1994). It is likely 
that risk sharing represents another key motive for gift giving. 
Previous studies have investigated the behavior of gift giving from different angles, such as 
risk sharing (Fafchamps and Gubert 2007) or status concern and peer pressure (Brown, Bulte, 
and Zhang 2011). In this paper, we attempt to simultaneously disentangle the three factors using 
a three-wave census-type household panel dataset combined with well-kept gift records for all 
households in three natural villages in rural China. Meanwhile, we try to improve the empirical 
identification along all the three dimensions. 
Our datasets have several salient features. First, because we have detailed income and 
expenditure information for all the households in the sampled villages over three periods, we are 
able to measure relative social status and examine its impact on gift giving along a wide 
spectrum of income distribution. Second, the complete gift records enable us to match gift givers 
and recipients, thereby providing us with an effective way to identify the role of risk pooling in 
gift-giving behavior along several dimensions. Third, the long-term gift records capture the 
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dynamics of gift-giving activity, such as its recent escalation. The large variation in guest 
composition across occasions circumvents the main identification problems. Fourth, the gift 
records advance the literature on network formation through gift values, since relationship 
intensities often matter more to behavior than the connections themselves. 
As a preview of the main results, we find that gift-giving behavior is largely influenced by 
peers in the reference groups. Status concern is another key motive for keeping up the Joneses in 
extending gifts. In particular, poor families with sons spend more on gift giving in proportion to 
their income than their rich counterparts in response to the increasing marriage market squeeze. 
In contrast, risk pooling is not a key driver of the observed gift-giving patterns. Moreover, gift 
giving is largely reciprocal in China. After a small group of people receive unexpected windfall 
income, for example, they start to extend more generous gifts to others. Others have to follow 
suit, triggering the escalation of gift expenditure. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents the patterns of gift giving in rural 
China; Section 3 discusses the data; Section 4 lays out our basic analytical framework; Section 5 
discusses the main issues in peer effect identification and its relevance to our strategy; Section 6 
specifies the empirical model; Section 7 presents the main results on the determinants for gift 
spending and its escalation; finally, Section 8 concludes with further discussion. 
 
3.2 Gift Giving in Rural China 
Gift exchange is commonly practiced in developing countries but rarely documented in the 
economics literature. Chinese society is largely relationship (guanxi) based and gift exchange 
plays an important role in maintaining guanxi. Gift giving is largely reciprocal. One is supposed 
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to pay back previously received gifts later on according to the prevalent “market price” of gift 
giving.  
The analysis of gift giving in rural China is based on our surveyed villages in rural Guizhou 
(Table 3.1). Table 3.2 presents gift expenditure per occasion and the number of guests in 
coming-of-age ceremonies, weddings (bride’s family and groom’s family), and funerals over 
time. The average gift size has increased steadily for all the four occasions, as has the number of 
guests participating. However, the rising gift size is not sufficient to cover the total expenditures 
on these events. As shown in Table 3.3 on the total expenditures for the four types of events, the 
median expenditure for a coming-of-age ceremony is more than 8,000 Chinese yuan renminbi 
(CNY), while on average the host of such an event receives only CNY 3,782. In other words, the 
host has to cover more than 54 percent of the expenses out of his own pocket. The gap is even 
larger for wedding ceremonies among groom families: The amount of gifts received accounted 
for only 20 percent of total expenditure in 2009.  
Figure 3.1 presents the share of gift expenditure by income quartile over our three-wave 
survey in China and other countries. The three dashed circles highlight our three-wave surveys. 
Over time, the share of gift and festival expenditure has increased steadily. There is an increasing 
spread in the share of gift and festival expenditure among the income quartiles. The poorer a 
household, the higher the share of consumption devoted to social spending, and the faster the 
growth in share of gift and festival expenditure between 2004 and 2009. 
Figure 3.2 plots the annual growth rates of gift spending, consumption, and income over the 
period 2005–2009. Annual gift growth rates range from 18 percent to 45 percent in three 
villages, much higher than the 10 percent annual growth rate of per capita consumption. While 
the share of expenditures allocated to food dropped from 48 to 42 percent, the share of spending 
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on gifts and festivals soared from 8 percent to 17 percent. Apparently, gift spending escalation is 
an acute phenomenon in this impoverished region.  
 
3.3 Data Collection 
3.3.1 Three-Wave Census Survey 
The household information for this study comes from three waves of census-type household 
survey conducted by us in 18 selected natural villages in rural Guizhou, China.28 They are both 
geographically isolated and ethnically diversified. Local residents know each other well. Most 
residents’ kinship networks are confined to these villages. More than 20 ethnic groups are living 
in the area, including Han, Miao, Buyi, Gelao, and Yi. In total, ethnic minorities make up about 
20 percent of population. 
The three rounds of surveys in 2005, 2007, and 2010 cover 801, 833, and 872 households, 
respectively. The differences in sample size largely reflect demographic changes. All three 
waves include detailed information on household demographics, income, consumption, and 
transfers. Transfers include gifts received and extended. Since our analysis uses gift-exchange 
records from 3 of the 18 villages, only households involved in the social occasions surrounding 
the recorded gifts are relevant for this study. 
 
3.3.2 Gift-Exchange Records Collection 
Rural households usually keep the records of gifts received on major occasions for a long 
period because they have to pay back accordingly when the gift givers hold a social event (Yan 
                                                 
28 This survey was jointly conducted by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), the Chinese 
Academy of Agricultural Sciences (CAAS), and Guizhou University. 
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1996).29 In the survey area in Guizhou, we find that all the households keep a gift book. In early 
2010, we used a digital camera to capture the gifts recorded in the books for major occasions 
(male family member’s wedding, female family member’s wedding, funeral, coming-of-age 
ceremony, child birth ceremony, and house-moving ceremony) during the period 2000–2009 for 
all the households in 3 natural villages. The 3 natural villages were selected from the 18 natural 
villages (3 administrative villages) where the three-wave census survey was conducted (Table 
3.1). In each administrative village, we selected the natural village with mirroring the average 
development level of the whole administrative village.. 
A unique Karst landform keeps the 3 villages isolated from the outside society. Among 
them, village 1 is the most remote (10 kilometers away from the county seat with poor road 
access), and local customs are well preserved. On the other hand, village 3 is only 2.5 kilometers 
away from the county seat. It is the most vulnerable to external changes, such as the recent social 
spending inflation. In between, village 2 is populated by the Buyi ethnic minority, who preserve 
the Catholic culture and ceremony tradition different from that of the major Han villages (such as 
villages 1 and 3). In major public ceremonies in village 2, people generally participate in the 
events (such as Halloween and Christmas) without bearing a huge burden of gift exchange.30 
Since the surveyed villages are populated with Han group and ethnic minorities, we are able to 
explore social connections between ethnic groups. 
Based on the three-wave household surveys in 18 natural villages, we identify 335 
households in gift record books, including 160 households from the 3 natural villages where the 
                                                 
29 Yan writes, “Ritualized gift giving is also associated with the custom of making and preserving gift lists. Gift lists 
are homemade books on red paper (funeral gift lists are made on yellow paper) inscribed with a traditional Chinese 
calligraphy brush. They serve as a formal record of all gifts received by the host of a family ceremony” (1996, page 
49). 
30 A major difference in this aspect between public celebrations in India and household ceremonies in China can be 
found in Rao (2001) and Chen (2009). 
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gift records were collected and 175 households from the other 15 natural villages covered by our 
large-scale household survey.31 Once having joined in gift exchanges, most people remain 
active. A great proportion of previously inactive households become active at the end of each 
period. 
Figure 3.3 shows a map of the gift network in 1 of the 3 villages. In total, 8,074 gift links 
during the period 2000–2009 are identified. The potential links include all households in the 
hosts’ local villages and the identified links between local villages and the other 15 surveyed 
villages, whether or not there was a gift given. The assumption is that all households in the same 
village know each other and are aware of the dates of ceremonies. Given the geographic and 
local social environment, this is very likely to be the case. Meanwhile, 4,611 cross–
township/county gift links among 4,924 potential links were recorded. These potential cross–
township/county links included all the recorded cross–township/county links and zero-gift-flow 
links between the hosts and their bride’s-side blood relatives recalled by each household. Every 
effort was made to identify these potential but nonexistent gifts to circumvent sample attrition 
and sorting problems during our records collection process. Nearly all households’ gift-receiving 
records for the ceremonies were included in this study, since less than 5 percent of households 
reported gift book loss or damage.32 
If all family members are illiterate, a group of two or three educated relatives usually helps 
record gift giving on the celebration days. However, names on the records are usually 
nicknames, which might not offer precise identification of the individual involved. To solve this 
problem, we showed a name list to each household to facilitate their identifying the people 
                                                 
31 Our census-type survey determines that all households in the eighteen villages, who had presented any gifts to 
people residing in the three villages in recent years, are identified. Other names, such as those from out of the three 
administrative villages, are not included in our analysis. 
32 We consulted on major ceremonies with village leaders and local residents to verify before going to individual 
families. Meanwhile, this prior information helped households recall and find gift books for us. 
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represented on the records. We also consulted many local people to help identify the people 
recorded by their nicknames. 
Information on kinship and relatedness among villagers was also collected and matched to 
each gift link. The information was verified with the help of village leaders, the elderly, and local 
elites. As do many other rural communities, each of the 3 surveyed villages has several major 
clans. Taking village 3 in Figure 3.3 as an example, households in the same clan usually live 
closer to each other for historical reasons. Gift exchanges are more prevalent within a clan than 
across clans. 
 
3.4 Risk Pooling and Network Formation: An Analytical Framework 
In the literature, most studies tie pairwise link formation to individual decisions. 
Separability of the utility function is imposed with the assumption that the utility derived from 
the network is equal to the sum of the utilities brought by each link and that these link-specific 
utilities are not affected by the structure of the network. Following the conventional setting 
(De Weerdt 2004; Udry and Conley 2005; Fafchamps and Gubert 2007), we define the existence 
of a link ( ijL ) between two nodes of distance ijd . A link is established when the benefit from a 
link ( ( ,1) ( ,0))ij ijB d B d−  exceeds its maintenance cost ( )ijC d . Since distance does not explain all 
aspects of link formation, a residual ije  exists. Specifically,  
 1ijL =  if [ ( , 1) ( , 0)] ( ) 0ij ij ij ij ij ijB d L B d L C d e= − = − + > . (1) 
Social distance ijd  involves indicators of multiple dimensions: spatial distance, family 
characteristics and relatedness, shared activities, and so on. The longer the social distance, the 
less homogeneous are the shocks, and the more there might be monitoring and enforcement 
difficulties. Therefore, both the benefit and the cost of link formation should increase with social 
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distance ijd , leading to a trade-off between the scope and ability of mutual insurance in the 
networks. Thus, the effect of multidimensional social distance on link formation is an empirical 
question.  
First, income pooling should be more effective between households engaged in different 
activities or occupations, such as, in our context, between farmers and nonfarm migrant workers. 
A farmer’s income is determined by such factors as weather conditions and pest infestation, 
while the income of a nonfarm migrant worker depends on economic prosperity, which is 
expected to be uncorrelated with farm income. However, households with different occupations 
usually have less common ground to socialize with each other. 
Second, taking care of children and elderly is a form of risk sharing that differs from 
income pooling. Young households with children are faced with different health risks than those 
faced by the elderly; moreover, younger households are more capable of helping each other than 
are the elderly. Therefore, households with a large difference in age structure have the potential 
to insure each other. However, their social interactions might be limited due to differences in 
lifestyle. 
Third, due to the potential inter-household externalities to education, links between the 
better educated and the less educated are more attractive to the latter than to the former. 
Likewise, the poor may have stronger motivation to link with the rich than vice versa. On the 
other hand, rich households might be willing to help poor households who are not able to bear 
large expenses resulting from shocks and ceremonies. Since link formation is directional and the 
incentives behind it are asymmetrical, social distance should capture this factor.  
Kinship may strengthen link formation inasmuch as it reflects history, norms, and trust in a 
community. Given a certain geographic closeness, blood relationships facilitate in punishing 
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uncooperative behavior. From a Darwinist’s perspective, helping family members is a way to 
expand the gene pool. 
A level effect should also be included in framework (1) to explore whether households with 
certain common characteristics tend to form links. For instance, it is expected that wealthier and 
better-educated people tend to link to each other, and households with a higher share of elderly 
or children are less likely to link to each other. The wealth effect is captured by per capita 
income. Because networks affect the ability to generate income, income is endogenous to the 
network and thus should be instrumented in the first-stage estimation.33 
The framework to this point ignores peer influence in shaping one’s link formation 
decisions, which usually works in the same direction as the risk-pooling motive and may blur the 
identification. In a traditional rural society, peer influence matters because communities are 
isolated and people have close relations. 
Furthermore, the framework does not clearly consider the role of status. Unlike information 
networks, networks of gift giving on social occasions help in climbing social ladders and 
mobilizing resources in the future. The fact that status seeking works in the same direction as 
risk pooling and peer influence makes its identification important. 
 
                                                 
33 Since one’s social network affects the capability of income generation, income is potentially endogenous to the 
network formation process. Households with better networks may earn higher incomes. Therefore, we instrument 
per capita income with variables that predate the formation of gift links, including education of the head, size of the 
head’s lineal family, major family productive assets (such as a cow, a horse, and farming machines), inherited land 
size, number of working members in a household, gender of the head, whether the head is a cadre, and shocks 
suffered during the year. Since income enters the dyadic regressions in difference and sum, we separately instrument 
the difference and sum in per capita income (Table A.1). Most instruments have strong predictive power, especially 
land, cow, relative network size, education, and shocks. Predicted sum and difference in per capita income are used 
in lieu of actual income in the estimations that follow. Predicted per capita income rather than predicted wealth is 
used, because it is believed to be more precise than an index of wealth evaluated at subjective prices, especially in 
this context, where a great proportion of family assets is composed of dated housing. 
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3.5 Peer Effect Identification 
Although peer effect has been studied for decades, no consensus has been reached on its 
significance and magnitude due to criticisms related to identification (Manski 1993; Moffitt 
2001; Brock and Durlauf 2001). Even less is known about the mechanisms through which it 
operates. Three challenges confront peer effect identification: first, the real group within which 
people interact with each other is a priori unknown; second, correlated effects confound the 
identification because people usually endogenously form peer groups or are affected by common 
group characteristics (for example, common shocks in the development literature and teacher 
effects in studies of education) and thus behave similarly; third, the reflection problem persists 
because people influence each other in a group, which hinders any judgment on whether a 
person’s action is the cause or the effect of peers’ actions. 
 
3.5.1 Reference Groups 
The definitions of reference groups vary substantially in the literature, from the most 
comprehensive, a national population, to the very restrictive, such as a grade cohort. The large 
variation in the scope of reference groups reflects how hard it is to establish who influences 
whom a priori. 
Most studies do not have that information due to limitations on their data, on their 
understanding of the specific context and social mechanism, or both. Instead, they assume 
individuals in the population as potential peers and define peer influence based on average 
intragroup externality that affects group members identically.34 However, different time and 
social constraints among agents suggest that the set of potential partners has large variation, 
whether or not the population is partitioned. 
                                                 
34 Another strategy is to pick at random many sets of potential peers to build a simulated likelihood (Mihaly 2007). 
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In our study, identifying the effects of both peer pressure and status seeking on gift giving 
during social events requires an appropriate definition of the reference group. Peer pressure in 
sending gifts is most likely to work through information sharing among guests attending social 
events.35 Therefore, the main reference group for gift spending is defined according to gift 
presenters on each occasion. We also define reference groups for gift spending based on gift 
receivers to whom one presents gifts in any given year. A comparison of estimates from the two 
peer group definitions, fellow gift presenters and gift receivers, informs us of the relative 
intensity of peer pressure in extending gifts. 
Relative status is measured according to the geographic reference group.36 According to a 
recent study (Mangyo and Park 2011), geographic reference groups, often at the village level, are 
salient for rural residents living in close proximity. In rural China, a natural village is evolved 
over generations. Due further to the local Karst landform that isolates the natural villages in this 
study from the outside, a natural village is particularly suitable to be treated as a unit for social 
comparison. As a result, we define the reference group as the natural village for purposes of 
measuring yearly household-specific social status. 
 
3.5.2 Correlated Effects 
Correlated effects may come from two sources: unobservable common shocks and 
endogenous group formation. To separate correlated effects that confound peer effect 
identification, some studies use randomly assigned peers (Sacerdote 2001; Zimmerman 2003), 
                                                 
35 Rural residents send gifts to their local events, and information on the gift price is shared. On the day of a 
ceremony, an educated person is often responsible for keeping the record of gifts received. As a result, the market 
information on gifts given is largely common knowledge within a village. As shown by comparing kernel density 
estimates among social events, gift spending at each event tends to cluster. 
36 Ideally, the identification of relative status should follow that of peer effect. However, multiple relative status 
values appear for a household that gives gifts more than once a year, if fellow gift presenters per event are defined as 
peers. If gift receivers are defined as peers, missing values appear for a household that sends no gifts in a year. 
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some use conditional variance restrictions that disentangle excess variance due to peer effect 
from that due to group-level sorting (Graham 2008), and others use composition variations of 
adjacent cohorts within schools to identify peer effect (Hoxby 2000; Gibbons and Telhaj 2008; 
Ammermueller and Pischke 2009). Similar to the methodology of these latter studies, we identify 
peer effect through the large variation in the size and composition of guests attending each social 
event.  
To tackle the issue of common unobservable shocks, lagged all peers’ median gift per 
occasion is instrumented with lagged new peers’ median gift per occasion from brides’ out-of-
township blood relatives.37 The longitudinal structure of the data allows us to track each 
household’s previous peers and distinguish between new peers and old peers. On the one hand, 
the large distance between villages in the mountainous region limits the spread of common 
shocks and the sharing of information, which mitigates the concern for common unobserved 
factors. Information sharing is further restricted by the patrilineal culture, whereby fellow 
villagers attending a male-side ceremony have little connection with the external relatives of the 
bride. On the other hand, new peers’ median gift per occasion is highly correlated with that of all 
peers by construction. These two relevant features of out-of-township new peers result in a good 
instrument. 
To mitigate the concern for self-selection into gift groups, all fellow villagers and brides’ 
out-of-township blood relatives, whether they present gifts or not, are included in the analysis, 
since all households in each village know each other well and know about social events due to 
close local connections spanning generations. Moreover, correlated effects arising from 
unobserved individual and group effects are taken care of in our fixed-effect estimations. We 
                                                 
37 The traditional patrilineal culture and land allocation system in rural China determine that most males stay in birth 
villages, while most females migrate out upon marriage. Since local geographic condition restricts social 
connections with the outside, most out-of-township new peers are brides’ blood relatives. 
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further control guests’ group characteristics to test whether individuals sort themselves into 
groups according to certain unobservable characteristics or abilities (Broeck and Dercon 2007). 
 
3.5.3 The Reflection Problem 
The reflection problem arises when the endogenous effect and exogenous effects are 
entangled in the identification of peer effect. Since only the endogenous effect can generate a 
social multiplier with policy implications, studies never give up finding effective solutions. 
Methods utilized to isolate the two effects include these: instrumenting peers’ current behavior 
with their lagged behavior (Hanushek et al. 2003) or the lagged treatment they received (Boozer 
and Cacciola 2001), specifying a nonlinear setting (Manski 1993; Brock and Durlauf 2001), 
designing a partial-population experiment setting that directly affects the behavior of some but 
not all group members (Bobonis and Finan 2009), and utilizing network information or partially 
overlapping groups (De Giorgi, Pellizzari, and Redaelli 2010). 
In principle, the identification of endogenous effect from contextual effect is made possible 
when an appropriate exclusion restriction is found whereby an influencing factor of individual 
outcomes does not directly affect peers’ outcomes (Manski 1993). While it is difficult to 
distinguish a factor’s impacts on an individual from its impacts on peers using a standard dataset 
with perfectly overlapping peer groups, partially overlapping peer groups create direct as well as 
indirect connection. Ideally, rich information on social networks makes possible a clear 
identification (Calvó-Armengol, Patacchini, and Zenou 2009; De Giorgi, Pellizzari, and Redaelli 
2010; Lin 2010), but our outcome variable—individual gift spending per occasion—raises the 
concern for duplicated usage of gift information. Therefore, this strategy cannot be applied here. 
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Nonetheless, the partially overlapping peer groups across social events separate new peers 
from old peers and out-of-township peers from local peers. As discussed above, gifts from 
brides’ out-of-township blood relatives generally have no direct effect on gift spending from 
local residents, thereby satisfying the exclusion assumption. In line with the literature, we also 
take lagged median gifts from fellow gift presenters to break down the reflective influence. 
 
3.6 Empirical Strategy 
3.6.1 Model Specification 
Our main empirical estimations are dyadic regressions. In network analysis, a dyad is a pair 
of agents. Dyadic data contain two types of information: link attributes ijw  between nodes i  and 
j , and node attributes iz  and jz  for nodes i  and j , respectively. Therefore, the data are 
normally transformed into level effect ( i jz z+ ), social distance ( i jz z− ), and link attributes ijw  
to best preserve information.38 Since gift exchanges are directional, the outcome variable y  need 
not satisfy ij jiy y=  for any i  and j . Following Fafchamps and Gubert (2007), let 
 , , , 0 1 , , , 1 2 , , 3 , , 4 , , , , , ,[ ] ( ) ( )i j c t i j c t i t j t i t j t i t i j t i t i j c ty m y z z z z RD wα α α α α ψ φ− −= + − + + + + + γ + ++ ε , (2)  
where -i denotes peers of household i; , , ,i j c ty  is the actual gift guest i  presents to the host j  on 
occasion c  at time t ; , ,i j tw  denotes link attributes between i and j at time t , such as cross-village 
or not and blood relations; and ,i tz  and ,j tz , respectively, denote attributes of households i and j 
at time t.  
                                                 
38 Our conditional dyadic fixed effect model assumes conditional independence for consistency, which means that 
gift-giving decisions are independent from each other and conditional on all explanatory variables and node-specific 
unobserved factors. 
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Peer effect 1α  is identified via an instrumental variable (IV) approach. Reference groups for 
gift spending are defined according to fellow gift presenters per occasion in the main estimations 
and gift receivers to whom one presents gifts per year in the robustness check. Compared with 
the methodology of Brown, Bulte, and Zhang (2011), which restricts peer groups at the village 
boundary, our novel definition of peer group enables us to eliminate correlated effects and 
contextual effects that would confound peer effect identification. 
In the main estimations, lagged median gift spending per occasion from brides’ out-of-
township blood relatives, whether they sent a gift or not, instruments lagged all peers’ median 
gift to j  per occasion c , that is, , , , 1[ ]i j c tm y− − . Adopting a nonlinear peer influence setting, that is, 
lagged median behavior among peers, partially overlapping guests across occasions creates 
exclusion restrictions that mitigate the reflection problem. 
Out-of-township peers circumvent the concern for correlated effects that arises from 
common unobservable shocks. All fellow residents within the village boundaries and brides’ out-
of-township blood relatives, whether they present gifts or not, are included in the peer group to 
mitigate concern for self-selection into gift groups. 
To test the risk-pooling motive, we combine 2α  and 3α : 2α  identifies social distance effect 
while 3α  identifies level effect. The two effects are controlled to eliminate the concern that 
apparent sorting by gift given could be due solely to the similarities in preferences that come 
from closeness. A set of household factors is included to construct social distance and level 
effect indicators, including head characteristics (gender, marital status, education, age, and 
ethnicity), family characteristics (share of youth and elderly, cadre, household size, land size, 
family assets, number of farm workers, and number of nonfarm workers), and major household 
shocks (natural disaster, livestock death, and family member death). 
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However, the link formation framework used by Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) (1 = link 
exists; 0 = link does not exist) conveys no information on how the intensity of a link is 
determined. The strength of links in many contexts is what really matters to an individual’s well-
being. It shows to what extent one can rely on networks when needed, rather than what the mere 
existence of links could do. Therefore, we substitute the actual gift one presents on an occasion 
for the existence of a link as the dependent variable. 
From the econometric identification perspective, the Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) 
framework illustrates that low-degree variation hinders the effort to reliably identify 
determinants of more links, that is, the level effect 3α , since the degree for a directional link 
from i  to j  is either 0 or 1. Combined with the dependence of dyadic observations, the issue is 
that joint likelihood of the sample cannot be decomposed into a product of single observation 
likelihoods. However, link intensity based on gift amounts provides much larger variation. 
Therefore, a linear dyadic model of gift spending per occasion is estimated to circumvent the 
issue of indecomposable dependent dyadic observation likelihoods. 
Relative status ,i tRD  is measured via defining natural villages as peer groups. It is captured 
by the individual-specific Deaton relative deprivation index (Deaton 2001), the normalized 
difference between the average income of those with higher income and an income level x 
weighted by the proportion of those with income higher than the corresponding individual i. Its 
value lies between 0 and 1. The more relatively deprived, the higher the value.39 The identified 
impact is denoted by 4α . This is an improvement over the method of Brown, Bulte, and Zhang 
(2011), which uses community-specific distributional indicators to measure status seeking. 
                                                 
39 For a detailed review of a series of relative deprivation measures, see Chen and Zhang (2011). 
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The main specification (2), however, does not directly account for the recent gift escalation. 
Manipulating the dyadic observations to difference between each pair of households with zero 
and nonzero gift exchanges,40 the pairwise difference model (3) investigates how the incremental 
gift spending can be interpreted as influenced by three major factors: risk sharing, changes in 
status, and changes in peer influence. The pairwise difference model removes the unobserved 
pair heterogeneity: 
 , , 1 , , 1 2 , , 3 , , 4 , , ,[ ] ( ) ( )i j t i j t i t j t i t j t i t i j ty m y z z z z RDα α α α− −∆ = ∆ + − + + + ∆ + ∆ε . (3)  
To check whether peer effect is robust to more IVs, we keep out-of-township peers’ median 
gifts and additionally follow the strategy of De Weerdt and Dercon (2006), which uses changes 
in peers’ windfall income and remittance to instrument changes in peers’ median spending per 
occasion. Changes in peers’ windfall income directly affect changes in peers’ gift spending and 
exert only indirect impact on one’s gift spending growth via peer influence. 
 
3.6.2 Dependence of Dyadic Observations 
Due to the presence of node-specific characteristics common to all links containing that 
node, dyadic links are not independent. The nonindependence feature can be expressed as 
, ,( , ) 0i j i kE ε ε ≠ , , ,( , ) 0i j k iE ε ε ≠ , , ,( , ) 0i j k jE ε ε ≠ , and , ,( , ) 0i j j kE ε ε ≠  for all k. Conventional 
ordinary least squares estimation generates consistent coefficient estimates but inconsistent 
standard errors. Monte Carlo simulations show that the corrected standard errors can be much 
larger, especially when the average links per nodes is large (Fafchamps and Gubert 2007). 
Three general categories of approaches have been utilized to tackle the dependence of 
dyadic observations. The first category is to run the generalized least squares estimation while 
                                                 
40 We restrict our analysis to dyadic links between households that once held social occasions. 
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assuming some form for the covariance matrix. However, the method has not been as thoroughly 
worked out as panel data (Simpson 2001). 
The second category of approaches is to correct for the understated dyadic p-values or 
standard errors. The conventional method has one dimension to be clustered, while for dyadic 
data we need to simultaneously cluster two dimensions, gift presenters and gift receivers. Three 
corresponding methods are developed in this category. First, a multiway clustering method is 
developed to allow arbitrary heteroskedasticity and intragroup correlation in distinct non-nested 
categories (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller 2011; Thompson 2009). Though applied in some 
settings with , ,( , ) 0i j i kE ε ε ≠  or , ,( , ) 0i j k jE ε ε ≠ , the clustering does not consider the cases when 
, ,( , ) 0i j k iE ε ε ≠  or , ,( , ) 0i j j kE ε ε ≠ . A second method, quadratic assignment procedure (QAP), is 
widely utilized in the sociology literature. QAP uses permutation methods to adjust p-values, but 
it relies on bootstrapping (Simpson 2001; Santos and Barrett 2010). The third method in this 
category, that of Fafchamps and Gubert (2007), corrects dyadic standard errors due to the cross-
observation correlation in error terms involving certain individuals. It thereby more thoroughly 
adjusts for dependence of dyadic observations. 
The third category uses individual fixed effect to purge out the unobserved attributes 
(De Weerdt 2004; Udry and Conley 2005). For the dyadic data, the dyadic fixed-effect model 
involves putting in a dummy variable for each gift presenter and gift receiver. However, a large 
set of dummies often leads to inefficiency or substantive parameters without estimation when the 
covariate does not vary much along a dimension. Meanwhile, the fixed-effect model may not 
handle some forms of correlated errors (Thompson 2009). Another limitation with dyadic fixed 
effects is that they limit the set of covariates that can be included due to collinearity. Fortunately, 
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the long-term network records and dispersed gift spending along both dimensions allow us to 
identify the parameters with a large set of dummies. 
Though all the three methods are effective in their own ways, there still is an assumption 
that the error terms of two dyads containing no mutual members are uncorrelated. We relax this 
assumption in the robustness check through clustering the observations by time periods. Results, 
not shown here to save space, indicate that this affects only standard errors, not inference. 
In this paper, we estimate dyadic regressions across all possible dyads using De Weerdt 
dyadic fixed-effect correction (De Weerdt 2004), Fafchamps-Gubert (FG) standard error 
correction (Fafchamps and Gubert 2007), and QAP (Simpson 2001). The absence of some 
dyadic observations is perfectly predicted by a household’s never holding any ceremonies in the 
past few years, two households’ not knowing each other across villages, or both. Therefore, there 
is no point including those pairs in the estimation. All estimations are based on an N x N square 
adjacency matrix composed of (potential) pairwise connections among event organizers. 
Through this survey design, square adjacent matrices are built.41 
To implement the De Weerdt dyadic fixed-effect correction, a set of dummy variables is 
introduced, one for each household in the sample indicating whether that household is involved 
in a pair. Every row of the data contains two dummies equal one. Combined with the observable 
attribute variables, the set of dummies controls the unobserved attributes left in the error term. 
The FG standard error correction uses the following formula to correct the covariance 
matrix for the coefficient estimates β . N denotes number of dyadic observations and K is the 
number of regressors. X is the matrix of all regressors and ijX is the vector of regressors for 
                                                 
41 This strategy is consistent with the standard social network survey that asks respondents to identify a list of other 
households on which they could rely in case of need or to whom they give help when called upon to do so. 
 114 
dyadic observation ij. We have 1ijklm =  if i k= , j l= , i l= , or j k= , and 0 otherwise. The FG 
method should be implemented on an N x N square adjacency matrix. 
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N N N N
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N K N
β − −
= = = =
=
− ∑∑∑∑ . (4) 
To implement QAP, the dependent variable is permuted and merged back with the 
independent variables. During repeated permutations, values sharing a row or column in the 
original data will share a row or column in the permuted data. Therefore, we preserve any 
dependence among elements of the same row or column but eliminate any relationship between 
the dependent variable and the independent variables. Then we run the estimation with the new 
merged dataset and repeat the permutation and estimation to generate an empirical sampling 
distribution. If the actual coefficient is at an extreme percentile of the distribution under the null, 
we can reject the null hypothesis. 
 
3.7 Empirical Results 
3.7.1 Determinants for Gift Spending per Occasion 
We first attempt to explore factors for gift exchanges. In Table 3.4, three standard error 
corrections are adopted in the dyadic estimation of determinants for gift spending. Regression 1 
adjusts for dyadic standard errors according to FG, regression 2 reports QAP adjusted p-value, 
and regression 3 presents results from the De Weerdt dyadic fixed-effect estimations. 
We find incomplete risk pooling. The estimation in regression 1 shows that households do 
not purposefully insure along occupation or education, but they do significantly insure each other 
along income profile and against shocks. Younger families send more gifts to households with 
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senior members.42 Level effects show more intense gifts between cadres and richer households. 
Families with unmarried sons are motivated to link to each other in exchange for insurance 
against large expenses on future weddings. Gift giving is more intense between lineal relatives. 
Given a lineal relative relationship, we find significantly less gift spending per occasion across 
villages, suggesting that intra-village social links are valuable. It also means that monitoring and 
enforcement difficulties dominate the concern with risk pooling.43, 44 Regressions 2 and 3 present 
similar results on risk sharing. The differences lie in insignificant insurance against shocks. 
Peer influence is salient. Regressions 1–3 show that a 1 percent increase in peers’ gift 
spending leads to an increase in gift giving per occasion by 0.26 percent, 0.26 percent, and 0.46 
percent, respectively. The FG and QAP methods demonstrate very similar results that are 
consistent with the experience of Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) and of Santos and Barrett 
(2010). 
Status seeking weakly determines more intense gift spending for the lower tail of the 
distribution. For regressions 1–3, the lowest-ranked households spend 13.5 percent, 56.7 percent, 
and 25.7 percent more, respectively, on gift giving per occasion than do top households. 
 
3.7.2 Determinants for Changes in Gift Spending per Occasion 
Having presented the determinants for gift spending on an occasion, we now explore the 
main issue—driving forces behind the recent escalation in gift spending. The estimation methods 
                                                 
42 Unlike other studies using household head age, our family demographic structure indicators in terms of share of 
elderly and share of unmarried sons are controlled. Our structure more directly captures potential complements in 
taking care of the elderly and insuring against lump-sum wedding expenditure for an unmarried son, respectively. 
43 Our estimation of geographic proximity might be more reliable than that of Fafchamps and Gubert (2007), since 
variations in geographic distance are larger in our dataset, capturing numbers of cross-village links, while this type 
of link is absent in Fafchamps and Gubert. 
44 There is a concern that households may self-select into a neighborhood. However, the historically evolved locality 
of farmland in rural China prevents endogenous household placement. See Figure 4.3 for the typical pattern of 
household geographic clustering based on inherited farmland in each clan. 
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in regressions 1–3 in Table 3.5 correspond to those of regressions 1–3 in Table 3.4, respectively. 
Different from gift giving itself, the evidence for risk pooling through gift spending 
escalation is largely insignificant. We find risk sharing responding to shocks only in regression 
1. Health and weather shock smoothing and income pooling are even of the opposite sign in 
regression 3, suggesting that poorer households suffering from more shocks purposefully connect 
with richer counterparts through rapidly growing gifts. Under regressions 1 and 3, gift spending 
among families with unmarried sons or senior members experiences a higher increase. 
Throughout the three scenarios we do not observe gift escalation caused by risk sharing across 
occupations. 
The marginal peer effect is much larger in promoting gift escalation than in explaining gift 
spending itself. A 1 percent growth in peers’ gift spending increases own gift expenditure per 
occasion by 0.70 percent under FG correction, 0.72 percent under QAP, and 0.51 percent under 
De Weerdt correction. 
Being more deprived in social ladders boosts gift spending growth. A 1-point increase in the 
Deaton relative deprivation index, that is, from the bottom to the top in the distribution, causes a 
75 percent higher increase in gift spending per occasion under FG correction, an 85 percent 
higher increase under QAP estimation, and an 82 percent higher increase under De Weerdt 
correction. Compared with its weak impact on gift giving, the rapid increase in gifts is well 
explained by the motive to improve relative standing. 
Following the IV strategy in De Weerdt and Dercon (2006), we further add changes in 
peers’ windfall income and remittance to instrument changes in peers’ median gift per occasion 
and conduct four robustness checks (Table 3.6). Windfall income in our context includes two 
exogenous sources: resettlement subsidy targeting dilapidated houses and vulnerable habitats, 
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and land acquisitions subsidy due to urbanized projects near the local county seat (Table A.2). 
Both sources of income survive the test of their association with observable family 
characteristics (Table A.3), which suggests that they are largely random to household 
characteristics. To mitigate endogeneity that drives the effect of remittance on gift giving, 
remittance is restricted to that sent from household members who migrated at least two years 
ago. 
The F-statistic for the first-stage estimations demonstrates that the IVs have large predicting 
power, while the p-values for the Hansen j-statistic suggest that the instruments are not 
overindentified. All four estimations on changes in gift expenditure with these IVs confirm peer 
effect and status seeking. 
First, pairwise difference models are estimated with these IVs. The identified marginal peer 
effects are 0.75 under FG correction, 0.78 under QAP, and 0.55 under De Weerdt correction. The 
identified status-seeking effects are 0.75 under FG correction, 0.84 under QAP, and 0.76 under 
De Weerdt correction. All identified peer effects and status seeking are of high significance. 
Second, instead of defining one’s fellow gift presenters in each social event as peers, we 
identify peers as a set of gift receivers for each household over a year.45 We conclude that peer 
pressure in extending gifts comes from both fellow ceremony guests and event organizers, the 
former dominating the latter with regard to the marginal effect. The identified peer effect is 0.36, 
closer to that of the De Weerdt scenario. The status-seeking effect is 0.47, which is smaller than 
that of any of the three pairwise dyadic regressions. 
In the first-stage estimations for both pairwise dyadic regression and household fixed-effect 
                                                 
45 The median values are taken for a set of own gift-sending links per year (the left-hand side) and a set of all peers’ 
gift-sending links per year (the right-hand side). The resulting dataset has one observation for each household per 
year, and a household fixed-effect model is estimated that regresses median own gift spending per occasion within 
each year on median peers’ gift spending per occasion. This model eliminates the household unobserved factor(s) 
that may result in inconsistent estimation of peer effect. 
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regression, changes in peers’ median windfall income significantly predict changes in peers’ 
median gift per occasion, while remittance demonstrates significant impact in the household 
fixed-effect model. There is no windfall income-sharing mechanism in the 18 villages. 
Therefore, changes in peers’ windfall income should exert only indirect impact on own gift 
growth via peers’ gift expenditure and its influence over own gift spending, generating a 
spillover effect. The resettlement subsidy and land acquisitions subsidy are supposed to fulfill 
specific objectives. However, gift spending seems to be very responsive to these income sources, 
possibly due to the wealth effect that triggers gift escalation. 
Rapid economic development in rural China continues to bring large windfall income 
opportunities, and at the same time rising wages in recent years may be increasing remittance. If 
these incomes are unevenly distributed, it is very likely that gift expense escalation spills over 
within communities, exerting a disproportionate impact on the poor.  
 
3.8 Concluding Remarks 
Lavish household social spending has been widely observed in rural China. This paper 
studies an impoverished context wherein people spend heavily on gifts at the expense of basic 
consumption. Complementary to the literature that studies the determinants of total household 
social spending, we stick to the micro foundations of the behavior—how own gift spending for 
an event responds to relative status, peer influence, and risk sharing. We present estimates for the 
separate effects of each of these factors on gift giving. 
Our results confirm the prevalence of peer influence and status-seeking motivation in 
shaping gift spending escalation. The two effects persist upon applying different dyadic standard 
error corrections, adopting alternative IVs, changing reference groups from fellow ceremony 
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guests to event organizers, controlling group characteristics that may correlate with network 
formation and own gift giving, and clustering by year to further deal with link dependence. 
The risk-sharing effect on gift giving is consistently observed only via income pooling, but 
it is not evident via occupation diversification, education, shock smoothing, and so on. 
Moreover, none of the above social distances accounts for the recent gift escalation. One 
standard interpretation is that network maintenance cost in some dimensions is too high to 
sustain. 
Gift spending during social events is associated with status awards. Therefore, we observe 
that lower-ranked households are more motivated to invest in gifts. In particular, households 
with unmarried sons tend to extend more gifts. Considering the finding that part of the effect is 
captured by the status-seeking factor (Watson and McLanahan 2011), the evidence becomes 
more salient. This is hardly surprising when the marriage market in China is tightening and 
favorable to girls. The pressure to build bigger houses, bid up bride-prices, and throw larger 
wedding banquets to improve their sons’ likelihood of marriage drives households with sons to 
invest early in the market. 
The capability and motive for gift giving is amplified by massive windfall income and other 
opportunities amid the rapid development in China. Though received by only some households, 
their effects spill over to peers and contribute to the escalation in gift expenditure. For instance, 
the passing of the Lewis turning point means significantly rising wages in the labor market 
(Zhang, Yang, and Wang 2011), which coincides with the inflating cost of ceremonies. 
Meanwhile, official subsidies have been implemented over the past five years, such as direct 
grain subsidy since 2005 and a lumpy land acquisitions subsidy due to the accelerating 
urbanization process in rural China. The challenge is to minimize the negative externalities 
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caused by peer influence over gift giving and to promote more effective risk pooling for the poor 
on social occasions. 
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Figure 3.1 Cross-country comparison of the share of household social spending (rural) 
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Sources: Banerjee and Duflo 2007; authors’ three-wave census data in rural Guizhou; Rao 2001. 
Notes: 1. The categorization for rural China (rCHN1, rCHN2, rCHN3, rCHN4) is based on the same four 
quartiles as other datasets (dollar amounts in U.S. dollars): less than $1 per day (denoted as “1”), $1–$2 per 
day (denoted as “2”), $4–$6 per day (denoted as “3”), and $6–$10 per day (denoted as “4”). The poverty 
lines are adjusted according to 2005 purchasing power parity (PPP) rate 
from http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp . 
2. Notation: CHN, China; Gua, Guatemala; INDU, India—Udaipur; INDO, Indonesia; INDK, India—
Karnataka; COTE, Côte d’Ivoire; MEX, Mexico; NIC, Nicaragua; PAK, Pakistan; PAN, Panama; PAPU, 
Papua New Guinea; SOU, South Africa; INDH, India—Hyderabad. “r” denotes rural area. 
3. The dashed circle and the arrow show rapid increase in the share of gift and festival expenditure in our 
three-wave Guizhou survey. 
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Figure 3.2 Annualized growth of (per capita) income, consumption, and gift 
spending 
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Source: Gift records data (2005–2009) and three-wave survey data. 
Notes: Annualized growth rates have been adjusted for inflation based on China Statistical Yearbook issued 
by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China, various issues. 
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Figure 3.3 Dyadic links and gift exchange networks 
 
Source: Authors’ social network data from one of the three villages. 
Note: Dots of the same color show households in the same clan. Dots to the boundaries show households 
from other villages. The dots (households) are based on actual geographic locations. 
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Table 3.1—Summary statistics by natural village (2009) 
   Village 1 Village 2 Village 3 Total 
Total number of households 48 27 80 155 
Total population 203 96 295 594 
Distance to the county seat (km) 10.0 11.0 2.5 7.8 
Per capita cultivated land (mu) 0.87 0.16 1.10 0.71 
Share of flat land (%) 40.0 20.7 80.0 53.4 
Male head of household (Yes=1; No=0) 93.5 94.8 91.6 92.8 
Education of household head (years) 2.87 3.06 3.98 3.44 
Minority head of household (Yes=1; No=0) 2.9 90.1 5.9 18.9 
Share of household members aged 11–29, unmarried (%) 15.9 15.7 14.7 16.6 
Share of household members aged 60 and above (%) 14.2 17.9 12.5 14.1 
 Source: Authors’ survey data for the three natural villages where we collected gift records. 
 
 
Table 3.2—Gift spending and sizes of ceremonies (2000–2009, per occasion) 
Year 
Coming-of-age Male wedding Female wedding Funeral 
Mean 
gift 
(CNY) 
Gift 
SD 
Mean 
# 
guests 
Mean 
gift 
(CNY) 
Gift 
SD 
Mean 
# 
guests 
Mean 
gift 
(CNY) 
Gift 
SD 
Mean 
# 
guests 
Mean 
gift 
(CNY) 
Gift 
SD 
Mean 
# 
guests 
2000–
2004 28.8 18.1 35.5 41.7 20.3 31 41.6 21.1 22 23.5 17.2 31 
2005 25.1 12.3 34 45.9 27.2 38 - - - 28.7 17.4 49 
2006 27.6 8.0 41 55.4 29.4 34.3 58.1 24.7 31 21.8 13.3 61.9 
2007 46.6 27.8 46 50.5 25.9 40 53.3 24.1 26.3 - - - 
2008 - - - 53.6 34.8 35.5 59.7 29.2 36 83.4 42.1 56 
2009 73.3 41.6 51.5 90.6 52.3 37.3 68.4 39.7 45 37.9 23.6 75.5 
Source: Authors’ gift exchange data from three natural villages. 
Notes: All gift values have been adjusted for inflation based on the appropriate year’s China Statistical 
Yearbook published by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China, various issues. “-” means no 
ceremony occurred during that year. 
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Table 3.3 Median expenditures (CNY) in organizing major ceremonies (1996–2009) 
Year Coming-of-age Wedding (groom’s family) Wedding (bride’s family) Funeral 
1996 - 4,500 (3.00) 3,157 (2.10) 2,688 (1.79) 
1997 - 3,852 (2.84) 3,100 (2.29) 3,471 (2.56) 
1998 - 5,211 (3.85) 3,025 (2.23) 3,170 (2.34) 
1999 - 3,634 (2.64) 3,829 (2.79) 4,328 (3.15) 
2000 - 6,250 (4.85) 2,929 (2.27) 4,393 (3.41) 
2001 - 7,371 (5.81) 5,644 (4.45) 3,388 (2.67) 
2002 - 7,347 (5.20) 4,536 (3.21) 3,402 (2.41) 
2003 - 7,891 (6.22) 5,143 (4.05) 4,655 (3.67) 
2004 - 10,423 (8.24) 4,243 (3.35) 6,150 (4.86) 
2005 3,208 (1.95) 9,486 (5.76) 7,633 (4.63) 5,156 (3.13) 
2006 3,387 (2.62) 11,805 (9.14) 7,502 (5.81) 6,175 (4.78) 
2007 4,284 (2.75) 8,569 (5.50) 4,927 (3.16) 8,096 (5.20) 
2008 8,046 (5.50) 13,983 (9.56) 5,833 (3.99) 7,561 (5.17) 
2009 8,154 (5.51) 15,066 (10.18) 7,766 (5.25) 7,151 (4.83) 
Source: Authors’ survey data. 
Notes: 1. All expenditure amounts have been adjusted for inflation based on the appropriate year’s China 
Statistical Yearbook published by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China, various issues. All 
values are in CNY. 2. Recall data for coming-of-age ceremonies were collected only since 2005. 3. 
Numbers in parentheses denote expenditure as proportion of average per capita income in the 18 villages. 
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Table 3.4 Dyadic regression on gift expenditure per occasion 
 
R1 R2 R3 
FG 
SE correction 
Quadratic Assignment 
Procedure (p-value)  
De Weerdt  
SE correction 
Social distances (def(Zi , Zj))   
Cumulated shocks -0.079** (0.04) -0.076 (0.13) -0.130 (0.09) 
Head minority status -0.061 (0.06) -0.022 (0.43) 2.026** (1.01) 
Household size 0.022 (0.02) 0.012 (0.36) -0.063 (0.09) 
Number of farm workers 0.047 (0.04) 0.031 (0.25) 0.081 (0.17) 
Number of nonfarm workers 0.007 (0.02) 0.018 (0.34) -0.026 (0.08) 
Head education -0.005 (0.01) -0.008 (0.33) -0.043 (0.03) 
Head gender 0.019 (0.08) 0.053 (0.41) 1.823 (1.37) 
Cadre -0.055 (0.08) -0.021 (0.43) -0.237 (0.23) 
Head marital status 0.147* (0.08) 0.113 (0.24) -0.062 (0.32) 
Head age 0.016*** (0.00) 0.015*** (0.00) 0.071* (0.04) 
Share of elderly -0.315*** (0.11) -0.294 (0.12) -1.082** (0.47) 
Share of unmarried sons -0.097 (0.08) -0.081 (0.29) -0.130 (0.31) 
Per capita income (predicted, log) 0.248*** (0.04) 0.260*** (0.00) 0.246*** (0.04) 
Level effect (sum(Zi , Zj))   
Cumulated shocks -0.040 (0.03) -0.050 (0.28) 0.089 (0.07) 
Head minority status 0.014 (0.06) 0.030 (0.44) -0.453 (0.86) 
Household size 0.099*** (0.02) 0.093*** (0.01) 0.100 (0.08) 
Number of farm workers 0.067* (0.04) 0.037 (0.24) 0.021 (0.06) 
Number of nonfarm workers 0.009 (0.02) 0.029 (0.32) -0.125* (0.08) 
Head education 0.011 (0.01) 0.016 (0.23) 0.051 (0.03) 
Head gender -0.077 (0.08) -0.071 (0.36) -2.276 (1.39) 
Cadre 0.321*** (0.08) 0.334** (0.02) 0.293 (0.23) 
Head marital status -0.075 (0.08) -0.110 (0.27) -0.630** (0.31) 
Head age -0.005* (0.00) -0.005 (0.18) -0.047 (0.04) 
Share of elderly 0.494*** (0.11) 0.489** (0.03) 0.420 (0.49) 
Share of unmarried sons 0.215*** (0.07) 0.212 (0.13) 0.309 (0.30) 
Per capita income (predicted, log) 0.495*** (0.06) 0.470*** (0.00) 0.804*** (0.11) 
Link attributes       
Lineal relatives or not 1.578*** (0.12) 1.706*** (0.00) 1.566*** (0.13) 
Across villages or not -1.938*** (0.10) -1.814*** (0.00) -1.761*** (0.11) 
Peer influence   
Peers’ median gift (per occasion, lag, 
log) 0.262** (0.12) 0.263** (0.05) 0.455* (0.27) 
Status seeking   
Deaton relative deprivation 0.135 (0.13) 0.567** (0.05) 0.257 (0.31) 
R-square / N 0.44 / 3,136 0.47 / 3,136 0.55 / 3,136 
Source: Gift records data and three-wave survey data.  
Notes: Dyadic standard errors are reported in R1 and R3, and QAP p-values are reported in R2.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Village and year fixed effects are 
controlled. 
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Table 3.5 Pairwise dyadic regression on changes in gift expenditure per occasion 
 
R1 R2 R3 
FG 
SE correction 
Quadratic Assignment 
Procedure (p-value) 
De Weerdt  
SE correction 
Social distances (def(Zi , Zj)) 
Cumulated shocks -0.146** (0.07) -0.060 (0.21) 0.604*** (0.20) 
Head minority status 0.214*** (0.04) 0.119* (0.05) -1.992*** (0.64) 
Household size 0.019 (0.02) 0.015 (0.25) 0.037 (0.06) 
Number of farm workers 0.012 (0.01) 0.010 (0.32) 0.014 (0.02) 
Number of nonfarm workers 0.002 (0.02) 0.003 (0.48) 0.084* (0.05) 
Head education -0.006 (0.01) -0.002 (0.44) -0.026 (0.03) 
Head gender -0.021 (0.07) -0.009 (0.47) -4.901** (1.88) 
Cadre 0.248*** (0.09) 0.098 (0.14) -0.115 (0.24) 
Head marital status 0.091 (0.06) 0.039 (0.33) 0.045 (0.20) 
Head age 0.003 (0.00) 0.001 (0.35) -0.274*** (0.09) 
Share of elderly 0.027 (0.11) 0.060 (0.32) 0.185 (0.59) 
Share of unmarried sons -0.182** (0.08) -0.093 (0.16) -0.134 (0.35) 
Per capita income (pred, log) 0.199 (0.15) 0.070 (0.31) -1.137*** (0.37) 
Level effect (sum(Zi , Zj)) 
Cumulated shocks -0.017 (0.03) -0.002 (0.50) 0.038 (0.05) 
Head minority status -0.170*** (0.04) -0.078 (0.11) -4.304*** (1.57) 
Household size -0.052*** (0.02) -0.024* (0.08) -0.016 (0.06) 
Number of farm workers 0.031* (0.02) 0.031 (0.23) 0.025 (0.02) 
Number of nonfarm workers -0.036** (0.02) -0.019 (0.17) -0.072* (0.04) 
Head education 0.017** (0.01) 0.011* (0.08) 0.038 (0.03) 
Head gender -0.151** (0.06) -0.085 (0.15) -4.213*** (1.20) 
Cadre -0.221*** (0.07) -0.104* (0.07) 0.112 (0.15) 
Head marital status 0.079 (0.05) 0.045 (0.30) -0.123 (0.23) 
Head age -0.001 (0.00) -0.001 (0.46) -0.040* (0.02) 
Share of elderly 0.208** (0.10) 0.143 (0.14) 1.078** (0.48) 
Share of unmarried sons 0.162*** (0.06) 0.095 (0.12) 0.512** (0.23) 
Per capita income (pred, log) 0.010 (0.05) -0.011 (0.36) 0.210*** (0.07) 
Change in peer influence 
Peers’ median gift (per occasion, lag, 
log) 0.698*** (0.15) 0.717*** (0.00) 0.506*** (0.14) 
Change in status seeking 
Deaton relative deprivation 0.750*** (0.27) 0.845*** (0.00) 0.821*** (0.26) 
R-square / N 0.18 / 3,136 0.11 / 3,136 0.24 / 3,136 
Source: Gift records data and three-wave survey data. 
Notes: Dyadic standard errors are reported in R1 and R3, and QAP p-values are reported in R2.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Village and year fixed effects are 
controlled. 
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Table 3.6 Pairwise dyadic regression on changes in gift expenditure with more IVs 
(Changes in peers’ windfall income, changes in remittance, and changes in out-of-
township median gift per occasion as IVs) 
 Marginal effect Standard error 
Pairwise dyadic regression—second stage 
1.Pairwise difference model (under FG standard error correction) 
Δ Peers’ median gift (per occasion, lag, log) 0.749*** (0.15) 
Δ Deaton relative deprivation 0.747*** (0.27) 
2. Pairwise difference model (under Quadratic Assignment Procedure)  
Δ Peers’ median gift (per occasion, lag, log) 0.778*** (0.00) 
Δ Deaton relative deprivation 0.840*** (0.00) 
3. Pairwise difference model (under De Weerdt standard error correction)  
Δ Peers’ median gift (per occasion, lag, log) 0.548*** (0.14) 
Δ Deaton relative deprivation 0.761*** (0.26) 
Pairwise dyadic regression—first stage 
1st stage: Δ out-of-township median gift (per occasion, lag, log) 0.687*** (0.02) 
Δ peers’ windfall income (lag, log) 0.016** (0.01) 
Δ peers’ remittance (lag, log) 0.007 (0.02) 
F-statistic for joint significance 19.28 
p-value for Hansen j-statistic - 
 
Household fixed-effect regression—second stage 
4. Household first-difference model (DV: average gift per occasion in each year; gift receivers as peers) 
Δ Peers’ median gift (per occasion, lag, log) 0.363*** (0.09) 
Δ Deaton relative deprivation 0.465** (0.24) 
Household fixed-effect regression—first stage 
Δ peers’ windfall income (lag, log) 0.210*** (0.04) 
Δ peers’ remittance (lag, log) 0.361*** (0.07) 
F-statistic for joint significance  14.90 
p-value for Hansen j-statistic 0.41 
Source: Gift records data and three-wave survey data. 
Notes: 1. Scenarios 1 and 3 in the second stage report dyadic standard errors. Scenario 2 in the first stage 
reports QAP p-values. Scenario 4 reports robust standard errors. 2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%. 3. The previous IV—changes in out-of-township peers’ median gift spending 
per occasion—is utilized. Meanwhile, two additional IVs are used, changes in peers’ windfall income and 
changes in peers’ remittance. The instrumental variables strategy follows De Weerdt and Dercon (2006). 
We adopt a more exogenous remittance definition that includes only family members who migrated at least 
two years ago. 4. The organization of the observations by household and year in the household fixed-effect 
estimation (scenario 4) prohibits us from identifying out-of-township peers’ median gift spending pending 
per occasion. Therefore, it is dropped from the IV list. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 
 
Appendix Table A.1 Instrumenting income 
 Sum of per capita income Difference in per capita income 
 All regressors as sums All regressors as differences 
Land (mu) 0.02*** 0.02** 
 (0.00) (0.01) 
Machine (dummy) -0.23*** 0.09 
 (0.06) (0.18) 
Cow (#) 0.05*** 0.11*** 
 (0.01) (0.03) 
Horse (#) -0.06 0.06 
 (0.04) (0.13) 
Hhsize (# members) -0.07*** -0.15*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) 
Network size (# lineal relatives, log) 1.22*** 0.13 
 (0.20) (0.61) 
Education (years) 0.01** 0.08*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) 
Sex (dummy) -0.16*** 0.31** 
 (0.05) (0.15) 
Cadre (dummy) -0.04 -0.49*** 
 (0.04) (0.12) 
Shocks (# times) -0.19*** -0.14*** 
 (0.01) (0.04) 
Year dummies Y Y 
Village dummies Y Y 
R-square 0.83 0.45 
N 3,136 3,136 
Source: Gift records data and three-wave survey data. 
Notes: Dyadic standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. 
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Appendix Table A.2 Summary statistics for windfall income and nonearned income 
Year Mean* Median* SD* N* 
 Direct grain subsidy (targeting grain-growing area) 
2004 - - - - 
2006 24.67857 20.5 9.81 14 
2009 120.5333 90 62.57 105 
 Remittance (from hh members who migrated at least 2 years ago) 
2004 1,385.588 980 686.47 34 
2006 3,357.313 2,000 1,685.53 67 
2009 3,635.147 3,000 2,656.85 68 
 Resettlement subsidy (targeting dilapidated houses and vulnerable habitats) 
2004 - - - - 
2006 441.1692 396 321.01 13 
2009 902.5333 600 678.51 15 
 Land acquisitions subsidy (targeting hhs involved in projects near county seat) 
2004 - - - - 
2006 8896 10,000 5,548.74 5 
2009 60,147.5 55,000 35,341.32 18 
Source: Gift records data and three-wave survey data. 
Notes: * households who received the specific subsidies or remittances. “-” denotes no occurrence. 
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Appendix Table A.3 Windfall income and family characteristics 
 1 2 3 4 
  Resettlement subsidy (logit) 
Land acquisitions subsidy 
(logit) 
Network size (# lineal 
relatives, log) 
0.00 0.01 -0.09 -0.07 
(1.00) (0.77) (0.54) (0.50) 
Hhsize (# members) 0.02 0.02 0.40 0.40 
 (0.93) (0.90) (0.45) (0.31) 
Share of migrants -1.08 -0.76 1.81 3.62 
 (0.45) (0.58) (0.52) (0.24) 
Sex (dummy) -1.00 -0.91 -0.72 -0.65 
 (0.18) (0.21) (0.49) (0.23) 
Minority (dummy) -0.54 -0.21 -1.21 0.73 
 (0.46) (0.67) (0.35) (0.41) 
Education (years) -0.02 0.00 -0.07 0.26 
 (0.84) (0.95) (0.82) (0.17) 
Cadre (dummy) 0.69 0.62 0.31 0.42 
 (0.26) (0.30) (0.22) (0.24) 
Age (year) 0.04 0.03 0.22 0.15* 
 (0.11) (0.26) (0.12) (0.06) 
Share of the elderly -1.75 -0.50 -5.24 0.26 
 (0.19) (0.67) (0.36) (0.93) 
Share of youth 0.54 2.22** -0.03 0.76 
 (0.61) (0.02) (0.99) (0.81) 
Land (mu) -0.01 -0.04 0.28 -0.01 
 (0.85) (0.56) (0.24) (0.96) 
Cow (#) 0.02 0.16 -1.66 -0.02 
 (0.95) (0.55) (0.19) (0.98) 
Horse (#) -0.01 -0.14 -0.21 -0.32 
 (0.99) (0.88) (0.36) (0.71) 
Shocks (# times) -0.40 -0.25 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.54) (0.70) (0.99) (1.00) 
Year fixed effect Y N Y N 
Village fixed effect Y N Y N 
Pseudo R-square 0.157 0.077 0.379 0.245 
N 616 616 607 609 
Source: Gift records data and three-wave survey data. 
Notes: Resettlement subsidy targets dilapidated houses and habitats vulnerable to natural disaster. Land acquisitions 
subsidy targets households affected by public construction projects near the local county seat. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
SPATIAL IDENTIFICATION OF STIGMA BEHAVIOR THROUGH SOCIAL NETWORKS: 
PEER EFFECTS ON PAID BLOOD DONATION 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Certain markets exist, especially in impoverished environments where economic concerns 
outweigh moral values, for goods and services which are associated with significant social 
stigma (Kanbur, 2004; Edlund and Korn, 2002). Markets for body parts, child labor, prostitution, 
abduction and human trafficking, drug abuse and toxic waste are just some examples of these 
markets.  However, empirical economic studies on stigma behavior are rare, in large part due to 
the difficulty in collecting the secretive data.  
In this paper, I study a particular stigma behavior in Chinese society - paid blood plasma 
donation. More precisely, it refers to blood plasma donation where donors are rewarded with a 
valuable nutrition subsidy in cash. The donated plasma is extracted to produce expensive 
nutritional goods, rather than being used for hospital emergency. The associated stigma 
originates from two aspects: first, most local donors rely on the source of income once engaging 
in selling blood, signaling to people around that they are lazy and do not participate in regular 
labor market; second, in Chinese culture blood symbols spirit, and selling blood is not essentially 
different from selling one’s body. However, the stigma does not derive from infectious diseases 
that might spread out to the public. 
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The three decade rapid economic growth in China has been accompanied by strong demand 
for expensive blood products. Meanwhile, poor people across China continuously supply blood. 
Frequent blood donation in the impoverished and unsanitary context has had devastating impacts 
on human health and greatly affected agricultural production and poverty alleviation efforts. The 
induced HIV/AIDS crises in some regions in 1990s left thousands of children unattended. Some 
AIDS carriers alive have married, had children, or moved to other parts of China carrying the 
problem with them. However, this paper does not aim at evaluating the causal impact of selling 
blood. The question I am interested in is why blood sales still persist even if there has been high 
economic growth all over China in the past thirty years. 
Poverty has been regarded as a root cause of markets for stigmatized behavior. Individuals 
normally justify decisions based on both notions of money-metric utility and social norms. The 
impoverished environment may render more weight to money-metric utility at the cost of stigma 
against social norms. Though unbalanced economic growth might have left some regions much 
poorer than others, it is still difficult to explain why blood sales persist in many regions with 
fruitful poverty alleviation efforts and in more developed Eastern China. 
In this paper, I argue that peer effects drives people to give more blood through endogenous 
social interactions. Similar to other typical stigmatized markets, the disutility associated with 
selling blood is presumably reduced when more peers engage in it. Therefore, an identification of 
the effects relies on understanding social interactions. However, social interactions are missing in 
the theoretical literature on stigmatized behavior, such as Basu and Van (1998), Edlund and Korn 
(2002) and Kanbur (2004). For a long time period, the literature has had difficulty extending 
standard models of individual utility maximization to allow pairwise, triadic and more complex 
interactions that shape behavior and explain social concepts (Akerlof, 1976; Basu, 1986). Until 
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recently, the literature has started to incorporate the structure of social networks in affecting 
behavior (Calvó-Armengol et al., 2006 and 2009). 
Despite the vast empirical literature on identifying social interactions, it remains very 
problematic due to the reflection problem and correlated effects that may confound the 
identification (Manski, 1993). Taking advantage of a social network data with partially 
overlapping peer groups, I am able to circumvent the reflection problem and correlated effects 
using spatial instruments arises from the social networks.  
The intuition behind my identification strategy is twofold. First, partially overlapping 
groups generate peers’ peers (or excluded peers) who act as exclusion restrictions in solving the 
reflection problem; second, a large set of instruments, i.e., exogenous characteristics of the 
excluded peers naturally generated from the group structure, correlate with peers’ behavior by 
means of social interactions but uncorrelated with the individual group shock. These instruments 
allow me to partially deal with correlated effects (De Giorgi et al., 2010). An average of all 
relevant characteristics in a network, including those of direct peers and excluded peers, are 
further subtracted from each individual equation. The estimation solves the correlated effects 
(Bramoulle et al., 2009). 
The understanding of stigma behavior may also revolve around the issue of status seeking. 
However, the literature on the effect of relative concern on well-being mainly refers to keeping 
up with the Joneses in the context of wealthy populations, while empirical evidence from poor 
contexts is much less and results are mixed (Banerjee and Duflo, 2007; Ravallion and Lokshin, 
2010; Akay et al., 2011). An agent’s relative economic standing may contribute to the observed 
stigmatized behavior as being at the lower end of the income distribution may set in motion 
status contests (Hopkins and Kornienko, 2004). Those at the bottom end of the economic 
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distribution may perceive both greater potential rewards and a smaller downside risk when 
engaging in risky but “profitable” activities (Hopkins, 2011). Meanwhile, for families with 
unmarried male members or regions with skewed sex ratios, relative social standing in 
unbalanced marriage market with many excess men may further push them to engage in those 
activities (Robson, 1996; Wei and Zhang, 2011b). 
We collected two datasets to investigate peer effects and status seeking: a three-wave 
census-type household survey from 18 villages enables me to examine the evolving patterns and 
determinants of frequent plasma donations and capture relative socioeconomic status; and the 
collection of detailed gift exchange records from all households were designed in three out of the 
18 villages over 2000-2009 to define reference groups, measure intensity of social interactions, 
and identify peer effects. Many other studies worry about unobserved factors that simultaneously 
determine network formation and individual behavior. Fortunately, frequent gift exchange 
activities predate the initial introduction of blood bank to the region, mitigating the dependence 
of social network formation on blood sales behavior. The main network fixed effect and 
household fixed effect estimations further get rid of unobserved factors varying at network and 
household level which simultaneously affect network formation and blood sales. 
To my knowledge, this is one of the very few studies that apply the novel spatial 
identification strategy to identify social interactions, improving upon the current problematic 
solutions to identification. Meanwhile, this paper is among the first successful attempt to collect 
the secretive data on stigmatized behavior. More importantly, to my best knowledge, this is the 
first empirical study that applies the rigorous identification strategy of peer effects on 
stigmatized behavior. This paper also uniquely measures real reference groups and tests how 
  - 140 - 
intensity of social interactions drives peer effect estimations. It is among the first empirical tests 
on relative status and risk-taking behavior. 
Keeping a written record of gift received has been a tradition in China for thousands of 
years. This social norm has also been preserved in many neighboring countries, such as Vietnam, 
Korea, Japan, Thailand and Cambodia, where people engage in reciprocal gift exchanges (Chen, 
2011). The record kept by each household makes sure that peer groups vary at the household 
level, which guarantees the presence of excluded peers. However, it is surprising that this widely 
available source of data has not been used in the economics literature. 
My approach that utilizes partially overlapping reference groups identified from gift record 
is general and readily applicable to several data settings that allow excluded peers. Though 
coauthorship network data (Goyal et al., 2006), technology adoption network data (Conley and 
Udry, 2005) and risk-sharing network data (Dercon and De Weerdt, 2006) possess the feature of 
excluded peers, none of the peer effects study using these datasets adopts this approach. The only 
two exceptions are Bramoulle et al. (2009) and De Giorgi et al. (2010). However, the formal uses 
the Add Health data allowing a maximum of five males and five females in the nominated 
friendship networks, while the latter has little information on social interactions among 
classmates. Fortunately, the gift network data effectively gauges intensity of social interactions 
through accurate information on amount of pairwise gifts, and it records complete friendship 
networks. 
The main findings in this paper are the following: 1) there is strong evidence indicating the 
presence of peer influence on blood plasma donation decisions; 2) the intensity of social 
interactions is important in identifying peer effects; 3) peer effects are directional and appear to 
be partially driven by preference interactions that reduce stigma; 4) the less well-off in the 
  - 141 - 
distribution appear to be more motivated to engage in stigmatized behavior; and 5) tightening 
pressure from the unbalanced marriage market in China further increases the behavior. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, plasma donation in rural China is 
documented. Section 3 derives illustrative models for the impact of peer influence and income 
dispersion on plasma donation. In section 4, I describe the three-wave census type survey and 
gift-exchange network data, the identification of peer influence, the measures of relative status 
and the empirical framework. In section 5 I report estimation results, discuss the potential 
mechanism and present some initial evidence on health impacts. Finally, section 6 concludes. 
 
4.2 Plasma Donation in Rural China 
In China, the markets for whole blood and blood plasma are separate: the former is mainly 
supplied by voluntary donations in urban area, while the latter prevails in rural areas and offers 
cash compensation to blood plasma donors. The current regulation forbids pharmaceutical 
companies to extract plasma from voluntarily donated whole blood. The greater commercial 
demand for blood plasma makes it much more popular than whole blood donation. Besides 
significant income increase for plasma donors and booming profit for biotech companies, the 
plasma economy becomes a lucrative source of income for middlemen. 
The national regulation for plasma and blood donations stipulates that individuals are 
excluded from giving if they are older than 50 or younger than 20, weigh less than 50kgs for 
males and 45kgs for females, or seriously disabled. In addition, an interval of 15 days between 
donations is required for plasma, and 3 months for whole blood (Asia Catalyst, 2007). 
Once the plasma is separated from the whole blood, the red blood cells are re-injected back 
into the donor intravenously. To speed up the process, a donor can be given blood from previous 
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donors with the same blood type and sent on his way while his blood is being processed in a 
centrifuge machine. Reports show that even people that are tested positive with Hepatitis are 
allowed to give blood, and their plasma is simply placed in a different pile. 
In the past, contamination of red blood cells during the process of obtaining plasma was 
strongly suggested by the high prevalence of hepatitis C antibodies among repeat plasma donors. 
Outbreaks of HIV infection among commercial plasma donors from different areas occurred as 
early as 1994 (Wu et al., 2001). These have been attributable to the unsanitary conditions under 
which plasma donation has been carried out and no proper sterilization procedure implemented. 
Consequently, blood donors, together with injecting drug users (IDUs), have accounted for more 
than two thirds of China’s HIV infection (Figure 4.1), and as many as 250,000 blood plasma 
donors became infected by 2004 (Cohen, 2004). It is even estimated that by 2003, over 1.2 
million people had contracted AIDS in Henan Province alone, and blood transfusion in 
unsanitary blood banks is regarded as the root cause (Tsang, 2003; Gao, 2009). 
There has also been a strong regional component to both blood donations and the resultant 
outbreak of diseases, which has spurred government efforts to address this public health concern. 
For example, there was a widespread HIV/AIDS epidemic in Henan province in China in the 
1990s which was attributed to unsanitary conditions for plasma donation. China rapidly 
responded to the epidemic by reducing the number of commercial blood banks and tightening 
regulations. Many blood banks in Henan province have since moved to southwest provinces such 
as Guizhou, which has become a new supplier of blood plasma in China (Yin, 2006) and is thus 
the area we collected data for this paper (see Figure 4.1). It is also the poorest province in China 
(Table 4.1). 
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In 2004, there were 23 blood plasma stations in Guizhou. By early 2006, they have further 
increased to 25 plasma stations, which accounted for 40% of the total blood plasma supply, 
rendering it the largest plasma market in the country. However, despite the efforts of the 
government to ensure greater attention to making blood donations safe, in early 2006, a rapidly 
growing epidemic of infectious diseases affected Guizhou.46 In the same year, all blood banks in 
Guizhou were shut down due to Hepatitis C contamination.  
After steps were made by the government to improve the sanitary conditions of blood 
donation in the region the blood banks in Guizhou were commercialized and re-opened in 2008. 
Since then they have aggressively moved to increase blood donations. This included raising the 
cash “nutrition” subsidy that was provided donors, the awarding of cash prizes to registered 
donors at the end of each year to attract plasma donors. In addition, donors are required to donate 
once every half month, with cash penalties assessed when registered blood donors delay their 
donation. Due to the incentive scheme, there is almost no difference in donation frequency 
throughout the year: donors usually donate plasma every half month. Meanwhile, there is much 
smaller temporal variation than cross-sectional variation in plasma donation decisions. Once a 
family starts to donate plasma, it rarely stops. One obvious reason is that plasma donation 
generates a great proportion of income that is non-substitutable, while another important reason 
is that regular donors often feel lack of energy to do farm work and have to rely on plasma 
donation eventually. 
 
                                                 
46 In January of 2006, statistical data showed that the incidence, the number of deaths and the fatality rate of 
category B infectious disease respectively increased by 21.36%, 65.38% and 36.28% on year-on-year basis. In 
March of 2006, the three numbers further increased to 30.01%, 73.17% and 33.20%, respectively. 
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4.3 Conceptual Model 
A static model of stigmatized behavior in a social norm is developed in which peer pressure 
and relative social standing impact plasma donation decisions. The decision to donate plasma is 
subject to constraints on labor supply. Suppose that there is a continuum of agents in an 
economy. Each agent makes decisions on labor market participation and plasma donation 
engagement. Agents are heterogeneous in labor quality iθ 47, ranging from minθ  to maxθ  with the 
cumulative distribution function ( )F θ . Therefore, their income is denoted by iwθ  and varies 
according to labor quality. θ  denotes the lower threshold of labor quality below which an agent 
engages in the maximum legal donation, while θ  denotes the upper threshold of labor quality, 
above which an agent spends no time donating plasma.   
Since donors receive fixed cash compensation (i.e., nutritional subsidies) per donation and 
are subject to a maximum legal donation frequency, I denote the maximum income from plasma 
donation by F . ih  denotes donation intensity and ranges between 0 and 1. Following the basic 
household decision model setup with an exogenous wage rate as in Goto (2009), 
max ( ( , , ), ( , ))
i
i i ih
U c h w S h hθ              (1) 
                                                         . . i is t c w h Fθ  ≤ +  
where U( )⋅  is the utility function, and the standard assumption for utility from consumption c  is 
followed, i.e., 0, 0c ccU U>  < . ( )S ⋅  is the social stigma function which represents disutility from 
plasma donation. The standard assumption 0cS ScU U= <  follows, meaning that 1) the greater the 
disutility is from plasma donation, the lower is the marginal utility of consumption, and 2) the 
marginal disutility from plasma donation becomes greater as consumption increases. In other 
                                                 
47 To simplify the analysis, in this static model labor quality is not a function of blood sales. 
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words, the wealthier people suffer more from an increasing social stigma than their lower income 
counterparts. Utility is decreasing in stigma, and the marginal disutility from stigma is increasing 
in stigma, i.e., 0SU < , 0SSU < . 
h  is the average intensity of paid plasma donation in the reference group. w  is wage rate in 
quality terms. A person with labor quality iθ  receives iwθ  from labor provision.
48 The social 
stigma function ( )S ⋅  satisfies 0hS > , 0hhS > , 0hS < , 0hhS < . Stigma is increasing in own 
engagement but decreasing in others’ engagement in the group. The marginal stigma is 
increasing in own engagement, but decreasing in others’ engagement in the reference group. It is 
further assumed that a person does not feel guilty if one does not donate plasma regardless of the 
average plasma donation in the reference group, which means (0, ) 0S h = . Two major 
propositions follow. The corresponding derivations are provided in Appendix I.   
 
Proposition 1: Individual engagement in stigmatized behavior is increasing in others' 
engagement in the reference group. 
( , , ) 0i ih h w
h
θ∂
>
∂
           (2) 
 
Proposition 2: Let ( , )iF θ ξ  denote the cumulative distribution function of income excluding 
plasma donation compensation, where ξ  is the mean-preserving spread parameter. As income 
distribution becomes more unequal ( 'ξ ξ> , ( , )iF θ ξ  second-order stochastically 
dominates '( , )iF θ ξ ), the average plasma donation increases if ( , ) / 0F θ ξ ξ∂ ∂ >  [ , ]θ θ θ∀ ∈ . 
                                                 
48 All the households in our census-type survey are faced with only one blood market that sets up a unique 
maximum blood compensation income F, while human resources vary a lot among people and areas. It implies equal 
“fluid labor” wage and unequal labor wage. 
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h
h h w dF
h
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θ
θ
θ
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∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂= −
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∂
∫
∫
           (3) 
( , , ) ( , )( ) [ ]h h h w Fsign sign d
θ
θ
θ θ ξ θ
ξ θ ξ
∂ ∂ ∂
= −
∂ ∂ ∂∫         (4) 
where ( , , ) / 0h h wθ θ∂ ∂ <  and ( , ) /F θ ξ ξ∂ ∂  may vary over [ , ]θ θ . Nonetheless, a sufficient 
condition ensures an increase in the overall plasma donation intensity when income distribution 
becomes more unequal. Specifically, if ( , ) / 0F θ ξ ξ∂ ∂ >  [ , ]θ θ θ∀ ∈ , plasma donation 
intensifies. Appendix I shows a special case when income distribution is subject to the uniform 
distribution. 
This model is built on a general setting in which no status or rewards is explicitly 
introduced. I argue that even in this standard model the impact of changes in the distribution can 
be derived. In impoverished areas, frequent plasma donation is regarded as risky due to potential 
blood contamination, disease transmission and insufficient nutritional compensation. The 
dispersion of income motivates the disadvantaged in the distribution to engage in risky behavior 
when social rewards are sufficiently unequal. This result can be linked to a branch of rising 
literature on risk-taking behavior and inequality of rewards (e.g. Hopkins, 2011). Developing a 
framework of a status tournament, Hopkins (2011) finds that risk-taking behavior is increasing in 
the inequality of rewards. The poor become risk-loving if their lowest level of awarded status is 
sufficiently low. Status or rewards from a fair gamble are directly embodied in agents’ 
preferences (Hopkins, 2011), and my result is confirmed.  
 
  - 147 - 
4.4 Data and Empirical Strategy 
4.4.1 Data Collection 
As noted above, the dataset for this study comes from a three-wave census-type rural 
household survey conducted by the authors in 18 natural villages (from three administrative 
villages) in Puding County, Guizhou province in Western China.49  While Guizhou province is 
the poorest province in China. Puding’s per capita GDP is 6495RMB in 2009, which is close to 
the median level in Guizhou. It is both geographically and ethnically diverse. Han is the major 
group. More than 20 ethnic groups live there, including Miao, Buyi, Gelao, and Yi that in total 
comprise about 20% of population. 
We conducted the first-wave census survey of 801 households at the beginning of 2005 on 
the recall data from 2004. It collected detailed information on public facilities, investment and 
institutions in the villages and demographic characteristics, incomes and consumption for 
households. Transfers and blood donations were collected on each family member, including 
those who were working outside the county at the time of survey. Given the sensitivity of 
collecting data on blood donations, we made great efforts to ensure the accuracy of these data, 
including extensive training of local survey numerators who were able to effectively interact 
with the residents in our sample villages. Moreover, the numerators were trained to identify, and 
probe into major discrepancies between income and expenditures, a strong indication that 
respondents concealed blood donations as an income source. 
As documented earlier, blood banks in Guizhou were shutdown in early 2006 due to 
Hepatitis C contamination in some branches. Prior to the 2006 shut-down, donors received a cash 
“nutrition” subsidy valued at 80RMB for the plasma contained in 580 cc of blood. At that time, 
                                                 
49 This survey was jointly conducted by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Chinese Academy 
of Agricultural Sciences (CAAS), and Guizhou University. 
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31.2% households surveyed engaged in plasma donation, and the compensation accounted for 
10.9% of total income (Table 4.2 and Table 4.4).  
A follow-up survey of the same households was administered in early 2007 and 833 
households was interviewed on recall data from 2006. After the shutdown of the local blood 
bank in early 2006, a few local residents were still able to continue donation through traveling to 
other counties nearby, since the timing of shutting down differs. Therefore, the number of 
donors, donation compensation and share of income from donation were all much smaller than 
2004 and 2009 but were nonzero. In other words, the summary statistics for plasma donation in 
2006 reflect some households’ persistency in plasma donation through other means. 
In early 2010, the third wave follow-up survey was conducted for all 872 households on 
their recall information from 2009. Further information on each of the family members donating 
plasma was collected. Since 2008 when all blood banks were reopened, they were 
commercialized and therefore have had no connection with the local government. Nutrition 
subsidies have nearly doubled to 142RMB (in real term) for the same amount of blood in an 
effort to encourage donors and restore trust. While by the time of our third round of data 
collection in 2009 the proportion of donors has recovered to 14.1% households and 4.1% of total 
income, it was still much less than the 2004 year level (Table 4.2 and Table 4.4). It is also worth 
noting that while the payment is rather minimal to the rich, the amount of cash is still a strong 
incentive to donate blood for impoverished farmers. Over a longer term, i.e., 2004-2009, the 
villages where plasma donation has been pervasive are poorer as indicated by the FGT poverty 
measures (Table 4.3). Plasma donation is becoming a major source of income that helps lift 
households out of poverty (Figure 4.2). A donor typically earns around 3600 RMB from 
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continuous plasma donation per year, much more than from other local income generating 
activities. 
Throughout our three-wave survey, the majority of plasma donors in a family are women. 
This result may reflect labor divisions to accommodate agricultural production or off-farm work, 
as the opportunity cost for men engaging in these two activities are higher than women. 
However, the ratios of women donors in different villages vary significantly, reflecting different 
labor market situations. For instance, Table 4.4 suggests that villages with more local odd job 
opportunities have higher proportion of female donors. 
In addition to the census conducted in the 18 villages, I gathered a ten-year gift-exchange 
record book for each household in three natural villages.50 Gift-exchange data were 
spontaneously recorded on the days of all social occasions when guests presented the gifts to 
hosts, including male members’ weddings, female members’ weddings, funerals, coming-of-age 
ceremonies, child birth ceremonies, and house-moving ceremonies. Close relatives are 
responsible for recording gifts on site when hosts are busy organizing events or when hosts are 
illiterate. Gift-receiving records are usually kept for a long time in order to pay back accordingly 
when celebrations of other families are held. Household social links between the three villages 
and the other fifteen surveyed villages nearby were also captured. The gift exchange record 
captures nearly all real within-village and cross-village connections in the long term, avoids 
implicitly ranking relationships in other network datasets, and is directional. In total, 8074 gift 
links among households during 2000-2009 were identified (Figure 4.3). 
 
                                                 
50 Village 1 is the most remote (10 kilometers away from the county seat with poor road access). In contrast, Village 
3 is only 2.5 kilometers away from the county seat. In between, Village 2 is populated with Buyi ethnic minority, 
who preserve the Catholic culture different from the major Han villages (e.g. Village 1 and Village 3). 
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4.4.2 Reference Groups 
Reference groups can be defined quite differently in specific contexts. In a developed 
society, information flow is fast and efficient, such that reference groups are not straightforward. 
However, in an impoverished traditional community, public infrastructure drags resource flow, 
and the evolution of local norms usually strengthens reciprocity. These differences facilitate a 
much improved definition of reference group. 
In a recent study, Mangyo and Park (2011) suggest that village reference groups are salient 
for rural residents living in close proximity. Different from an administrative village that 
includes several natural villages and represents the lowest level bureaucratic entity in China, a 
natural village is spontaneously evolved. Households within each natural village know each 
other well. Therefore, reference groups for relative status measures and peer behavior are first 
defined at the natural village level when the whole sample is estimated. In our surveyed region, 
the special geographic condition, Karst landform, further isolates local villagers’ daily 
connections with other natural villages. 
Apart from the reference group confined by the natural village boundary, rich information 
on 10-year gift networks enables us to redefine reference groups according to each household’s 
corresponding gift receivers (alters). This definition has advantage over the village-based one 
due to one’s social interactions with multiple reference groups and overtime variation in peer 
group composition. Specifically, gift record between 2000 and 2004 is utilized to construct peer 
groups for the 2004 survey, 2000-2006 gift record is applied to reference groups for the 2006 
survey, and 2000-2009 gift record corresponds to reference groups for the 2009 survey.51 
                                                 
51 The estimation results in section 5 are robust to weighting reference group composition by a time decay factor. For 
example, corresponding to the 2006 survey, reference groups formed during 2000-2004 are discounted. 
Corresponding to the 2009 survey, reference groups formed during 2000-2006 are discounted. 
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Figure 4.3 illustrates the 10-year gift links for one of the three villages that I collected network 
data. Gift exchange networks are observed to be more intense within clans and natural villages, 
since their associated enforcement cost is usually much lower than between clans and villages 
(Chen et al., 2011). In a traditional rural community in China, a majority of residents in a natural 
village have kinship ties with each other. Social relations often revolve around the role of the 
clan. Clans are integral to determining social norms which in turn play a crucial role in shaping 
behavior. 
Though selling plasma is recognized as immoral in the Chinese culture, it becomes 
ethnically acceptable when more people in a clan, and the communities in which they are 
concentrated, engage in what would normally be unacceptable behavior.  This explains my 
observation from the data that plasma donation activity is usually clustered among people with 
close social relations. Proximity to other donors, alone, does not compel households to become 
blood donors, even if they have very similar socioeconomic characteristics unless they are part of 
the social networks.  
To illustrate this more concretely, Figure 4.4 shows the correlation between plasma 
donation decisions in the reference group and own donation decisions in all 18 surveyed villages, 
involving whether to donate and number of family members engage in, at the natural village 
level over the three-wave survey. Each point in the figure represents one village. The horizontal 
axes are others’ plasma donation decisions in one’s gift networks weighted by their network 
centrality and take the mean for each natural village. The vertical axes are average own plasma 
donation decisions for each natural village. The positive correlation is salient for both donation 
decisions. 
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Unequal income distribution seems to drive people to engage in plasma donation. 
Comparing Gini coefficient with and without plasma compensation, plasma donation reduces 
inequality (Table 4.3). Furthermore, households at the lower end of the distribution tend to be 
more motivated to engage in plasma donation. Figure 4.5 plots the negative association between 
relative status and one’s likelihood of plasma donation at the household level in all 18 surveyed 
villages. The reference group defined for this figure is the natural village boundaries. The higher 
the index (the horizontal axis), the more relative deprived a household is in the reference group. 
The association can be explained by the evidence that inflows of remittances to some 
households set in motion status contests through plasma donation from others (Brown et al., 
2011), and that a rise in the average income but more unequal distribution in the region (Table 
4.3) is accompanied with more spending on non-productive investments, such as housing (De 
Brauw and Rozelle, 2008), dowry and bride price (Yan, 1996; Liu, 2000) and ceremonies (Chen 
and Zhang, 2011). Though they are vehicles for social prestige that might challenge social status, 
welfare consequences of “positional externalities” associated with status seeking are severe for 
households living at or near subsistence levels. The highly ritualized practices of social occasions 
compel them to engage in risky income generating activities to avoid isolation from local 
networks. 
 
4.4.3 Conventional and Spatial Identifications of Peer Influence 
The identification problem arises since behavior is determined by behavior, which brings a 
circularity of cause and effect. Parameters in classical peer effect models are not uniquely 
identified (Manski, 1993 and 2000). To estimate the impact of peer influence on plasma 
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donation, the reflection problem that hinders disentangling endogenous effect from exogenous 
effect should be circumvented. 
Conventional instrumental variable strategy might be able to partially address the problem, 
since part of the difficulty arises from endogeneity of the behavior that enters into both sides of 
the econometric equation. To compare with main spatial (network) identification, I employ 
lagged community level instruments that directly affect lagged average group behavior but are 
argued to have no direct link to current individual behavior under evaluation. However, this 
strategy in general is applied to models in which peers share a common boundary. In other 
words, individuals interact in a partitioned group, and no influence comes from outside the 
group. For instance, Manski (1993) studies a linear-in-expectations model, where individual 
behavior depends on the expected behavior of the group. Moffitt (2001) excludes individual 
behavior from the mean behavior, and all groups have the same size. In both cases peer effects 
are not identified. 
There has been growing recognition that social interactions within partitioned groups are 
very particular and not likely to represent most forms of social interactions, while interactions in 
partially overlapping groups yield identification. Lee (2007) explores the role of variations in 
group sizes in identifying social interactions. De Georgi et al. (2010) assume social interactions 
with multiple reference groups to identify peer effect. Following the literature in spatial 
econometrics (Case, 1991; Anselin, Florax and Rey, 2004; Bramoullé et al., 2009), I consider a 
linear-in-means peer effects model where each household has its specific reference group, and 
the average behavior and characteristics of the group influence one’s own behavior. Interactions 
are structured through a directed social network. The relaxation of a group interactions 
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assumption allows us to separate endogenous effects from exogenous effects and resolve the 
reflection problem. 
In my estimation of peer influence, an agent’s plasma donation iy  is a linear function of the 
average behavior among its own peers in a heterogeneous group iP  of size in , own 
characteristics ix , and mean characteristics of the peer group. Agent i is excluded from the group 
defined by directed gift exchange networks. Ignoring potential correlated effects for a moment, 
the structural model is: 
[ | ] 0i i
j j
j P j P
i i i i
i i
y x
y x X
n n
α β γ δ ε ε∈ ∈= + + + + ,       Ε =
∑ ∑
      (5) 
where β  captures the endogenous effect and δ  the exogenous effect. Other than assuming the 
strict exogeneity of the regressors, i.e., [ | ] 0i XεΕ = , no further assumption is made on the error 
terms within a network. The model in matrix notation defined over all networks is: 
, [ | ] 0iy Gy x Gx xαι β γ δ ε ε= + + + +      Ε =       (6) 
where G  is an n*n  interaction matrix with 1/ij iG n=  if i send gifts to j and 0 otherwise. ι  is a 
n*1  vector of ones. The corresponding reduced form is: 
1 1 1( ) ) ( ) ( )y I G I G I G x I Gα β ι β γ δ β ε− − −= − + ( − + + −       (7) 
Bramoullé et al. (2009) show that the model is identified if [ | ]E Gy x  is not perfectly 
collinear with ( , )x Gx . A necessary condition for identification is that the matrices I , G  and 
2G must be linearly independent. If so, peers’ peers characteristics 2G x  and peers’ peers peers 
characteristics 3G x  are valid instruments. A sufficient condition for identification is that 
individuals interact through a heterogeneous network that has an intransitive triad. In other 
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words, there are individuals whose peers’ peers are not all their friends (De Georgi et al., 2010). 
Appendix II illustrates the spatial instrument identification with a fictitious network. 
All households in our survey are involved in their gift networks with intransitive triads, 
which facilitate identification. However, some households do not have a gift link of distance 3, 
i.e., they do not have peers’ peers’ peer. To avoid missing observations I take the average over 
all excluded peers’ characteristics as exclusion restrictions. 
Unobserved variables common to households who belong to the same social environment 
may be correlated with households’ background, which brings another identification problem. In 
this case, α  becomes vα . To address the problem of correlated effects, I further introduce 
appropriate differencing between structural equations to eliminate unobserved factors at the 
network level. Notice that my approach to get rid of correlated effects is further to De Georgi et 
al. (2010), which argue that the spatial instruments, i.e., the characteristics of excluded peers, 
uncorrelated with the individual group shock suffice for solving endogeneity due to unobservable 
correlated effects. 
Two types of within transformations can be naturally used for this purpose: the local 
transformation which expresses the model in deviation from the mean equation of one’s direct 
contacts and the global transformation which expresses the model in deviation from the mean 
equation of one’s direct and indirect contacts.52 Bramoullé et al. (2009) show that the global 
transformation imposes less restrictive conditions to obtain identification. Endogenous and 
exogenous social effects can be distinguished on most networks when the global network 
transformation is adopted. A within transformation is achieved by pre-multiplying  
                                                 
52 Both transformations assume that no household is isolated, and the results are generally valid for any row-
normalized matrix G. 
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'1J I G I
n
ιι= − = −  
and the structural model becomes, 
Jy JGy Jx JGx Jβ γ δ ε= + + +        (8) 
where [ | ]v vxεΕ  is allowed to be any function of vx . Conditional on vα , vx  is strictly exogenous. 
The matrix vG  is assumed to be exogenous conditional on vα  and vx , i.e., [ | , , ] 0v v v vx Gε αΕ = .  
The reduced form is: 
1 1( ) ( ) ( )Jy J I G I G x J I Gβ γ δ β ε− −= − + + −       (9) 
The model is identified if the matrices I , G , 2G and 3G  are linearly independent. In this 
case, 2 3( , ,...)JG x JG x  are valid instruments. It is sufficient to conclude that peer effects are 
identified when the diameter of a network (i.e. maximal gift exchange distance) is greater than or 
equal to 3, meaning, for example, that at least two agents i  and j  are separated by a friendship 
network of distance 3. 
The excluded peer instruments strategy itself does not address the concern about self-
selection into the networks due to endogenous gift network formation. Though randomized 
reference groups solve this issue, a ‘relevance-endogeneity’ trade-off persists. As endogeneity of 
a peer group diminishes due to randomization, the relevance of decision making as well as 
external validity of the social group is weakened (Fletcher, 2010). In this paper, I rely on 
observational data, and neglecting endogenous friendship selection may overestimate peer 
effects to a large extent (Fletcher and Ross, 2011). I will next discuss the potential concerns and 
my partial solutions to endogenous network formation. 
First of all, it is possible that some unobserved factors, e.g., popularity, affect both the 
likelihood to form links and the individual donation behavior and differs among individuals in 
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the same network. The network will not be exogenous conditional on vα  and vx . To avoid the 
resulting inconsistent estimates of social interactions, I estimate a panel data model with 
household fixed effects, which further get rid of the unobserved factors at the individual 
household level. In this specification, I assume individual popularity does not change overtime. 
Meanwhile, there is concern that the stigma associated with paid plasma donation affect 
network formation and is captured by the error term. Fortunately, the gift networks data between 
2000 and 2009 predates the initiation of blood bank to the local region in 2004 and therefore 
effectively mitigate this concern. 
In the above spatial instrument estimations, the average peer behavior is measured with or 
without being weighted by amount of gifts between each pair of gift giver (ego) and gift receiver 
(alter). The assumption is that the intensity of gifts positively predicts alters’ influence over egos. 
However, it is possible that, rather than pairwise influences, alters’ overall activeness in 
networks exerts influences on egos. The third strategy addresses this possibility through 
reweighing average peer behavior using Bonacich centrality in the sociology literature (briefly 
introduced in Appendix III). The spatial identification is applied to instrument the weighted peer 
behavior. Unique to social network studies that explicitly track all peers of each node i, 
information on long-term gift structure facilitates the calculation of centrality, i.e., the activeness 
of each node in networks.   
I would like to draw a cautious note on comparing magnitude of the results. First, having 
only extensive social network data for three out of eighteen villages surveyed, I have to use a 
sub-sample to spatially identify peer effects. However, the conventional instrument strategy 
cannot be adopted in the sub-sample estimations because the community level instruments do not 
have enough variation in the sub-sample belonging to a small number of communities. 
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Therefore, the magnitude of identified peer effects using the two strategies is not comparable. 
Moreover, the same sub-sample estimations that weight peers’ behavior differently still yield 
incomparable peer effects, because the weights are in different magnitude. Nonetheless, the 
consistency of identifications can be judged by their significance. 
 
4.4.4 Measures of Relative Concern  
Since Smith (1776), Veblen (1899) and Duesenberry (1949), it has been well established 
that relative concern affects well-being.53 Relative concern can originate from different 
dimensions, such as positional consumption and socioeconomic status. Unequal income and 
consumption distribution in a society may lead to social capital erosion and social comparisons 
(Kawachi and Kennedy, 1999), vulnerability to shocks, poor health outcomes and health-
compromising behaviors (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Wilkinson, 1997; Deaton, 2001; Li and Zhu, 
2006; Ling, 2009) through rising mistrust and stress or declining social cohesion.  
While the literature on relative concern has mainly referred to keeping up with the Joneses 
in the context of wealthy populations,54 empirical evidence from poor contexts has started to 
accumulate.55 Living in an impoverished context, people may have strong incentives to compete 
                                                 
53 Adam Smith implicitly put forward the idea in The Wealth of Nations in 1776, where he claimed that people 
should be endowed with the ability to appear in public without shame. Since Veblen’s seminal work in 1899, a few 
people started to believe that utility or happiness depends in part on the comparison of one’s own consumption to 
that of others, which was first formally modeled by Duesenberry (1949) in his relative income hypothesis. Since the 
1970’s, compelling evidence on relative concern has been accumulated (Easterlin, 1974; Sen, 1983; Frank, 1985; 
Van de Stadt et al., 1985). 
54 For example, in the US counties with high income inequality, intense competition for social status leads to higher 
median housing prices, higher personal bankruptcy rates, and a higher incidence of divorce. Meanwhile, relative 
concern explains the link between inequality and observed disparities in international savings rates, which were not 
predicted by traditional consumption theories (Frank, 1997; Levine et al., 2011). Bowles and Park (2002) find that 
total working hours were positively associated with higher inequality in OECD countries over time. Other evidence 
includes Clark and Oswald (1996), Solnick and Hemenway (1998), Neumark and Postlewaite (1998), Stutzer 
(2004), Luttmer (2005).  
55 Evidence from designer-label goods consumption in Bolivia (Kempen, 2003), festivals’ budget in India (Banerjee 
and Duflo, 2007), “splendid” funerals in Ghana (Economist, 2007), relative deprivation and migration in Mexico 
(Stark et al., 1991), bride-prices and dowries in south Asia and Africa (Rao, 1993; Dekker and Hoogeveen 2002), 
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for a higher spot on the social ladder when the status reward is high (Hopkins and Kornienko, 
2010). For instance, status may determine one’s access to scarce resources in a backward 
community, such as informal credit (Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007) and potential brides in the 
marriage market (Wei and Zhang, 2011a). Being surpassed on the social ladder, the poor 
households are compelled to divert limited resources from productive investments. As I explore 
in this paper, one funding channel is to exchange plasma for cash. “Positional externalities” is 
thus a problem that is particularly acute for households living near subsistence levels. 
While community-specific inequality measures may restrict my attention to the impact of 
overall inequality,56 household-specific relative status measures have two immediate advantages 
over community-specific inequality measures. First, such status measures help to avoid making 
an inference about an individual household based on aggregate data. Second, a specific pathway 
implicated in the relationship between income inequality and the interested behavior can be 
empirically evaluated. 
Previous studies use different measures of relative status. For instance, Gerdtham and 
Johannesson (2004) use mean and median income of a reference group as a proxy for relative 
status. Eibner and Evans (2005) apply measures of relative deprivation. Li and Zhu (2006) apply 
rank and an interactive term between rank and the Gini coefficient to capture relative status. Both 
the rank & Gini interaction measure and mean & median income capture income information for 
the entire distribution, while relative deprivation adopts the view that we only eye people richer 
than us. The view is consistent with the popular expenditure cascade hypothesis that every agent 
                                                                                                                                                             
marriage payments in Bangladesh (Anderson, 2007), and community level consumption in Nepal (Fafchamps and 
Shilpi, 2008) show strong support for relative concern. Fafchamps and Shilpi (2008) further notice that isolation 
from market is associated with a significant increase in relative concern. However, empirical evidence from 
developing contexts is still mixed. Ravallion and Lokshin (2010) find that relative deprivation is not the dominant 
concern Akay et al. (2011) find very low positional concerns both for income per se and for income from aid 
projects in Ethiopia. 
56 See Kaplan et al. (1996), Putnam (2000) and Kawachi et al. (1997) for studies on its effect on other behaviors, 
including violent crime, education and health that have adverse impacts for rich and poor alike. 
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except the richest one judges own behavior according to others closest above them in an 
economy (Levine et al., 2011). 
Relative deprivation was originally proposed by Runciman (1966), arguing that one is 
deprived if the others in the group possess something that one does not have. Easterlin (1974) 
proposes a simple model to incorporate consumption norms into the individual’s utility 
maximization framework whereby utility of individual i depends on i’s consumption relative to a 
weighted average of other people’s consumption. Yitzhaki (1979) develops the definition by 
viewing income as personal possessions and deriving the relationship between relative 
deprivation and income inequality. Chakravarty (1990) defines relative deprivation as “utility 
foregone” because of not possessing the economic variables under consideration. Similar to 
Easterlin (1974), Cooper et al. (2001) propose a model in which an individual’s utility depends 
on the absolute quantity and the quality of a good consumed as well as the quantity and quality 
of a status good consumed relative to peers. Wildman (2003a, 2003b) shows the relationship 
between average health, health inequalities, absolute income and income inequalities, and he 
links absolute and relative status hypotheses in the production of health. 
In Yitzhaki (1979) and Wildman (2003a), the level of deprivation experienced by an 
individual i with income y relative to another individual with income z is formulated as, 
                                                    ( ; )D i y z y= −    if y z<       (10) 
                                                    ( ; ) 0D i y =          if y z≥  
Based on this form, one would feel more deprived as the number of individuals in society 
with higher income z increases. Thus, an overall measure of deprivation for the individual i is 
given by summing the differences in income and weighting it with the proportion of people with 
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higher income than the individual i. Accordingly, Li and Zhu (2006) define relative deprivation 
of absolute income (RDA) as, 
1 ( )i j i
ji
RDA y y
N
= −∑   j iy y∀ >       (11) 
Through normalization by iN , the total number of people in their reference groups, RDA 
adopts normalized total income of other group members who earn more than i does to measure 
the relative deprivation of person i with income iy . One concern with RDA is that it does not 
take into account differences in the scale of the income distribution across reference groups. In 
other words, if everyone’s income doubles, relative deprivation will double as well. This would 
be a problem as I am using a panel dataset to measure relative deprivation over time, and 
incomes are not adjusted for inflation. Even if people view within-reference group income 
differences in proportional terms, RDA still overstates relative deprivation of individuals in high-
income reference groups. To improve upon it, relative deprivation over individual income (RDI) 
is defined as the ratio of RDA relative to person i’s own income. 
/i i iRDI RDA y=       (12) 
Intuitively following the measure of Gini coefficient, Wildman (2003b) proposes a measure 
of relative deprivation for an individual with income y at the provincial level and stratifies it by 
urban and rural regions as follows: 
1( ) [1 ( )] [1 ( )]yd F F y y F yµ= − − −       (13) 
where µ  denotes mean income and the population is ranked by income. 1( )F y  is the cumulative 
proportion of total income up to the income y and ( )F y  is the cumulative proportion of the 
population up to the individual with income y. 
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Deaton (2001) proposes a measure of relative deprivation for an individual i with income x 
at the provincial level and stratifies it by urban and rural regions: 
(1/ ) ( ) ( )
Tx
x
y x dF yµ −∫    or   (1/ )[1 ( )][ ( ) ]F x x xµ µ +− −       (14) 
where µ  denotes mean income for those in the reference group, Tx  is the highest income in the 
group. F(y) is the cumulative distribution of incomes among individuals in the group, and ( )xµ +  
is the average income of those with income higher than the individual with income x. The 
Deaton measure is the normalized difference between the average income of those with higher 
income and income x weighted by the proportion of those with income higher than the individual 
i. Its normalization process utilizes mean reference group income instead of individual income 
adopted in RDI. Besides, RDI is less sensitive to income distribution relative to Deaton index. 
The potential overestimation of some relative status measures in high-income groups could 
be an important issue when incomes differ substantially across groups or when a panel dataset is 
used to measure relative status over time. The Deaton index takes into account this scale issue. 
All relative status measures above presume that the distance between two agents matters, 
either in proportional or absolute terms. However, studies on animals suggest rank over distance 
in importance. To test whether it takes effect on human beings, individual’s rank over incomes 
within the reference group are used (Eibner and Evans, 2005; Li and Zhu, 2006). Unlike most of 
the other measures, rank is unaffected by changes in the shape of the income distribution. Thus, 
unlike the other measures, rank does not reflect differences in income inequality across groups. 
In other words, Rank ignores the magnitude of income differences among individuals and 
incorporates less information on relative deprivation. 
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4.4.5 Empirical Strategy 
I estimate the following household plasma donation model: 
, 1 ,
, , 1 2 , , , , ,
, 1 ,
i i
i i i
j t j t
j P j P
i P t i t i P t i t i P t
i t i t
y x
y RD x
n n
α β β γ δ λ φ ε
−
∈ ∈
−
= + + + + + + +
∑ ∑
       (15) 
or in matrix notation, 
1 2Y GY RD X GXαι β β γ δ λ φ ε= + + + + + + +     (15’) 
where , ,ii P ty  denotes three indicators of plasma donation engagement: whether a household i 
donates plasma; how much plasma household i donates; and how many household members 
donate.57 
Two strategies are applied in identifying reference group iP - village boundaries and gift 
networks. First, identification based on natural villages is adopted, which might be less 
problematic in my context due to the remote mountainous location that isolates social 
interactions. The validity of this treatment is based on the assumption that village boundary 
confines interactions and that intensity of pairwise connections is homogenous, which may not 
always be the case. Therefore, I utilize a sub-sample that has rich information on social 
networks. Large variations in the intensity of gifts and availability of cross-village links improve 
village-based peer group identification. More importantly, partially overlapping peer groups and 
overtime variations in peer group composition help disentangle the endogenous effect. 
Corresponding to the three peer effect identification strategies discussed earlier, group 
average plasma donation is constructed in three ways to measure peer behavior.58 The first way 
                                                 
57 Both donation value and number of family members donating blood measure donation intensity. However, we 
have to be cautious that donation value is a noisy measure due to respondents’ recall error, numerators’ calculation 
error and inclusion/exclusion of transportation fee, extra nutrients intake to minimize damage to health and lodging 
fee for donation. 
58 The household’s donation decision is excluded from the average donation in the reference group. 
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simply takes the average donation at the natural village level; the second way weighs alters’ 
donation decisions by normalized pairwise gift values and then takes the average for each ego; 
while the third way reweighs alters’ donation decisions by their network centrality and then takes 
the average for each ego. Since the first way is applied to the whole sample with no information 
on social networks, no adjustment in the intensity of relationships can be made. However, both 
the second and the third strategy are implemented on the sub-sample with rich information on 
gifts presented, so they capture the heterogeneous intensity of pairwise ties. 
Three estimation strategies are implemented to deal with simultaneity in identifying peer 
effects 1β , as individual donation decisions might indirectly affect the average donation in the 
reference group. The first strategy applies prior community level characteristics, i.e., average 
income, sanitary and transportation conditions, to instrument prior average peer donation 
decisions in the full-sample conventional IV estimation. Both the second and the third strategies 
define gift networks as the reference group in the sub-sample estimation with spatial instruments 
generated from network structure. Specifically, characteristics of peers’ peers as well as further 
indirect peers serve as instruments. For the second strategy, average peer behavior is measured 
with or without being weighted by normalized gift intensity. The normalization takes the ratio of 
each gift spending to the maximum gift one spent in that year. For the third strategy, peers’ 
donation decisions are weighted by their network centralities.  
Denoted by ,i tRD , relative status indicators gauge the extent to which the negative impact 
2β  affects members in a society differently and whether it is biased towards the lower tail of the 
distribution.59 Both household-specific and community level inequality measures are adopted to 
                                                 
59 The impact of inequality on plasma donation may be further complicated due to the fact that a more unequal 
income distribution might reduce stress, distrust and the resulting plasma donation among the middle class but 
aggravate it in the two tails of the distribution. Meanwhile, heterogeneity might present that some people are highly 
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make this comparison. Moreover, most empirical studies on relative status rely on sampling a 
few agents in a cross-sectional context, which impedes them from capturing a full and dynamic 
picture of within-group status distribution. My study alleviates these problems by utilizing a 
multi-wave census-type panel survey. 
Χ  denotes a set of other control variables, including household head gender, age, 
education, ethnicity, cadre and party membership, and share of the elderly in the households. 
Meanwhile, household per capita income is controlled.60 The share of unmarried family 
members between age 11 and 29 is included with the expectation that its larger share 
corresponds to more future expenses in the marriage market and higher incentive to donate 
plasma. The ratio of local wage to plasma donation compensation for each year at the village 
level is controlled. Other than the relative return, I further control travel time from each village to 
the local blood bank that captures non-money cost.61 Shocks, such as family member death, 
serious diseases, natural disasters, and livestock death, are also included. Plasma donation 
compensation is excluded from income and relative status measures. 
 
4.5 Empirical Results 
4.5.1 Main Results and Robustness 
My main estimation results are presented in the following order: I first show evidence using 
the main identification strategy – spatial IV estimations. Random effect estimations are followed 
                                                                                                                                                             
competitive and others are conformists, and people differ in their pride and compassion towards the poor around 
them. 
60 If a donor is turned away because he/she looks sick, this could simultaneously affect his/her income as the same 
appearance makes them look ill. Though it is unlikely that donors were ever turned back from donating blood, I 
replace income with its predicted value through regressing on family background and productive assets. 
61 Blood donation behavior is usually concentrated where local transportation condition permits. Transportation 
condition varies among natural villages. In natural villages with better road access, farmers use carts to transport 
people to the county seat and the nearby blood bank, while for ethnic minority groups living in the mountains, 
people are generally unable to regularly donate blood, because after a few hour walk to the county seat it is often too 
late to sign up for the limited slots of donation for the day. 
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by network fixed effect and household fixed effect estimations without weighting. Then I test 
different weighting strategies. Further to the spatial IV estimations, I compare the results with 
conventional IV estimations. Other robustness checks are then conducted. Finally, results for 
status seeking in the above estimations are presented and discussed. 
First, estimations with spatial instruments generated from the gift network data are 
presented in Table 4.5. Table 4.5a reports results without taking into account the intensity of peer 
influences. The first three columns without spatial instruments suggest that both peer influence 
and relative status significantly determine plasma donation decisions. The last three columns of 
Table 4.5a instrument peers’ average plasma donation decisions by characteristics of excluded 
peers generated from gift network structure. These characteristics involve per capita income, 
education, share of the elderly, share of unmarried son, relative wage, cadre status, relative 
economic status, travel time to the local blood bank. F-tests of the excluded instruments in the 
first stage indicate that weak instruments are not a concern. Over-identification tests fail to reject 
the validity of the spatial instruments. Standard errors in all estimations are clustered at the 
administrative village level. 
The spatial instrument estimations indicate that peer effects are highly significant in 
predicting individual donation behavior. The magnitude is smaller than without spatial 
instruments. A 0.1 unit higher peers plasma donation rate increases own probability by 0.018, 
and a 1% increase in peers plasma donation value leads to 0.116% increase in own donation 
value. Evaluated at the first family member donating plasma, one more family member in the 
reference group engages in plasma donation leads to a 0.024 higher chance that a second member 
in one’s own family donates plasma, small in magnitude. The estimated peer effect suggests that 
disutility from stigma declines when more peers engage in plasma donation. 
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Further to Table 4.5a, Table 4.5b weights each peer’s influence by their dyadic normalized 
gift value (namely, link intensity). The estimations in the first three columns confirm peer 
influence and status seeking. F-tests of the excluded instruments in the first stage rule out the 
possibility of weak instruments, and over-identification tests verify instruments’ validity. The 
spatial instrument estimations find smaller peer influence than estimations without weighting. 
However, since the ratio of each gift spent to one’s maximum gift spending in a year is used as 
the weight, it is important to note that the marginal effects are not fully comparable to Table 
4.5a. 
Throughout Table 4.5a-4.5b, all exogenous effects other than peers’ mean relative wage are 
insignificant, suggesting that social interactions mainly operate through peers’ behavior. 
Considering own characteristics, having an unmarried son is associated with higher incentive to 
donate plasma. The official stipulation prohibits the elderly from donating plasma, which 
corresponds to their significantly lower probability of donation. Minority status significantly 
reduces engagement in plasma donation. The evidence on the ratio of local wage to plasma 
donation compensation is mixed. Although the theory suggests that rising wage should attract 
people to work in the labor market, the mixed estimation results are plausible since the recent 
plasma donation compensation has been 2-3 times the daily market wage. Since 2008, the plasma 
donation compensation has nearly doubled, offsetting the rapid wage increase. Shocks such as 
family member death, big disease, natural disaster, livestock death and major stealing do not 
consistently drive people into donating plasma, even if all shocks are combined. 
In Table 4.6, I present results adopting the spatial instruments as well as centrality-based 
weighting approach in the social network sub-sample estimations. Bonacich centrality is utilized 
to weigh peer influence over plasma donation. The peer groups for both peer effects 
  - 168 - 
identification and status seeking are defined based on gift networks. The effects of peer influence 
and relative status largely persist. Since centrality, unbounded in nature, is used as the weight, 
the marginal effects are not comparable to Table 4.5a. 
Comparing spatial instrument estimations with different weighting strategies, it is 
concluded that the intensity of social interactions matters in peer effects identification. 
Specifically, the pairwise weighting based on gift values finds more significant peer effects on 
probability of donation and value of donation, and the centrality based weighting finds more 
salient peer effects on probability of donation. Since reference groups are all based on the same 
gift networks among estimations with different weighting, the differences in peer effects are 
most plausibly due to the intensity. The estimation without considering heterogeneous intensity 
tends to ignore peer effects. 
Due to my interest in time-invariant variables and the concern that plasma donation 
decisions tend not to change much once people engage in, all results presented till now are based 
on random effect estimations. To test whether peer effects and status seeking can be explained by 
within network/household variations, results from both global network fixed effect estimations 
and household fixed effect estimations are presented in Table 4.7. R1 through R3 suggest that 
both peer effects and status concern significantly account for within network variation in plasma 
donation. Household fixed effects estimations in R4 through R6 further show that peer effects 
explain variation in two out of three plasma donation decisions: whether any household member 
engages in donation and the number of household members donating plasma. However, peer 
effects do not account for variation in donation value. Moreover, Within-household changes in 
relative status have insignificant effect on plasma donation. 
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Taking the estimated peer effects at face value, the network fixed effects estimation for the 
donation equation informs us that a 10% increase in the proportion of peers selling blood 
increases own probability of selling blood by approximately 4%. In other words, 1 additional 
average peer who sells blood increases own probability of selling blood by 2.5 percentage points. 
Over an average of about 18%, this is an increase of about 13%; The average peer group size is 
17 and among these peers there is on average 3.1 who sale blood, so this is the effect of 32% 
increase in the share of peers who sale blood. 
The community IV strategy with perfectly overlapping groups is widely adopted in previous 
literature on peer effect estimations. To compare results with the main estimation strategy in this 
paper, the conventional method is applied in Table 4.8. Estimation results without any instrument 
variable are presented in Panel A of Table 4.8. Both relative status measures and peer effects 
significantly affect plasma donation: whether to donate, how much to donate (RMB) and how 
many family members join this income generating activity. Peer effects and status seeking seem 
to matter in both R1 and R3 estimations, their marginal effects on having any household member 
donate plasma are much larger than having a second member donate. This result is consistent 
with the fact that the number of families with more than one plasma donor increases little 
compared to the number of families with only one plasma donor (Table 4.4), which reflects their 
reluctance in engaging in plasma donation activity for the whole family.  
In the Panel B of Table 4.8, estimations adopting the conventional IV strategy are 
presented. Peers’ average behavior is instrumented with a series of community characteristics in 
the prior period: average travel time to the local blood bank, average income, average rate of 
access to tap water and travel time to the nearest clinics. The first stage estimations show that 
higher average income and higher rate of access to tap water in the natural village is associated 
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with lower average engagement in plasma donation, mainly due to income effect. Besides, 
households more distant from clinics are less likely to donate plasma. Over-identification tests 
fail to reject the validity of the four instruments. F tests for excluded instruments all suggest that 
they are not weak instruments. 
In the second stage estimations, higher prior average plasma donation in the peer group 
significantly pushes up one’s own likelihood and intensity of donation. The marginal effects 
demonstrate similar pattern as they are without IV. Compared to spatial instrument estimations, 
the marginal peer effects are much larger. Our results suggest that the conventional method 
based on perfectly overlapping peer groups might be overoptimistic about the magnitude of peer 
effects. Meanwhile, status seeking significantly determines plasma donation, which is not 
affected by whether peers’ donation behavior is instrumented or not. However, the marginal 
status seeking effect is smaller. 
While household-specific status concern is found, the community-specific inequality 
measure, i.e., the Gini coefficient, shows insignificant effect (Table 4.9). Though both ranges 
from 0 to 1, the variation that captures household status seeking is much larger than it is at the 
community level, suggesting that the household-specific measures might better capture risk-
taking behavior due to status dispersion. Moreover, compared to whether donate plasma, 
household decisions on the number of members donating are less subject to the effect of relative 
status. 
More household-specific status measures, including the rank & gini interaction, the 
Wildman status measure and percentile rank, are adopted in Table 4.10 to check robustness. 
Consistent with the Deaton measure, nearly all of these measures confirm that households in the 
lower social hierarchy are exposed to greater pressure to engage in plasma donation. 
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Additional robustness checks are presented in Table 4.11. First, similar to De Giorgi et al. 
(2010), I reduce the original large set of excluded peers’ characteristics as instruments. I drop the 
distance to the local blood bank due to the concern of geographic homogeneity in the 
communities, but peer effects remain. Alternatively, I drop age profile from the instrument list as 
regulation on donation age may not be strictly enforced, but peer effects are still there. Secondly, 
I construct placebo peer groups via randomly assigned groups. Specifically, I randomly select 
five alternative households to construct a reference group for each household. Peer effects 
disappear, suggesting that gift networks capture the domain of social interactions. Finally, people 
may concern that participating in funerals may not suggest popularity or influence. Instead, it 
might only reflect a norm of mutual assistance in a community. Gift links due to funerals are 
dropped when defining reference groups, but peer effects are significant. All the above checks 
indicate that the reference group definition and peer effects identification are robust.   
 
4.5.2 The Potential Mechanism of Peer Effects 
To understand from where peer effects are originated, I first test the direction of influences. 
Are peer effects from gift presenters (egos), gift receivers (alters) or both? The above estimations 
of peer effects all assume that influences flow from gift receivers to gift presenters, but not 
necessarily vice versa. A gift, especially in impoverished regions, means that a relationship 
matters to gift givers. New work in the econometrics of networks and sociology confirm that 
exploiting directionality in networks is a useful identification strategy (Freeman, 1979; 
Bramoulle et al., 2009). Fortunately, the gift record allows us to test the directional hypothesis. 
Unlike the identified peer effects that gift presenters’ plasma donation decisions are driven 
by their gift receivers’ actions, estimations in Table 4.12 do not find evidence that gift receivers’ 
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plasma donation is affected by gift presenters, providing additional evidence in favor of the 
causal interpretation regarding social influence in donation behaviors. If contextual effects are 
spuriously driving the relationship between gift presenters and gift receivers, there is no reason 
to expect a directional result. In other words, gift senders in the context should appear to have an 
influence on gift receivers. Since no such a significant effect is found, the evidence is suggestive 
of a causal effect. 
Having been able to verify peer effects in shaping individual behavior and the asymmetric 
flow of peer influences from gift receivers to gift presenters, the presence of endogenous 
interactions might arguably be too broad to be very helpful if empirical analysis is to guide 
policy (Manski, 2000). 
There are distinct endogenous channels whereby group behavior affects individual 
behavior. For example, preference interactions may persist such that the disutility associated with 
plasma donation declines as more peers engage in. In this case, an individual’s preference toward 
stigmatized behavior is largely shaped by peers’ behavior. Alternatively, an individual may learn 
about the attractiveness of plasma donation from peers in terms of large income generation with 
“little” effort. In this case, positive information disseminated shapes expectations through 
interactions. What is the main mechanism at work, preference interactions or expectation 
interactions? 
A public crisis during the three-wave survey might help us understand the basic processes. 
In 2006, Hepatitis C infected Guizhou and blood banks were shutdown. The epidemic directly hit 
some blood banks in the province but not our surveyed one, while the government shut down all 
of them. Therefore, the shock was purely exogenous to local households. The lower rate of 
donation two years after the reopening of local blood bank suggests that awareness of potential 
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risks may affect individual donation. If negative information dominates the process, during the 
period after shock we should not observe an increasing pattern of individual blood plasma 
donation for groups with more donors. However, the data suggests that almost no household 
which had engaged in plasma donation after the shock withdrew from donation in 2009. In 
contrast, a number of households were newly involved in the activity, especially in the 
communities where donation had been prevalent. Moreover, the estimation dropping 
observations before the blood bank shutdown suggests even stronger peer effects than the whole 
sample estimation (Table 4.13). 
In early 2006 when infectious diseases came, the local government made every effort to 
publicize information on epidemic situation. Information on potential risks should be already 
embodied in donation decisions after the shock. Therefore, a salient increase in individual 
plasma donation due to group influences over two time points after the shock is most plausibly 
attributed to preference interactions that reduce stigma, rather than expectation interactions. 
Prescriptions for appropriate public policy differ between preference interactions and expectation 
interactions. My result infers that an educational intervention showing devastating effects of 
frequent plasma donation might be useful before the epidemic crisis if expectation interactions 
are at play, and superfluous later on when preference interactions stand out. More attentions 
should be given to policies that change preference, rather than just providing information on 
potential risks. 
 
4.5.3 Some Evidence on Negative Health Outcomes 
Mixing several bloods in the same centrifuge among several donors in obtaining plasma, the 
excessive cost reduction motive for blood banks in rural China has been widely documented as a 
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root cause of blood contamination and the resulting high prevalence of Hepatitis C and HIV 
infection among commercial donors (Wu et al., 2001; Cohen, 2004). Meanwhile, blood banks in 
the surveyed region were shut down due to an outbreak of epidemic of infectious diseases. 
Therefore, positive causal relationship can be established between blood plasma donation and the 
potential risk of disease infection, which may further lead to negative (and even deadly) health 
impacts. In the field, I observed several tragic cases in which people died after frequent blood 
donation and were infected with deadly diseases. 
Though information on Hepatitis and HIV infection is too sensitive to collect, in the second 
and the third waves of survey self-rated health status was collected at the individual level. 
Comparing current donors (in 2009) with non-donors among all who did not engage in blood 
donation (in 2006), it is found that the formal group has a lower absolute self-rating, a lower self-
rating relative to peers in their age group, and a more serious deterioration in both health status 
over time. Regressing changes in individual level self-rated health status on changes in plasma 
donation decisions between 2006 and 2009, plasma donation is associated with significantly 
lower absolute self-rating and lower relative self-rating. 
Blood donation may engender devastating impact on health and agricultural production. In 
the second wave, information on physical strength and farming was collected from 527 
households before the local government intervened in and stopped us from collecting more 
information. Among them, 75 households engaged in blood plasma donation. 64.0% of donors 
become weak in strength and are easily infected with diseases. 67.6% of donors clearly feel lack 
of strength and experience physical discomfort in the busy season. 
Information on risk awareness associated with blood donation was also collected from the 
same sample. Working in factories in the coastal region is vulnerable to work accidents. 
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However, among migrant workers 61.9% believe that blood donation is more risky than 
industrial injury. Even for households with disabled migrant workers due to work accidents, 19 
out of 32 cases still believe that blood donation is more risky. Due to the sensitivity of the issue, 
only a limited number of blood donors were asked whether they had any health check before 
donation, 6 out of 15 donors answered no. Sharing insanitary centrifuge machine in collecting 
plasma, the cross infection will be very serious if any donor carries infectious diseases. 
 
4.6 Conclusions 
Datasets on stigmatized behavior are often too sensitive to collect. Fortunately, combining 
two sources of data I collected in the field, i.e., a unique 10-year gift network data and a primary 
census-type panel data in rural China with detailed information on stigmatized behavior, I study 
one kind of such behavior—frequent plasma donation with cash compensation. This paper is 
among the first empirical studies on stigmatized behavior. To my knowledge, this is the first 
paper that utilizes dyadic social network to identify social interactions in shaping stigmatized 
behavior. 
A novel identification strategy, i.e., spatial instruments naturally generated from the 
network structure, is implemented to gauge peer influence on plasma donation decisions. The 
strategy effectively solves the reflection problem and distinguishes correlated effects that are 
puzzling empirical studies on peer effects. 
The unprecedented rich information on real social connections through long-term pairwise 
gift exchanges enables me to probe into the intensity of social interactions. The census nature of 
the household survey further aids me in measuring relative socioeconomic status along the 
income spectrum and therefore distinguishes status seeking from status-neutral peer influences.  
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I find strong evidence of peer influences in blood donation decisions, which enriches the 
general understanding about poverty and paid plasma donation. The intensity of social 
interactions matters in the identification. Peer effects are directional. It is only imposed from gift 
recipients to gift presenters, suggesting that receiving more gifts indicates higher popularity in 
the networks. The results also indicate that peer influences identification using perfectly 
overlapping groups tends to be overoptimistic in finding the effects. 
The identified endogenous social interactions provide parameter for large-scale 
interventions with general equilibrium effects. Due to negative externalities associated with the 
behavior, individual donation level increases with peers’ average donation. Contextual 
interactions and correlated effects, however, imply no such feedbacks. Programs aiming at 
targeting popular agents in the networks and therefore curbing indulgence in stigmatized 
behavior tend to be very effective. In the case of paid plasma donation, this action may indirectly 
reduce donation from others in the group with a feedback to further decrease donation from the 
targeted households.  
My results further infer that identified peer effects might be originated from preference 
interactions that reduce stigma. Expectation interaction may drive peer effects, especially at the 
initial stage of the epidemic, through the dissemination of information on potential risks 
associated with plasma donation. 
Status seeking plays an important role in shaping risk-taking behavior. The poor are 
generally faced with greater pressure to raise social status, thus creating incentives to frequently 
donate plasma. The finding calls for redistributive policies to reduce stigmatized behavior. 
Moreover, social pressure is especially salient for households with unmarried sons, suggesting 
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tightening unbalanced marriage market in contemporary China. This particular finding suggests 
some adjustments to one child policy. 
The finding that status seeking not captured by the community-specific inequality measures 
warns us that well-accepted inequality measures, such as the Gini coefficient, may obscure 
heterogeneous individual incentives along the distribution and fail to deliver accurate policy 
implications. Consistent with my empirical findings, the theoretical derivation of the Hypothesis 
2 shows sufficient but demanding conditions, which may not be satisfied in the actual social 
hierarchy. This finding also alerts us that stigmatized behavior tends to cluster in unequal 
communities, especially towards the group of the lowest social rankings. An appropriate 
intervention should be explicitly targeting the lower tail of unequal communities.  
This paper suggests that the study of plasma donation is important on its own right. It 
engenders devastating impacts on people who engage in, such as on human physical and mental 
health, agricultural production, poverty alleviation and inter-generational inequality. The HIV 
crisis in Henan Province in China in the 1990s and Hepatitis C crisis in Guizhou Province in the 
2000s are some of the hard lessons we should learn from. Moreover, stigma explains the 
difference between obnoxious markets and a regular market. Stigmatized behavior often evokes 
popular discomfort, distrust and even outrage among the public. It brings all kinds of negative 
externalities to the society. Having convincingly shown the significance of peer effects in this 
paper, understanding the mechanism that underlies social interactions and the consequences of 
stigmatized behavior will be a valuable question open to future research. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix I: Proof of Propositions 
The first order condition for an interior solution is: 
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which solves optimal intensity of plasma donation *( , , )ih h wθ  given the labor quality ( iθ ), the 
average intensity of plasma donation in the reference group ( h ), and the wage rate ( w ). The 
second order condition is satisfied. 
Considering the corner solutions for h , if an individual donates the maximum legal plasma 
( 1h → ), according to Kuhn-Tucker condition we have 
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where the labor quality is low enough that the marginal utility of consumption dominates the 
marginal disutility of social stigma for the whole range of h . The above equality holds with θ . 
In contrast, if the labor quality is high enough that the marginal utility of consumption is 
dominated by the marginal disutility of social stigma for the whole range of h , the following 
inequality holds. The following equality holds with θ . 
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Finally, to achieve the interior market equilibrium of peer Influence, an ex-ante expectation 
of average plasma donation should coincide with the resulting average plasma donation given 
that expectation. 
max
min
( , , ) ( )ih h h w dF
θ
θ
θ θ= ∫       (A4) 
where min maxθ θ θ θ< < < . Meanwhile, a stable equilibrium of the peer Influence requires that 
/ 1 , ,i ih h h wθ∂ ∂ < ∀ . 
Differentiating LHS of (1) with respect to w  yields 
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Collecting the term /ih w∂ ∂ , we have 
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Therefore, both the rising wage rate ( w ) and labor quality ( iθ ) have a negative impact on 
plasma donation. First, growth in consumption induces a fall in marginal utility of consumption; 
second, a rise in consumption makes marginal disutility of the social stigma greater. 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
To derive the impact of peer pressure on plasma donation, we differentiate LHS of (A1) 
with respect to h , which yields 
( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , )[ ] [ ]
( , , ) ( , , )[ ( )] 0
i i i i i i
cc h cS h S hhh hh
i i i i
h Sc h SS h h
h h w h h w h h wFU c FU S S U S S
h h h
h h w h h wS U c U S S
h h
θ θ θ
θ θ
∂ ∂ ∂
+ + + +
∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂
+ + + =
∂ ∂
   (A8) 
Collecting the term /ih h∂ ∂ , we get 
2
( , , ) 0
( )
cS S h SS cS S h SSi i h hh h h hh h
cc h cS h hh S h Sc h h SS
FU S U S S U S FU S U S S U Sh h w
h FU c FU S S U S U c S U SOC
θ + + + +∂
= − = − >
∂ + + + +
  
(A9) 
More intense plasma donation in the neighborhood induces i to more actively engage in plasma 
donation. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
To investigate how dispersion of income and social status affect plasma donation decision, 
let '( , )iF θ ξ  be a mean-preserving spread of ( , )iF θ ξ . The average intensity to donate plasma is 
max
min
( , )
( , )
( , , ) ( , )
( ( , ), ) ( , , ) ( , )
h w
h w
h h h w dF
F h w h h w dF
θ
θ
θ
θ
θ θ ξ
θ ξ θ θ ξ
=
   = +
∫
∫
              (A10) 
where ( , , ) 1h h wθ =  if min[ , ]θ θ θ∈  and ( , , ) 0h h wθ =  if max[ , ]θ θ θ∈ . Differentiating (A10) with 
respect to ξ  and rearranging, we have 
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( , , ) ( , )
( , , )1 ( , )
h h w F d
h
h h w dF
h
θ
θ
θ
θ
θ θ ξ θ
θ ξ
ξ θ θ ξ
∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂= −
∂ ∂
−
∂
∫
∫
                           (A11) 
Since ( , , )1 0h h w
h
θ∂
> >
∂
 θ∀ , and max
min
( , , ) ( , , )( , ) ( , ) 1h h w h h wdF dF
h h
θ θ
θ θ
θ θθ ξ θ ξ∂ ∂< <
∂ ∂∫ ∫  
holds in a stable equilibrium. Therefore, the denominator of (A11) is positive, and we have 
( , , ) ( , )( ) [ ]h h h w Fsign sign d
θ
θ
θ θ ξ θ
ξ θ ξ
∂ ∂ ∂
= −
∂ ∂ ∂∫       (A12) 
where ( , , ) / 0h h wθ θ∂ ∂ < . Therefore, whether average plasma donation intensifies is determined 
by the direction of changes in plasma donation from households in the range of [ , ]θ θ θ∈ . The 
latter is indeterminate, due to the fact that the sign of ( , ) /F θ ξ ξ∂ ∂  depends on θ  and may vary 
over [ , ]θ θ . However, a sufficient condition ensures an increase in the overall plasma donation 
intensity when income distribution becomes more unequal (as the result of mean-preserving 
spread). Specifically, if ( , ) / 0F θ ξ ξ∂ ∂ >  [ , ]θ θ θ∀ ∈ , plasma donation intensifies. 
A Specific Example: To further illustrate the sufficient condition, it is specified that 
households’ income iwθ  in the community is subject to a uniform distribution [ , ]i m mθ ξ ξ∈ − + , 
where m  is the average level of labor quality and ξ  is a mean-preserving spread parameter. The 
probability distribution function and cumulative distribution function take the following form: 
( , ) 1/ 2f θ ξ ξ=          ( , ) [ ( )] / 2F mθ ξ θ ξ ξ= − −  
The average intensity of plasma donation is 
( ( ), )
( ( ), )
1 {[ ( ( ), ) ( )] ( , , ) }
2
h w
h w
h h w m h h w d
θ ξ
θ ξ
θ ξ ξ θ θ
ξ
= − − + ∫       (A13) 
Differentiating h  with respect to ξ , we have 
2
1 1 1[ ( , , ) ] ( )
2 2
1 ( , , ) 1 ( , , )1 1
2 2
h h w d m h
h
h h w h h wd d
h h
θ
θ
θ θ
θ θ
θ θ θ
ξ ξ
ξ θ θθ θ
ξ ξ
+ − −
∂
= − = −
∂ ∂ ∂
− −
∂ ∂
∫
∫ ∫
      (A14) 
where the denominator is positive, / 0h ξ∂ ∂ >  if 1/ 2h < . Therefore, in the case of uniform 
income distribution with second-order stochastically dominating shifts, the average plasma 
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donation intensifies if 1/ 2h < . In Table 4.4, it is easily seen that the participation rate of plasma 
donation in each village satisfies this condition. 
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Appendix II: An Illustration of Spatial Instruments Identification 
 
 
 
My peer group definition is directional, depending on whether a gift is sent or not. In this 
fictitious case, Bob sends gift to Carol and Ted, but not Alice; Carol only sends gift to Ted; Ted 
sends to Bob and Carol and Alice; and Alice only sends to Ted. For Bob, Carol and Ted are in 
the peer group, while Alice is peers’ peers. For Carol, Ted is in the peer group, while Alice and 
Bob are peers’ peers. For Ted, All other agents are in the peer group. For Alice, only Ted is in 
the peer group, while Bob and Carol are peers’ peers. For all four agents, their excluded peers’ 
characteristics can serve as instruments for their own peers’ characteristics. 
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Appendix III: Bonacich centrality 
Bonacich centrality is mainly based on the adjacency matrix G  of network g, in which an 
entry in a square corresponding to a pair {i, j} denotes whether there exists a link from i to j. 
Specifically, 1 (0) denotes there is (no) direct connection between a pair of agents. It should be 
noted that adjacency matrix is asymmetric, i.e., a link from i to j does not necessarily mean a link 
from j to i. In adjacency matrix G , entries in the main diagonal are set to be 0. 
kG denotes the k-
th power of the matrix, where 
0G I= . In 
kG , an entry 
k
ijg  measures the amount of walks of 
length k that exist between players i and j in network g .  
Define a matrix ( , )M g ασ , which is well-defined when ασ  is sufficiently small. Its entry 
0
( , ) ( )k kij ijkm g gασ ασ
∞
=
= ∑  measures the total amount of walks in g from i to j where walks of 
length k are weighted by ( )kασ .  
1
0
( , ) [ ] ( ) ( 15)k k
k
M g I G G Aασ ασ ασ
∞
−
=
= − =    ∑
 
Given the parameter ασ , Bonacich centrality vector is defined as 1( , ) [ ]bC g I G Jασ ασ
−= − , 
where Bonacich centrality of node i 
1
( ; , ) ( , )
n
b ij
j
C i g m gασ ασ
=
= ∑ . I  is a n*n  identity matrix, and 
J  is a n*1  column vector of ones. 
It is straightforward to observe that Bonacich centrality is no smaller than 1. 
1 0
( ; , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( 16)
1 0
n
b ii ij
j i
if
C i g m g m g A
if
ασ
ασ ασ ασ
ασ≠
>    >
= + =     =    =
∑  
In my analysis, Bonacich centrality with positive attenuation factors generated by the 
UCINET software are adopted in one of the weighting scenarios, and I accept the idea that being 
connected to neighbors with more connections makes one more powerful. 
Bonacich centrality demonstrates major advantages over other centrality measures. While 
other measures exclude the case that actions of an agent influence neighbors which in turn 
feedback on the initiator, Bonacich centrality takes it into consideration; second, some other 
measures solely depend on the length of the shortest paths between nodes in a network. 
However, it is possible that ties are not perfectly reliable and other paths of different lengths may 
take effects. Fortunately, both direct and indirect influences in a network are captured by 
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Bonacich centrality; meanwhile, one node might be centrally tied to a large number of others, but 
those others might be disconnected from the network as a whole. Bonacich centrality takes 
peers’ centrality into account; moreover, all other centrality measures except Bonacich centrality 
are parameter-free (Calvó-Armengol et al., 2009); finally, Bonacich centrality has behavioral 
foundation derived from Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative game, while other centrality 
measures are mainly geometric in nature (Ballester et al., 2006). Jackson (2008) derives 
Bonacich centrality using the framework of a linear interaction of behaviors among peers where 
individual behavior is a weighted average of peers’ behavior.  
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Figure 4.1 Prevalence of HIV-AIDS Infected from Blood Collection and Drug Injection 
 
Source: Cohen (2004). 
Notes: 
[1] This figure describes the situation of HIV infection up to 2004. Outbreaks of HIV infection in China have been 
mainly caused by drug injection (IDUs) and plasma collection, which altogether have accounted for more than two 
thirds of China’s HIV infection, and 250,000 blood plasma donors became infected by 2004 (Cohen, 2004). The 
infected population is distributed in specific regions: the pink area is mainly affected by plasma collection, while the 
blue area is mainly influenced by drug injection. The darker the color, the more severe infection there is. 
[2] The area in yellow is Guizhou province, which was not a major HIV infected area due to either drug injection or 
plasma collection up to 2004. 
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Figure 4.2 Distribution of Per Capita Income Including / Excluding Plasma Donation 
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Source: Authors’ 2004 survey data 
Note: Two vertical lines, “L” and “H”, refer to the low (668RMB) and high (892RMB) official poverty lines 
stipulated by the Chinese government. 
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Figure 4.3 Long-term Gift Exchange Network in One Village  
 
Source: Authors’ gift network data from one of the eighteen villages. 
Note: Dots of the same color show households in the same clan. Dots to the boundaries show households from other 
villages. The dots (households) are based on actual geographic locations. 
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Figure 4.4 Peer Influence on Household Plasma Donation 
(Probability and Number of Donors) 
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Source: Authors’ survey data 
Notes: The horizontal axis weights each peer’s plasma donation decisions, including whether to donate (left figure) 
and how many household members engage in (right figure), by its gift network centrality and takes the mean value. 
Mean value is further taken at the natural village level. The vertical axis takes the mean of own plasma donation 
decisions at the natural village level. Each dot represents one natural village. 
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Figure 4.5 Relative Deprivation and Predicted Rate of Plasma Donation Participation 
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Source: Authors’ survey data 
Notes: The left figure and right figure respectively show the relationship between one’s own predicted probability of 
plasma donation and relative status (1=lowest status; 0=highest status) using main estimation equation (15) with 
(right figure) and without (left figure) adding control variables. 
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Table 4.1 Summary Statistics by Three Administrative Villages (2004) 
  Village 1 Village 2 Village 3 Total 
Number of natural villages 9 5 4 18 
Distance to county seat (km) 10 8 2.5 6.8 
Number of households 257 151 393 801 
Total population 1089 535 1449 3073 
Share of minority households (%) 76.6 12.6 6.7 30.8 
Share of household members aged 60 and above (%) 14.2 17.9 12.5 14.1 
Share of households with migrants (%) 30.7 55 43.3 41.4 
Share of household members who migrate (%) 12.3 13.5 12 12.4 
Male head of household (%) 93.5 94.8 91.6 92.8 
Education of household head (years) 2.87 3.06 3.98 4.44 
Household average year of schooling 2.19 2.67 3.67 2.97 
Per capita cultivated land (mu) 0.87 0.86 1.1 0.98 
Percentage of flat land (%) 40 20.7 80 53.4 
Land rental rate (Yuan per mu) 30 50 100 60 
Share of households with TV (%) 39.3 39.7 61.6 50.3 
Share of households with bicycles or motorcycles (%) 2.3 3.3 19.3 10.9 
Share of households with phones (%) 8.9 15.2 23.4 17.2 
Having difficulty with access to drinking water 79.4 80.1 39.2 59.9 
Share of households with local non-farm jobs (%) 49.5 43.7 66.5 56.6 
Share of households with self-employment (%) 7.4 3.3 7.4 6.6 
Source: Authors’ survey data 
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Table 4.2 Income and Consumption by Three Administrative Villages (2004-2009) 
  Admin Village 1 Admin Village 2 Admin  Village 3 Total 
  2004 2006 2009 2004 2006 2009 2004 2006 2009 2004 2006 2009 
Main Sources of Income (Percent)             
  Farming 26.3 26.7 23.7 31.0 37.4 29.5 37.0 31.5 26.1 33.3 31.4 33.1 
  Livestock 12.3 13.3 13.1 9.1 10.9 10.8 6.0 3.4 2.1 8.1 6.8 6.9 
  Local non-farm and self-employment  18.2 13.8 13.1 6.4 16.7 13.9 32.3 39.9 35.0 24.0 30.0 23.8 
  Remittance from migrants outside the county 7.8 22.4 11.6 10.9 10.2 9.4 7.3 10.7 6.6 8.0 13.1 8.8 
  Disaster relief, anti-poverty programs, deforestation subsidies 5.1 2.9 6.1 2.5 6.9 5.8 1.9 0.5 4.8 2.8 2.0 5.4 
  Gift income 3.2 4.5 4.7 11.7 11.6 8.4 4.9 11.1 10.7 5.6 9.1 8.2 
  Plasma donation income 13 4.6 7.2 15.7 1.7 4.7 7.6 0.7 1.6 10.9 2.2 4.1 
             
Main Expenditures (Percent)             
  Food 53.8 51.1 48.1 47.1 42.9 36.5 45.4 38.5 34.3 47.8 42.2 35.5 
  Clothing 4.4 4.4 4.6 3.1 3.7 4.1 4.0 4.9 4.1 4.0 4.6 4.2 
  Fuel 5.9 6.4 6.7 5.4 6.9 7.3 10.2 9.5 8.0 8.4 8.3 7.5 
  Telephone 1.1 2.1 5.3 1.3 2.4 3.8 1.5 3.5 6.4 1.4 3.0 5.5 
  Medical care 14.1 16.7 15.1 24.7 16.8 16.9 15.2 15.2 11.2 16.4 15.8 13.5 
  Education 9.0 10.0 9.6 7.9 12.2 14.0 8.8 12.3 14.1 8.7 11.7 12.9 
  Gift and festival spending 6.4 9.2 10.1 6.8 13.9 16.1 8.9 15.9 17.5 7.9 13.9 15.2 
Source: Authors’ survey data; Times to send gifts was not in the 2004 wave, therefore denoted by “-”.  
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Table 4.3 Poverty and Income Inequality by Three Administrative Villages (2004-2009) 
 Admin Village 1 Admin Village 2 Admin Village 3 Total 
  2004 2006 2009 2004 2006 2009 2004 2006 2009 2004 2006 2009 
Per capita annual income (RMB) 1009 1111 1262 1274 1638 1655 1749 2420 2442 1404 1817 2855 
Income inequality (Gini) 42.4 45.3 46.5 42.3 52.0 61.8 40.2 42.8 50.9 43.1 48.2 55.2 
Income inequality excluding plasma donation (Gini) 46.6 46.9 47.4 44.7 52.5 63.5 42.4 43.0 51.4 46.3 49.0 56.6 
(Mean) Deaton relative deprivation index 0.441 0.432 0.444 0.409 0.484 0.584 0.418 0.406 0.500 0.423 0.432 0.495 
Income below poverty line of 892 RMB (%) (P0) 54.1 52.5 30.7 41.1 44.1 33.3 23.4 21.1 13.1 37.3 36.3 22.4 
poverty-gap below poverty line of 892 RMB (P1) 22.4 23.3 13.0 15.8 17.9 16.1 8.1 7.5 6.1 14.5 15.0 10.1 
squared poverty-gap below poverty line of 892 RMB (P2) 12.2 13.6 7.8 7.7 9.6 10.5 3.9 3.7 4.2 7.5 8.3 6.4 
Source: Authors’ survey data. 
 
 
Table 4.4 Blood Plasma Donation by Three Villages (2004-2009) 
  Admin Village 1 Admin Village 2 Admin Village 3 Total 
 2004 2006 2009 2004 2006 2009 2004 2006 2009 2004 2006 2009 
Participation rate in donating plasma (%) 46.4 16.9 23.9 31.1 7.6 10.2 21.0 6.1 8.5 31.2 10.1 14.1 
Mean per capita plasma donation (RMB) 197 56.6 178.0 235.5 22.4 93.7 113.4 11 33.0 163.2 28.6 93.8 
Cash compensation (nutrition subsidy) for plasma donation (580cc) 80 80 150 80 80 150 80 80 150 80 80 150 
# households without plasma donor 140 236 229 104 146 132 308 367 387 552 749 749 
# households with one plasma donor 110 34 50 44 9 12 81 23 35 235 66 97 
# households with two or more plasma donors 11 14 22 3 3 3 1 1 1 15 18 26 
Proportion of women among plasma donors (%) - - 90.0 - - 38.5 - - 88.9 - - 80.3 
Source: Authors’ survey data
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Table 4.5a Spatial Instruments Identification on Peer Effect and Status Seeking 
(Network Sub-sample, Ego Random Effect Estimation, No Weighting, 2004-2009) 
 Without spatial instruments With spatial instruments 
  
Donate 
or not 
(Linear Prob) 
Donation 
Value (log) 
(OLS) 
# hh members 
Donate 
(Oprobit) 
Donate 
or not 
(Linear Prob) 
Donation 
Value (log) 
(2SLS) 
# hh members 
Donate 
(iv+Oprobit) 
Endogenous Effect 
Mean plasma donation rate 
(peers) 
0.394***   0.176**   
(0.035)   (0.070)   
Mean Plasma donation Value 
(peers) (log) 
 0.097***   0.116*  
 (0.040)   (0.064)  
Mean # of hh members donate 
(peers) 
  0.038***   0.024*** 
  (0.005)   (0.009) 
Own Characteristics 
Per capita income 0.005 -0.014 -0.005 0.004 -0.027 -0.005 
(0.007) (0.026) (0.005) (0.006) (0.047) (0.005) 
Edu -0.003 -0.019 -0.003 0.000 -0.019 -0.003 
(0.005) (0.031) (0.004) (0.005) (0.068) (0.004) 
Share of elderly -0.286*** -0.867** -0.226*** -0.378*** -0.123 -0.224*** 
(0.089) (0.408) (0.089) (0.110) (0.669) (0.076) 
Share of unmarried son 0.215*** 1.210*** 0.154** 0.205*** 1.276*** 0.155*** 
(0.073) (0.450) (0.067) (0.068) (0.447) (0.052) 
Deaton RD 0.167** 0.294 0.160** 0.150** 0.459 0.027*** 
(0.079) (0.450) (0.081) (0.060) (0.373) (0.007) 
Ratio of farm wage to 
plasma compensation 
-0.377** -0.565 -0.257* -0.313* -0.849 -0.255* 
(0.184) (1.111) (0.149) (0.174) (1.507) (0.150) 
Travel time to  
blood bank 
-0.001* -0.002* -0.000 -0.001* -0.002 -0.000 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.000) 
Shocks Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exogenous Effect (or Contextual Effect) 
Mean Per capita income 
(peers) 
0.001 -0.127* -0.000 -0.001 -0.030 -0.000 
(0.009) (0.067) (0.007) (0.009) (0.073) (0.006) 
Mean Edu (peers) -0.014 -0.095 -0.011 0.007 0.193* -0.010 
(0.012) (0.077) (0.009) (0.013) (0.115) (0.011) 
Mean Share of elderly  
(peers) 
0.181 0.348 0.122 0.395* 1.099 0.121 
(0.218) (1.455) (0.150) (0.224) (1.557) (0.165) 
Mean share of unmarried son 
(peers) 
0.083 0.667 0.030 0.100 -0.586 0.026 
(0.136) (0.804) (0.096) (0.129) (1.294) (0.058) 
Mean deaton_rd 
(peers) 
-0.132 -0.910 -0.144 -0.221 0.720 -0.150 
(0.137) (0.898) (0.101) (0.135) (1.142) (0.091) 
Mean Ratio of farm  
wage to plasma (peers)  
-0.524** -1.429 -0.344* -0.757*** -0.409 -0.369** 
(0.249) (1.536) (0.201) (0.268) (1.679) (0.185) 
Mean Travel time to  
blood bank (peers) 
-0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.027 -0.001 
(0.003) (0.018) (0.002) (0.003) (0.034) (0.002) 
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Shocks Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Village fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Excluded Instruments (Exogenous Characteristics of Excluded Peers) 
Mean Per capita income 
   0.226 -2.286* -0.072 
   (0.319) (1.396) (0.341) 
Mean Edu 
   -0.950*** -5.504*** -0.811*** 
   (0.224) (0.984) (0.240) 
Mean Share of elderly 
   -8.061* -75.190*** -14.068*** 
   (4.712) (20.971) (5.111) 
Mean share of unmarried son 
   -11.394*** -35.630* -9.252* 
   (4.416) (20.670) (4.965) 
Mean deaton_rd 
   4.519*** 30.808*** 5.332*** 
   (1.277) (5.456) (1.372) 
Mean cadre status 
   8.441*** 12.624 9.439*** 
   (2.345) (10.362) (2.534) 
Mean Ratio of farm  
wage to plasma income 
   8.807*** 91.060*** 9.671*** 
   (2.367) (10.695) (2.567) 
Mean Travel time to  
blood bank 
   -0.007 0.039 -0.005 
   (0.009) (0.038) (0.009) 
F test excluded instruments - - - 13.49 31.21 14.41 
p-val over-identication test - - - 0.153 0.617 0.219 
(Pseudo) R2 0.361 0.242 0.270 0.332 0.314 0.327 
N 486 486 486 464 464 464 
Notes: 
[1] Standard errors are clustered at the administrative village level. *significant at 10%;**significant at 
5%;***significant at 1%. 
[2] Marginal effects are presented. Most households have no more than 2 members donating plasma. 
Therefore, the marginal effect for ordered probit estimation compares 2 household members donating 
plasma with less than 2 members donating. 
[3] The identification strategy follows (Bramoullé et al., 2009). The excluded instruments used in each 
estimation are the following characteristics of excluded peers: per capita income, education, share of the 
elderly, share of unmarried son, relative wage, cadre status, relative economic status, travel time to the local 
blood bank. 
[4] Shocks include funerals, big diseases, livestock deaths and natural disasters. 
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Table 4.5b Spatial Instruments Identification on Peer Effect and Status Seeking 
(Network Sub-sample, Ego Random Effect Estimation, Weighted by Gift Link intensity, 
2004-2009) 
 Without spatial instruments With spatial instruments 
  
Donate 
or not 
(Linear Prob) 
Donation 
Value (log) 
(OLS) 
# hh members 
Donate 
(Oprobit) 
Donate 
or not 
(Linear Prob) 
Donation 
Value (log) 
(2SLS) 
# hh members 
Donate 
(iv+Oprobit) 
Endogenous Effect 
Mean plasma donation rate 
(peers) 
0.413***   0.267***   
(0.044)   (0.099)   
Mean plasma donation Value 
(peers) (log) 
 0.118***   0.143**  
 (0.044)   (0.072)  
Mean # of hh members donate 
(peers) 
  0.047***   0.034** 
  (0.008)   (0.014) 
Own Characteristics 
Per capita income 
0.010 -0.014 -0.005 0.004 -0.028 -0.003 
(0.009) (0.026) (0.005) (0.006) (0.047) (0.003) 
Edu 
-0.004 -0.019 -0.003 -0.000 0.022 -0.004 
(0.005) (0.032) (0.004) (0.006) (0.069) (0.003) 
Share of elderly 
-0.291*** -0.884*** -0.230*** -0.385*** -0.120 -0.261*** 
(0.089) (0.408) (0.089) (0.109) (0.668) (0.072) 
Share of unmarried son 
0.213*** 1.208*** 0.153*** 0.203*** 0.386 0.138*** 
(0.072) (0.450) (0.066) (0.068) (0.593) (0.054) 
Deaton RD 
0.147** 0.298 0.037** 0.148** 0.467 0.036*** 
(0.063) (0.449) (0.015) (0.061) (0.373) (0.009) 
Ratio of farm wage to 
plasma compensation 
-0.405** -0.612 -0.280* -0.349** -0.783 -0.220* 
(0.185) (1.111) (0.153) (0.172) (1.507) (0.120) 
Travel time to  
blood bank 
-0.001 -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
(0.001)  (0.003) (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.004) (0.000) 
Shocks Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exogenous Effect (or Contextual Effect) 
Mean Per capita income 
(peers) 
0.001 -0.128 -0.001 -0.001 -0.026 -0.002 
(0.010) (0.067) (0.007) (0.009) (0.072) (0.008) 
Mean Edu (peers) 
-0.015 -0.094* -0.012 0.006 -0.182 -0.013 
(0.012) (0.077) (0.009) (0.013) (0.116) (0.010) 
Mean Share of elderly  
(peers) 
0.177 -0.370 0.121 0.385* 0.931 -0.029 
(0.216) (1.456) (0.151) (0.222) (1.573) (0.159) 
Mean Share of unmarried son 
(peers) 
0.077 0.643 0.033 0.087 0.578 0.089 
(0.136) (0.805) (0.096) (0.129) (1.292) (0.092) 
Mean deaton_rd 
(peers) 
-0.149 -0.921 -0.153 -0.231* 0.685 -0.098 
(0.141) (0.898) (0.102) (0.133) (1.142) (0.093) 
Mean Ratio of farm  
wage to plasma (peers)  
-0.532** -1.466 -0.344* -0.783*** 0.306 -0.461*** 
(0.249) (1.538) (0.202) (0.265) (1.682) (0.140) 
Mean Travel time to  -0.001 -0.013 0.000 -0.001 -0.029 0.000 
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Blood bank (peers) (0.003) (0.018) (0.002) (0.003) (0.034) (0.002) 
Shocks Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Village fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F test excluded instruments - - - 17.13 25.50 28.10 
p-val over-identication test - - - 0.652 0.625 0.475 
(Pseudo) R2 0.311 0.246 0.229 0.318 0.317 0.280 
N 486 486 486 464 464 464 
Notes: follow Table 4.5a. 
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Table 4.6 Spatial Instruments Identification based on Centrality Weighting 
(Network Sub-sample, Ego Random Effect Estimation, 2004-2009) 
  
R1 
Donate or Not 
R2 
Donation Value 
R3 
# hh Members Donate 
Mean prior plasma donation decision 0.037*** 0.097* 0.005*** 
(0.009) (0.058) (0.001) 
Deaton RD 0.135** 0.409 0.032*** 
(0.060) (0.376) (0.011) 
N 464 464 464 
(Pseudo) R2 0.247 0.309 0.304 
Notes: [1] For each household, its Peers’ plasma donation decisions are weighted by corresponding centrality. Mean prior plasma donation decision is calculated 
via taking mean over peers’ weighted plasma donation decisions. 
[2] Centrality is a sociology concept that measures the activeness of a node in a network. Appendix III presents a detailed discussion of the Bonacich centrality 
measure used in this paper. 
[3] The centrality measure is unbounded. Therefore, the coefficients are incomparable to previous results in Table 4.5 and Table 4.6. 
[4] Other notes follow Table 4.5a. 
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Table 4.7 Network and Ego Fixed Effect Estimations on Peer Effect and Status Seeking 
(Network Sub-sample, 2004-2009) 
 R1 R2 R3  R4 R5 R6 
 Network Fixed Effect  Household Fixed Effect 
 Donate or Not Donation Value # hh Members Donate  Donate or Not Donation Value # hh Members Donate 
Mean prior plasma 
donation decision 
0.431*** 0.525* 0.008**  0.204** 0.015 0.164* 
(0.163) (0.296) (0.004)  (0.081) (0.086) (0.089) 
Deaton RD 
0.202*** 0.506 0.009***  0.039 -0.568 0.071 
(0.058) (0.561) (0.002)  (0.076) (0.547) (0.090) 
N 464 464 464  464 464 464 
(Pseudo) R2 0.146 0.065 0.402  0.294 0.113 0.244 
Notes: The fixed effect panel model is estimated at the network (peers and excluded peers) level and household level. Other notes follow Table 4.5a. 
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Table 4.8 Conventional IV Identification on Peer Effect and Status Seeking 
(Full Sample, Household Random Effect Estimation, 2004-2009) 
 R1 R2 R3 
 
Donate or Not 
(Linear Prob) 
Donation 
value (log) 
(2SLS) 
# hh members 
donate 
(Ordered Probit) 
 Panel A: Without IV Strategy 
Mean prior plasma donation decision 0.425*** 0.177*** 0.046*** (0.064) (0.028) (0.011) 
Deaton RD 0.079*** 0.375** 0.011*** (0.030) (0.157) (0.004) 
N 1507 1507 1507 
(Pseudo) R2 0.203 0.191 0.229 
 Panel B: With IV Strategy 
Mean prior plasma donation decision 
0.947*** 0.267*** 0.106*** 
(0.325) (0.061) (0.014) 
Deaton RD 
0.066* 0.381** 0.013*** 
(0.037) (0.158) (0.004) 
Excluded Instruments  
Lagged travel time to local blood bank 
-0.002*** -0.025*** -0.001*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Lagged average income in the community 
-0.002 -0.182*** -0.003 
(0.003) (0.047) (0.004) 
Lagged access to tap water 
-0.097*** -2.751*** -0.144*** 
(0.011) (0.123) (0.014) 
Lagged travel time to nearest clinics 
-0.016*** -0.987*** -0.024*** 
(0.006) (0.051) (0.007) 
N 1507 1507 1507 
(Pseudo) R2 0.464 0.414 0.229 
F test - excluded instruments 17.80 53.01 16.96 
Over-identification test (p-value) 0.167 0.908 0.109 
Notes: [1] Marginal effects are presented. Most households have no more than 2 members donating plasma. 
Therefore, the marginal effect for ordered probit estimation compares 2 household members donating 
plasma with less than 2 members donating. 
[2] The instrumental variables are lagged by 2-3 years. Specifically, the 2009 values are lagged to 2006 
values, while the 2006 values are lagged to 2004 values. 
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Table 4.9 Comparing Household-specific Relative Status and Community Inequality 
  R1-Gini 
R2-
Deaton R3-Gini R4-Deaton R5-Gini R6-Deaton 
 Panel A: Spatial Instruments Identification 
 
Donate or not 
(Linear Prob) 
Donation value (log) 
(2SLS) 
# hh members donate 
(ordered probit) 
Mean prior plasma donation decision 
0.143* 0.176** 0.113** 0.116* 0.036*** 0.024*** 
(0.082) (0.070) (0.065) (0.064) (0.013) (0.009) 
Relative status (Gini or Deaton) 0.292 0.150** 3.683 0.459 0.077 0.027*** 
(0.384) (0.060) (2.236) (0.373) (0.047) (0.007) 
N 464 464 464 464 464 464 
Pseudo R2 0.295 0.332 0.308 0.314 0.303 0.327 
 Panel B: Conventional Instrument Variables Identification 
Mean prior plasma donation decision 
1.085*** 0.947*** 0.247*** 0.267*** 0.109*** 0.106*** 
(0.269) (0.325) (0.060) (0.061) (0.014) (0.014) 
Relative status (Gini or Deaton) 
-0.423*** 0.066* -1.650*** 0.381** -0.030* 0.013*** 
(0.131) (0.037) (0.623) (0.158) (0.018) (0.004) 
N 1507 1507 1507 1507 1507 1507 
(Pseudo) R2 0.194 0.464 0.191 0.414 0.223 0.229 
Notes:  
[1] This Table aims to compare the impact of status seeking using the household-specific measure versus the community-specific measure. Due to the space limit 
here, results from more household-specific measures are presented in Table 4.10. 
[2] Other notes follow Table 4.5a. 
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Table 4.10 Testing Alternative Relative Status Measures 
 Donate or Not Donation Value # hh Members Donate 
 
Rank*Gini 
/ 1000 
Wildman 
/1000 
Rank 
/1000 
Rank*Gini 
/ 1000 
Wildman 
/1000 
Rank 
/1000 
Rank*Gini 
/ 1000 
Wildman 
/1000 
Rank 
/1000 
Relative status (three 
measures) 
0.133** 0.017** 0.085*** 0.665** 0.036 0.423*** 0.022***  0.003** 0.013*** 
(0.059) (0.008) (0.028) (0.299) (0.042) (0.144) (0.008) (0.002) (0.004) 
N 1507 1507 1507 1507 1507 1507 1507 1507 1507 
(Pseudo) R2 0.197 0.191 0.199 0.188 0.186 0.191 0.227 0.224 0.229 
Notes:  
[1] robust standard error in parentheses;*significant at 10%;**significant at 5%;***significant at 1% 
[2] Other notes follow Table 4.5a. 
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Table 4.11 More Robustness Checks on Peer Effects 
(Network Sub-sample, RE Estimations, 2004-2009) 
 R1 R2 R3 
 Donate or Not Donation Value # hh Members Donate 
1. Baseline 0.176** 0.116* 0.024*** 
(0.070) (0.064) (0.009) 
2. Drop geographic location from characteristics of excluded peers 0.204** 0.115* 0.013** 
(0.081) (0.063) (0.006) 
3. Drop age profile from characteristics of excluded peers 0.159* 0.109* 0.008** 
(0.086) (0.065) (0.004) 
4. Placebo peer groups -0.023 0.071 0.017 
(0.072) (0.067) (0.013) 
5. Drop gift links due to funerals 0.216** 0.131* 0.027* 
(0.087) (0.074) (0.014) 
Notes: 
[1] robust standard error in parentheses;*significant at 10%;**significant at 5%;***significant at 1% 
[2] Other notes follow Table 4.5a. 
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Table 4.12 The Potential Mechanism: Testing Directional Peer Effects Hypothesis 
(Network Sub-sample, Alter Fixed Effect Estimation, 2004-2009) 
  
R1 
Donate or Not 
R2 
Donation Value 
R3 
# hh Members Donate 
Mean prior plasma donation decision 0.157 -0.232 0.132 
(0.235) (0.181) (0.269) 
N 336 336 336 
Pseudo R2 0.285 0.248 0.247 
Notes:  
[1] It is hypothesized that influence flows from the gift receiver to gift presenter, but not necessarily vice versa. A gift, especially in impoverished regions, means 
that a relationship matters to the gift giver. New work in the econometrics of networks and sociology confirm that exploiting directionality in networks is a useful 
identification strategy (Freeman, 1979; Bramoulle et al., 2009). Fortunately, the gift record allows us to test the directional hypothesis. 
[2] In this table, there is no evidence that gift receivers are influenced by gift presenters, providing additional evidence in favor of the causal interpretation 
regarding social influence in plasma donation behaviors. If contextual effects are spuriously driving the relationship between ego (gift sender) and alter (gift 
receiver), there is no reason to expect a directional result. The context should cause both sides to move up and down simultaneously; hence, if I find a significant 
effect in one direction, I should also find it in the other: the gift sender should appear to have an influence on the gift receiver. Since no such a significant effect is 
found, it is believed that the evidence from the gift record is suggestive of a causal effect. 
[3] Other notes follow Table 4.5a. 
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Table 4.13 The Potential Mechanism: Expectation Interactions or Preference Interactions? 
(Network Sub-sample, After the Shutdown of Local Blood Bank (2006, 2009)) 
  
R1 
Donate or Not 
R2 
Donation Value 
R3 
# hh Members Donate 
 Household Fixed Effect Estimations 
Mean prior plasma donation decision 0.517*** 0.160 0.155* 
(0.166) (0.135) (0.090) 
N 382 382 382 
Pseudo R2 0.635 0.246 0.228 
Notes:  
[1] Only observations after the outbreak of Hepatitis C epidemic are included in the estimations. 
[2] Other notes follow Table 4.5a. 
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Table 4.14a Summary Statistics on Self-rated Health Status (2006 and 2009) 
 Mean SD 
Non-donor in both 2006 and 2009 
Change in absolute self-rating 0.139 1.077 
Change in relative self-rating 0.268 1.097 
Non-donor in 2006 but donor in 2009 
Change in absolute self-rating 1.848 1.093 
Change in relative self-rating 1.914 0.951 
Donor in 2006 but non-donor in 2009 
Change in absolute self-rating 0.250 0.957 
Change in relative self-rating 0.200 0.632 
Donor in both 2006 and 2009 
Change in absolute self-rating 1.612 0.997 
Change in relative self-rating 1.605 0.933 
Notes: Both absolute self-rating and relative self-rating of health status range from 1-5. 1 corresponds to the 
healthiest status, while 5 points to the least healthy status. Relative self-rating evaluates health status compared to 
peers of similar age. 
 
 
Table 4.14b Association between Blood Donation and Individual Self-rated Health Status 
(2006 and 2009) 
  R1 R2 
 
Change in 
absolute self-rating  
Change in 
relative self-rating 
Changes in Donation Decisions 1.401*** 1.231*** 
(0.193) (0.171) 
Control Variables Yes Yes 
N 753 1058 
(Pseudo) R2 0.063 0.045 
Notes: 
[1] *significant at 10%;**significant at 5%;***significant at 1%. 
[2] Both absolute self-rating and relative self-rating of health status range from 1-5. 1 corresponds to the 
healthiest status, while 5 points to the least healthy status. 
[3] Control variables involve changes in per capita income, major shocks, income inequality and demographic 
characteristics. 
[4] The difference in sample sizes between two regressions is due to missing values in self-rating. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
COSTLY POSTURING: RELATIVE STATUS, CEREMONIES AND EARLY CHILD 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
It is common wisdom that the best way to cut hunger and malnutrition is through income 
growth. However, Deaton (2010) uncovers a famous food puzzle: despite rapid economic growth 
in the past several decades in India and China, calorie consumption per capita has declined and 
the rate of improvement in nutritional status has been relatively slow. Surprisingly, when given 
more resources, the poor tend to eat less basic staple food but consume greater amounts of 
tastier, albeit less nutritious, food (Jensen and Miller, 2008). Moreover, the poor are more likely 
to spend their extra income on entertainment and social festivals (Banerjee and Duflo, 2007). A 
question arises: why, amid income growth, do the poor prefer to consume less food at the 
potential high cost of nutritional status?  
Of course, there are many potential explanations to the puzzle. Reductions in physical 
activities and thus the need for calories associated with economic growth is one representative 
explanation (Deaton, 2010). However, this channel alone cannot explain why the child 
malnutrition rate in India has barely improved in the past several decades, considering that 
children’s physical activities might not have declined as much as adults. In this paper, we offer 
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an alternative explanation: due to social pressures and concerns for status, the poor are forced to 
cut basic necessities in order to afford gifts for social events in their communities.   
In many low income countries, rural people live in closely knit communities. It is a social 
norm that people are compelled to attend weddings, funerals, and other social festivals in their 
communities and present a gift. In a recent book (2011), Banerjee and Duflo provide the 
following insightful observation on the phenomenon of keeping up with the Joneses: 
 
“Poor people in the developing world spend large amounts on weddings, dowries, and 
christenings. Part of the reason is probably that they don't want to lose face, when the social 
custom is to spend a lot on those occasions. In South Africa, poor families often spend so lavishly 
on funerals that they skimp on food for months afterward.” 
 
Because the poor have limited resources, the fiscal burden of hosting or taking part in these 
social events is much higher for the poor than the rich. In order to save money for hosting the 
events or preparing a gift, the poor may have to cut back basic necessities such as food. Such a 
reduction in food intake may have a lasting detrimental impact on the nutritional and health 
status of the poor. In other words, the reductions in food intake and stagnant improvement in 
nutritional status are likely to be caused by increased social spending.   
It is challenging to test the squeeze effects of keeping up with the Joneses using commonly 
available household surveys, since they normally sample only a few households in a community, 
making it impossible to measure relative concerns. In this paper, we use a primarily collected 
census-type panel household survey in 18 villages in rural China to test the squeeze effects of 
social spending on children’s health outcomes. The dataset is unique in several ways. First, all of 
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the households in the villages are measured in three waves. Since the villages are in remote and 
poor mountainous areas, each village forms a good reference group. Therefore, we are able to 
measure the relative deprivation status for each household over years. Relative income status, 
rather than absolute income level, is utilized due to the strong evidence that people’s motives to 
consume visible goods are context-specific and that attending costly social events are clearly 
positional consumption in the Chinese custom. Second, all of the children’s anthropometric 
information was collected in the third wave survey in 2009. Third, we collected detailed 
information on funerals, weddings, and all other ceremonies in the past ten years. Moreover, 
consumption of detailed subcategories of food items was collected from each household 
member. 
Because the number of social events held by other households in a village is largely beyond 
the control of a family, we use it as an identification strategy to examine the impact of fetal 
exposures to costly social events on children’s health outcomes. However, if the health outcome 
and number of social events are both influenced by some unobserved factors, the above 
identification strategy will be biased. For example, a village with a higher mortality rate may be 
inherently less healthy, therefore displaying higher rate of underweight and stunting among 
children. To alleviate this concern, we classify social events into negative and positive shocks. 
Among all social events, funerals are more likely to be associated with bad economic conditions, 
while other ceremonies (e.g. weddings, coming-of-age, house building) tend to represent good 
economic status. We separately examine the impact of fetal exposures to negative and positive 
shocks on child health outcomes and find the results are robust no matter whether the positive or 
negative shock variable is used. 
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We focus on the impact of frequent social events that occur at the very beginning of life—
the fetal period. Our results show that it is the children of the poor who are more vulnerable to 
the shocks of social events. Those born to mothers who were exposed to frequent social events 
during their pregnancies are more likely to display higher rates of stunting and underweight (too 
short and skinny for their age). For the poor, attending social events may yield an unintended 
negative consequence on their children’s health outcomes. However, avoiding social networking 
with neighbors may result in social exclusion.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides evidence that social 
spending squeezes the poor’s food consumption; section 3 examines the impact of prenatal 
exposures to social shocks on child health outcomes; and Section 4 concludes. 
 
5.2 Social Spending and Food Consumption 
5.2.1 Literature on Social Spending 
It has been increasingly recognized in the economics literature that people care about their 
relative standing in a society and that the concern for status shapes both consumption and 
savings behavior (Veblen, 1989; Duesenberry, 1949; Esterlin, 1974; Sen, 1983; Frank, 1985; 
Van de Stardt et al., 1985). The literature on relative concern and status consumption is largely 
focused on rich people and high-income countries. It is widely documented that the rich care 
about status and tend to indulge conspicuous consumptions. Recently, there is an emerging body 
of literature showing that the poor are also subject to relative concerns—the phenomenon of 
keeping up with the Joneses applies to the poor as well. For example, the poor prefer to consume 
designer-label goods in Bolivia (Kempen, 2003); lavish weddings are ubiquitous in India 
(Banerjee and Duflo, 2007); funerals in Ghana (The Economist, 2007) and South Africa (Case et 
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al., 2008) cost more than one year’s household income; and in Nepal, rural residents’ expected 
adequate level of consumption is largely influenced by the average consumption of the other 
people living in the same village (Fafchamps and Shilpi, 2008). Powered by relative concerns in 
a manner similar to the rich, the poor also tend to spend more of their extra income on status 
goods and in visible social occasions.  
Apart from relative concerns, social norms may also dictate the behavior of social spending.  
In developing countries, social networks, particularly within villages, can provide informal 
insurance (Udry, 1990). Gift exchanges play an important role in lubricating social networks. For 
instance, in the event of a family member’s death, the pooled gifts from social networks can help 
the survivors to defray part of what are quite often costly funeral expenses. Attending and 
presenting a gift at friends’ and neighbors’ weddings, funerals, and other social occasions is a 
social norm in many parts of the world.  
Though gift-giving is largely reciprocal, it takes time and effort to build and maintain social 
networks. In China, a family is supposed to pay back previously received gifts later on according 
to the prevalent market price of gift size per occasion (Yan, 1996). Unfortunately, gift price has 
been escalating in recent years due to worsening inequality and particular demographic patterns. 
Specifically, some people get rich and spend heavily on social events, while others have to 
follow (Chen et al., 2011). Unbalanced sex ratio under the one child policy also strengthens the 
fast increasing gift trend that families with unmarried son send more gift as a marriage market 
signal (Brown et al., 2011). However, households get gift back only when they have major 
ceremonies to hold or suffer from major idiosyncratic shocks, none of which occur regularly. 
Ceremonies on average cost more than twice the income from gifts received and are becoming 
even more costly (Chen et al., 2011). Therefore, reciprocal gift exchange is not very effective in 
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smoothing consumption. Even if some gifts are returned at a critical time point, those not in the 
form of food or fungible may not improve child nutrition. 
It is an open question as to which of the above two channels, i.e., concern for relative 
standing or social norms, better explains the observed social spending behavior among the poor. 
Putting that aside, however, both mechanisms predict that the poor tend to spend more of their 
extra money on more socially visible goods and activities. 
 
5.2.2 Patterns of Social Spending in Rural China 
The objective of this paper is not to test the mechanisms behind social spending but rather to 
present empirical evidence that social spending poses a heavy burden on the poor using a unique 
dataset from China.62 China is largely a guanxi (network) society. Participating in and presenting 
gifts at funerals, weddings, and other ceremonies held by fellow villagers have been regarded as 
social norms in Chinese villages for thousands of years. Despite its ubiquitousness in daily life, 
there is surprisingly little empirical evidence in the economics literature on the patterns of social 
spending across income groups and over time in Chinese societies.  
The dataset for this study comes from three waves of census-type household survey 
conducted in 18 villages in Puding County, a nationally designated poor county in Guizhou 
Province in China (Appendix Figure 5.1).63 The survey collected detailed information on 
household demographics, income, consumption and transfers. The first wave of the survey 
included 801 households at the beginning of 2005. The second wave of the survey was 
                                                 
62 In another paper, Chen et al. (2011) look at the relative importance of peer effects, status concern, and risk pooling 
on the escalation of social spending in rural China and conclude that peer effects and status concern well explain the 
observed gift spending pattern in rural China. Meanwhile, risk-sharing is not the underlying determinant. 
63 This survey was jointly conducted by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), the International 
Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (ICARD) at the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences (CAAS), 
and Guizhou University. 
 218 
 
 
administered in early 2007 and 833 households was interviewed. In January 2010, the third wave 
follow-up survey was conducted and 872 households were interviewed. 
The survey area offers an ideal setting to study the relationship between social spending and 
food intake among the poor for several reasons. First, poverty rate is quite high in the county. As 
shown in Table 5.1, in 2004, more than one-third of people lived below the national poverty line. 
Using the higher international poverty line of one dollar per day, the poverty incidence is higher. 
Second, despite the initial high incidence of poverty, the real per capita income has grown 
rapidly at an annual rate of more than 10% from 2004 to 2009. Even for the poor households 
below the $1.25 international poverty line, we still observe annualized income growth rate at 
3.7%. However, we do not observe any improvement in most categories of basic food intake. 
This provides us with a good opportunity to study Deaton’s food puzzle as to why the 
improvement in nutritional status has been stagnant among the poor amid rapid income growth. 
Third, our survey villages are in rather isolated and mountainous areas. In such an isolated 
environment, villagers naturally interact much more frequently with each other within the same 
village than with those residing outside their home village. As a result, the villages form clearly 
defined reference groups.64 By surveying all the households in the villages, we are able to 
accurately measure relative income status for each household within a village. 
In the second and third waves of the survey, we asked the households to report major 
events, including weddings, funerals, coming-of-age ceremonies, during the past ten years, as 
well as the related expenses and gifts received. In this area, all the households keep a gift book, 
which lists the amount of all gifts received and the names of gift givers in major ceremonies held 
by them. In the third wave of the survey, we used digital cameras to record gift books from all 
                                                 
64 Because of the high degree of isolation from the outside, people within a village know each other well. Three 
small neighboring villages of ethnic Miao group form a strong bond among themselves. Therefore, we combine 
them when defining a reference group. 
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the households in three out of eighteen villages. The data enable us to examine the patterns of 
social spending in different social occasions over time and across income groups.  
Table 5.2 presents the average gift size per occasion, number of weddings and funerals, and 
participation rate of funerals within a village from 2004 and 2008, based on the gift record data 
collected in 3 out of 18 villages. Four salient features are apparent from the table. First, average 
gift size per occasion has increased from 2004 to 2008. Second, the difference in gift size 
between rich and poor is minimal. The poor at the bottom 25% of income distribution on average 
spend even more on a gift per occasion than their top 25% counterpart in the same village across 
all the years. The finding is consistent with our field observation that in the surveyed areas, there 
is an implicit “market price” for gift size per occasion that people follow when extending a gift. 
Third, participation at funerals is almost universal within a village. As shown clearly from the 
last column, more than 95% of households attend fellow villagers’ funerals. Fourth, participation 
rates between the rich and the poor in social events are very similar, especially for funerals. 
Figure 5.1 shows that households in the poorest income group participate more widely in 
funerals than the third and fourth highest income groups. This is consistent with the findings by 
Brown et al. (2011) that participating in funerals is largely driven by social norms. The rather 
standard gift size and nearly universal participation rate of major ceremonies indicate that the 
average gift expenditure per capita in a village should be positively related to the number of 
ceremonies held in a year. This is apparently the case, as shown by the strong positive correlation 
between the two variables in Figure 5.2. 
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5.2.3 The Squeeze Effects of Social Spending on Food Consumption 
Because the poor have limited financial resources, social spending poses a much heavier 
fiscal burden on the poor than the rich. In order to afford a gift to attend a social festival, they 
have to make a sacrifice elsewhere. Living on the margin, they have little to cut back. Tightening 
their financial belt and skimping purchases of meat, sugar and other food items for a few weeks 
after the ceremony is often the default option for the poor. Figure 5.3 plots the share of cash 
expenditure spent on gifts and food by relative status, measured by Deaton relative deprivation 
Index (2001, shortened as RD index hereafter).65 For those with lower relative status (larger 
value along the horizontal axis), we can clearly see that the drop in the share of food expenditure 
is accompanied by the increase in the share of gift expenditure. In principle, they could eat more 
food and suffer less from malnutrition by simply spending less on gifts. But apparently they did 
not make such a choice. By comparison, for those households with higher status (smaller values 
along the horizontal axis), both lines barely move. 
To further test the squeeze effects of social spending on the food consumption of people 
with low status, in Table 5.3 we run an seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) on the share of 
food and gift cash expenditure. Ceremonies held by other families within the same village are 
largely exogenous shocks to a family. Since the 18 villages are in the same township, they are 
likely to be subject to the same covariate natural shocks, if any, mitigating some concerns about 
unobserved idiosyncratic natural shocks. However, one may still argue that the number of 
ceremonies might capture some unobserved factors which also determine consumption patterns. 
For example, it is possible that residents in a richer village can afford more wedding, house 
building and coming-of-age ceremonies (positive shocks) than those in a poorer village and they 
                                                 
65 We will discuss the measure in detail in the next section.  
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are likely to consume more food. In contrast, the population in villages with greater number of 
funerals (negative shocks) may be generally poorer. Consequently, they may have less money to 
buy food. Therefore, the positive and negative shocks may bias the estimation of food 
consumption in different directions. Although it is difficult to find good instruments to 
ameliorate the concern on the potential endogneity problem of the ceremony variable, we run 
separate regressions by using positive and negative shocks to see if the estimates fall in a narrow 
band. If both positive and negative shocks yield similar results, we can confidently rule out the 
potential bias as a result of endogneity. 
In the first set of regressions (R1), we include the number of ceremonies other than funerals 
held by fellow villagers,66 Deaton Relative Deprivation Index (RD), the interaction term between 
the above two variables, as well as a set of control variables at the household level, and year and 
village fixed effects. The coefficient for the interaction term in the food share equation is 
statistically significant and negative. This suggests that those with lower status spend less on 
food consumption than their richer counterparts, provided that they attend the same number of 
ceremonies in a given year. Similarly, the coefficient for the interaction term in the second set of 
regressions (R2) remains negative and significant, suggesting squeeze effects of social spending 
on food consumption among those in the lower social spectrum.  
 
5.3 Quantifying the Effect of Social Spending on Child Health Outcomes 
5.3.1 Fetal Origins Hypothesis 
To resolve Deaton’s food puzzle, next we need to test if a cut in food intake as a result of social 
spending comprises nutritional status, in particular that of children. A burgeoning body of 
                                                 
66 Throughout the estimations in this paper, we take the log form for the number of funerals and other ceremonies. 
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literature on fetal origins hypothesis suggests that in utero is a critical period for human 
development. In utero exposures to malnutrition are likely to adversely affect health outcomes in 
later life (Barker and Osmond, 1986; Barker et al., 1989).  
 However, it is impossible to directly test this hypothesis using human subjects in a 
controlled experiment. The empirical literature largely relies on natural shocks, such as famine 
and drought, to identify the casual effect of prenatal exposures to malnutrition on long-term 
health outcomes. For example, studies based on the Dutch Famine (1944-1945) reveal that the 
famine had negative impacts on various health related outcomes, such as mental disorder in early 
adulthood, schizophrenia, and lower glucose tolerance in adults (Neugebauer et al., 1999; Brown 
et al., 2000; Hulshoff Pol et al., 2000; Ravelli et al., 1998). Similar fetal origins effects are found 
in studies on the 1918 flu (Almond, 2006) and the Chernobyl radioactive fallout (Almond et al., 
2009). Children born during a drought in rural Zimbabwe show a higher rate of stunting in the 
subsequent two years (Hoddinott and Kinsey, 2001). Maccini and Yang (2009) show that high 
rainfall at the very beginning of life is associated with better health and education outcomes in 
later life for Indonesian women. 
 Yet, not all empirical studies based on natural shocks confirm the fetal origins 
hypothesis. For instance, studies on the survivors of the Leningrad Siege (1941-1944) in general 
conclude that those exposed to starvation in the fetal stage do not show much difference in health 
outcomes from cohorts born outside Leningrad and in other years in the later stages of life. One 
key reason is that in the event of severe shocks like the Leningrad Siege, only the healthier 
survive and can be observed in later life. Therefore, the presence of mortality selection renders it 
less likely for researchers to observe the negative health impact on the survivors later on. Mu and 
Zhang (2011) show that prenatal exposures to the Chinese Great Famine (1959-1961) result in 
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higher disability rates for female survivors but not for males, largely because of much larger 
excess male mortality rates during the famine. Exposure to milder shocks, however, might 
facilitate the testing of fetal origin hypothesis, since scarring effects for survivors are much less 
likely to be offset by selective mortality in extreme fetal exposures. 
The studies based on natural shocks have provided tremendous insight on the fetal origins 
hypothesis in extreme events. However, estimates of the effects of mild exposures may be more 
relevant to policy than estimates of the effects of disasters. Almond and Currie (2011) argue that 
the immediate mortality and economic disruption from the 1918 flu or the China famine are 
sufficient to imply that any reasonable measure to prevent such catastrophes is likely to pass a 
cost-benefit calculation, thereby showing that there was additional damage to fetal health from 
these disasters merely “makes the rubble bounce.” 
Moreover, most people, even the poor, do not suffer from natural shocks as severe as 
famine. Instead, they face more frequent, yet minor, social shocks —funerals and wedding that 
they are obligated to attend. Do children born to mothers exposed to more frequent social shocks 
have worse health outcomes as predicted by the fetal origins hypothesis? To our knowledge, no 
studies have examined the impact of prenatal exposures to social shocks on child health 
outcomes. 
In the third wave of our survey, we collected anthropometric information for all the children 
in our sample. The data enables us to address the above question. We use three variables—
height-for-age, stunting and underweight—as major child health outcome measures. Stunting and 
underweight are defined based on two standards: the WHO standard and the standard of China 
Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).  
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Height-for-age measures the cumulative long-term nutritional status an individual has 
obtained over the life course, while weight-for-height or BMI-for-age measures more acute 
changes. Weight-for-age and underweight may confound the height-for-age measure. A stunted 
child would have a low weight-for-age z-score due to his low height even if his weight-for-
height z-score is normal. If squeeze effects due to prenatal exposure to social shocks are found, it 
should be mainly related to height-for-age and stunting status but to a much lesser extent related 
to weight-for-age67 or underweight and not related to weight-for-height. A comparison of the 
most important anthropometric indicator in this paper – height-for-age z-score – between our 
IFPRI-CAAS Guizhou sample and the matched CHNS 2004 & 2006 Guizhou sample is drawn in 
the Appendix Figure 5.2 and help confirm the data representativeness. 
As shown in Table 5.4, nearly half of children born in 2008 are stunted. Despite 
impressive annual rates of income growth at more than 10% from 2004 and 2008, the stunting 
rate had not declined, but rather rose slightly in the sample villages. The problem is more acute 
among girls, whose stunting rate increased from 41.4% in 2004 to 55.6% in 2008. The rate of 
underweight shows a similar pattern. Overall, the prevalent high stunting and underweight trend 
is consistent with He and Chen (2004) that in impoverished counties in Guizhou and Guangxi the 
most recent stunting and underweight rates are around 60% and 30%, respectively. As illustrated, 
the Deaton food puzzle can be observed in rural China as well.  
                                                 
67 Weight-for-age is not adopted in this paper due to the concern for measurement errors. The third wave survey took 
place in January, the coldest time of the year when people often wear heavy winter clothes. However, it is hard to 
weigh children’s clothes, in particular those of newborns.  Therefore, the measurement for the weight of young 
babies is likely less accurate. In the wake of potential large measurement errors on anthropometric information 
among newborns, we exclude those born in 2009 (i.e., 1-12 months after birth) from our empirical analysis. The 
doted vertical reference line in the Appendix Figure 2 shows this cut-off point. More importantly, we have to 
exclude those samples because our 2009 survey was conducted in January 2010 during which social events were 
frequently held. Without the complete number of events including January, the definition for number of social events 
in lunar year 2009 is inaccurate. 
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 The observed Deaton puzzle may have something to do with in utero exposures to social 
shocks. Table 5.5 reports the average height-for-age z-score for children born between 2004 and 
2008 according to low and high income groups in villages with more frequent and less frequent 
social shocks (number of all ceremonies). The last column measures the difference-in-differences 
(DID) of the z-score. Almost all the values are negative, suggesting that it is children of the poor 
income groups who exhibit lower z-scores when exposed to more frequent social shocks at the 
fetal stage. Because of the small sample size for each cohort, we cannot compute the t-value of 
the DIDs. In the last row, we pool together all the children born between 2004 and 2008. The 
DID value is significant and negative. While this simple analysis based on two-by-two discrete 
groups shows some suggestive evidence on the squeeze effects of social spending on child health 
outcomes, it is interesting to further investigate if there is a linear negative relationship between 
the continuous variables of z-scores and number of ceremonies. Figure 5.4 depicts the height-for-
age z-score against the number of ceremonies exposed in the fetal period for the high and low 
income status groups. For the low-income status group, the greater number of exposures to 
ceremonies, the lower value of z-score. In contrast, the figure does not reveal an obvious pattern 
between z-scores and social shocks for the high-income group.  
The simple DID analysis and bivariate plot provide tentative evidence in support of the 
squeeze effects of fetal exposures to social events. In order to more rigorously verify the squeeze 
effects, we need to control for more variables in more quantitative analyses.  
 
5.3.2 Measuring Reference Groups and Relative Status 
Before going to the quantitative analyses, we need to first define reference groups and 
measure relative status. The theoretical models on relative concerns often take reference groups 
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as given. However, in empirical analyses, defining reference groups is more of an art than 
science. People interact with others in different cycles in their work and family life. Identifying 
and measuring reference groups are always a great challenge for empirical research on social 
interactions.  
 The challenge might be greater in cities than in rural areas. In rural areas in developing 
countries, people often live in a rather close community. Two recent studies on China show that 
rural people often use their home village as a reference group (Knight, Song and Gunatilaka, 
2007; Mangyo and Park, 2011). In our surveyed area, the villages are located in an area 
renowned for its Karst landform, which presents a barrier for frequent interactions across 
villages. Therefore, in this paper, we primarily use villages as reference groups in our empirical 
analyses.68  
 Having defined reference groups, next we need to measure relative concerns, as they are 
often mentioned as a key motive behind social spending in the literature (e.g. Brown et al., 2011; 
Chen et al., 2011). In this paper, we adopt the widely used Deaton RD index (2001). The index 
captures the idea that a person is deprived if others in the group possess something that one does 
not have. It closely follows the spirit of Frank, Levine, and Dijk (2010) and Hopkins and 
Kornienko (2004).69 
The Deaton RD index originated from Yitzhaki (1979) and Wildman (2003). The level of 
deprivation experienced by an individual i with income y70 relative to another individual with 
                                                 
68 We also check the robustness of our results using alternative reference groups - surname networks within a village. 
69 Frank, Levine and Dijk (2010) define “Expenditure Cascade” in an economy where every agent judges own 
behavior based on others closest above them. Hopkins and Kornienko (2004) develop a rank-based theoretical 
model that captures the status concern motive for lower ranked agents. In the model, rising average income of their 
fellow residents triggers a competition for status that extends all the way down to the bottom of the distribution. 
Moreover, Hopkins and Kornienko (2004) relate positional spending to a measure of income inequality, which pave 
the way for us to empirically identify status seeking and social influences. 
70 Y can be defined in the dimension of income, consumption, assets and so on. Here income is utilized, which 
includes both in-kind and cash income. 
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income z is formulated as, 
                                  ( ; )D i y z y= −    if y z<   or                              (1) 
                                  ( ; ) 0D i y =          if y z≥                                           (2) 
Based on this formula, an individual would feel more deprived as the number of individuals 
in society with more income than this individual increases. Thus, an overall measure of 
deprivation for the individual i is computed by summing the differences in income and weighting 
it with the proportion of people with higher income than the individual i. The above measures 
tend to overstate relative deprivation of individuals in high-income reference groups. This could 
be a very important issue when incomes differ substantially across groups. To make scale 
invariant, Deaton (2001) proposes a measure of relative deprivation for an individual i with 
income x: 
           
(1/ ) ( ) ( )
Tx
x
y x dF yµ −∫    or   (1/ )[1 ( )][ ( ) ]F x x xµ µ +− −                   (3) 
where µ  denotes mean income for those in the reference group, Tx  is the highest income in the 
group. F(y) is the cumulative distribution of incomes among individuals in the group, and ( )xµ +  
is the average income of those with income higher than the individual with income x. The 
Deaton RD index normalizes difference between average income of those with higher income 
and income x weighted by the proportion of those with income higher than the individual i. The 
Deaton RD index takes into account differences in the scale of income distribution across 
groups. Unlike other deprivation measures, such as deprivation of absolute income (Li and Zhu, 
2006), the Deaton RD index is scale invariant. In others words, it will not automatically double 
as everyone’s income doubles.  
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5.3.3 Quantifying the Effect of Social Shocks on Child Health Outcomes 
The standard child nutritional and health demand function, derived from a welfare 
maximization framework, often includes income, food prices, access to healthcare, genetic 
make-up, and other individual characteristics (Behrman and Deolalikar, 1988; Strauss and 
Thomas, 1995, 2008). In this paper, we include the Deaton relative deprivation measure as well 
as its interactions with variables of interest as additional variables. The specification can be 
written as: 
, 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 0 , 1 1 , 0 2 , 1
3 , 0
* *
+ +
ijt j t j t j t j t j t j t j t
j t c ijt p jt p t h jt s jt v t vt ijt
Outcome RD CAB RD CBB RD RD CAB
CBB C PCG p H S
α β γ γ γ
γ α α α α α υ δ ϕ ε
= = = = = = =
=
= + + + +
+ + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + + + +
    (4) 
where ijtOutcome  denotes child i's nutrients intake and health status in household j at time t; 
jtRD  denotes relative status for household j; ijtC  is a vector of child i’s characteristics, including 
age, sex and birth order; jtPCG  is a vector of characteristics of the principal care giver, 
including household head sex, education, ethnicity, cadre status, mothers’ height71, and major 
shocks (illnesses and natural disasters); tp  denotes a vector of local food prices; and jtH  is a 
vector of local health facility characteristics, such as distance to the closest clinic center. Other 
household characteristics, including share of the elderly, household size, per capita income are 
controlled for. υ  is a set of administrative village72 fixed effects that account for any time-
invariant differences between villages (such as geography) that may also be correlated with 
social events and child health outcomes. δ  is a set of year of birth fixed effects, which account 
for any year-to-year changes in birth conditions that occur for the surveyed region that 
                                                 
71 Fathers’ health status is not included, since some of them were migrating out to work during our survey. In most cases, mothers and children were left behind in the villages. 
72 An “administrative village” is the lowest level bureaucratic entity comprised of several villages. The surveyed 18 villages belong to 3 administrative villages, one with 10 
villages, each of the other two with 4 villages respectively. 
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potentially correlate with social events (such as business cycles). The baseline model in Panel A 
Table 5.7 includes both year and administrative village fixed effects. In Panel B Table 5.7, we 
further include a set of administrative village-specific linear time trends that address the concern 
that the trend in social events within some villages is spuriously correlated with the trend in child 
health outcomes across villages over time. In Panel C Table 5.7 and all the other regression 
tables, we further control for administrative village x year fixed effects vtϕ . To account for the 
possibility that the stochastic error terms ( ijtε ) are correlated within villages over time, the 
estimations are clustered at the year x village level. The results are robust when the estimations 
are clustered at the village level. 
Two time periods are critical in the identification of squeeze effects: the fetal period (t=0) 
and the period after birth (t=1). , 0j tCBB =  is the number of ceremonies held by other families 
within the same home village in the year prior to child i’s birth. Similarly, , 1j tCAB = is the number 
of ceremonies held by others during child i’s birth year. The main coefficients of interest are 
2γ , 3γ , α and β .  The magnitude and significance level of these coefficients as well as 
2 jtRDγ α+ and 3 jtRDγ β+ , shows us degrees of exposures to social events shocks in the fetal 
period or after birth matter to child health outcomes. 
As discussed earlier, although the number of all ceremonies held by other families within a 
village is largely beyond an individual household’s control, the number of ceremonies may 
reflect a village’s wealth level as well as other underlying unobserved factors, which may 
potentially influence child health outcomes. To address this concern, we distinguish negative 
shocks (number of funerals) from positive shocks (e.g. weddings, coming-of-age and other 
ceremonies). If positive and negative shocks also represent the underlying unobserved health 
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conditions in a village which are correlated with child health outcomes, then the estimations 
based on positive and negative shocks will yield biases in opposite directions. Therefore, 
separate regressions using positive and negative shocks provide us with a lower and upper bound 
of the effect. If both sets of regressions produce significant results with similar magnitude and 
the same sign, it suggests that there are indeed squeeze effects. 
The simultaneous identification of prenatal social events shocks , 0j tCBB =  and social events 
shocks after birth , 1j tCAB =  do not confound each other. In our survey, dates of birth were 
recorded based on household registration book, which follows the western calendar. However, 
dates of social events were recorded according to respondents’ recall, and local rural residents 
adopt lunar calendar in their everyday life, which spans from February to January. Though we do 
not have information about the exact timing of all social events for all 18 villages, complete gift 
record books we collected from 3 out of 18 villages provide us with rich information about the 
timing. Since the three villages are very similar in terms of socioeconomic conditions to the other 
15 villages, we infer that the pattern of timing in Figure 5.5 generally applies to all these villages. 
As shown in Figure 5.5, most ceremonies (except funerals and childbirths73) are planned 
and held at the end of the lunar year, i.e., January, when nearly all families come back to 
celebrate the Chinese lunar new year. The timing of major social events in the lunar calendar 
combined with dates of birth in the western calendar makes sure that children in the prenatal 
period are exposed to most social events in the year prior to birth (t=0), while most social events 
in the birth year (t=1) occur after child birth. 
                                                 
73 Though child birth generally occurs in a good year, the timing of pregnancy also determines the timing of delivery 
and may demonstrate other seasonal / climate / weather patterns. Therefore, in both left Figure 5 and all empirical 
estimations we exclude the number of child birth from the good year shock category. The results are not much 
affected compared to estimations with childbirth events, since childbirth is much less costly than other events. 
Observed from the guest size and gift size recorded in the gift books, only closest relatives come to celebrate 
childbirth, and most gifts are cheap in-kind goods (mostly in the form of red eggs). Moreover, many local residents 
preserve the tradition to organize wedding and child birth as a single event due to the high organizing cost. 
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Even if funerals are most often unplanned and held throughout a year, they demonstrate a 
seasonal pattern in our sample - a disproportionate share of them are between November and the 
following January (Figure 5.5) - due to the demographic characteristics that more people die in 
winter than in other seasons. This fact ensures a clean identification using the number of 
funerals. 
Considering that the normal gestation period is 38-42 weeks, the clustered number of social 
events towards the end of the lunar year guarantees children born before the end of the following 
September had prenatal exposure to most of these social events. The earlier the birth date, the 
later a child is exposed to clustered social events during the fetal period. However, for children 
born between October and December, none of them directly experienced social events shocks in 
the prior year. In the robustness checks, we restrict our sample to children born between 
February and September. 
 
5.3.4 Main Empirical Results on the Squeeze Effects 
Building upon the findings in Figure 5.4 and Table 5.5, we run separate regressions on three 
child health outcome variables,—height-for-age z-score, stunting, and underweight,—in low and 
high income groups. The specification is the same as in equation (4) except that it excludes the 
interaction terms of RD. Table 5.6 reports the regression results for the key variable of interest, 
the number of funerals (or other ceremonies) exposed in prenatal period and after birth, 
respectively. Children born to mothers in low income groups, who are exposed to more funerals 
or other ceremonies during their pregnancies, show lower height-for-age z-scores and display 
higher rates of stunting and underweight. Doubling the exposure to funerals or other ceremonies 
in the network on average corresponds to 1-1.5 standard deviation lower height-for-age z-score. 
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In contrast, the health outcomes of children born to richer families do not appear to be vulnerable 
to social event shocks experienced in the year prior to their birth. More social events experienced 
by children in rich families are even associated with insignificantly better height-for-age z-score. 
For them, more social events in the neighborhood mean more social capital than social burden 
and mobilize resources towards children. Unlike in utero exposures, the number of social events 
exposed after birth have little to do with child health outcomes. The findings in this table indicate 
that the health outcomes of children born to poor families are associated with the number of 
social events held in their village in the year before their birth. 
One might question this arbitrary division of the sample into low and high income groups. 
In Table 5.7, we regress the three health outcome variables on the whole sample by interacting 
the Deaton RD measure with the incidence of funerals or other ceremonies at the village level in 
the year prior to or in the year after child birth. Regardless of whether we use the number of 
funerals or other ceremonies, the interaction terms of in utero exposures to the number of social 
shocks incurred prior to birth with the Deaton RD measure are statistically significant, negative 
in the regression on height-for-age z-scores, and positive in regressions on stunting and 
underweight rates. In comparison, none of the coefficients for the interaction term between the 
Deaton RD measure and the number of funerals or other ceremonies after birth is significant. 
Considering that a larger value of the RD measure means a lower status, the significant 
interaction terms mean that children from households with lower economic status and are 
prenatally exposed to social event shocks are more likely to be shorter and develop higher rates 
of stunting and underweight than those from higher status households.  
In Panel A of Table 5.7, the baseline estimations with year fixed effects and administrative 
village fixed effects are presented. In Panel B of Table 5.7, administrative village-specific year 
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trends are further controlled for. The first derivative of equation (4) with respect to the number of 
social events tells us that households whose Deaton RD index above or equal 0.21-0.41 
significantly suffer from net squeeze effects, while the mean RD index over the three-wave 
survey is around 0.45. In other words, the cutoff point for net squeeze effects applies to two 
thirds of the households with higher relative deprivation level. Panel C in Table 5.7 adopts 
administrative village x year fixed effects, which capture more general village-specific 
unobservable factors over time. The squeeze effects are significant and marginal effects are 
similar. Specifically, households with Deaton RD values above or equal 0.14-0.34 suffers 
significantly from net squeeze effects. 
 
5.3.5 Robustness Checks and Other Findings 
One common finding worth noting in Table 5.7 is that squeeze effects are almost always 
much more significantly demonstrated in the longer term nutritional status measures, i.e., height-
for-age and stunting, than in the shorter term measure, i.e., underweight status, suggesting the 
long-term negative impact of prenatal exposure to costly social events. However, underweight 
may not be a good measure for comparison, since a child suffering from stunting is very likely to 
also suffer from underweight only because the small stature. Therefore, it is worthwhile to 
further get rid of the potential confounded longer and shorter term effects. If the main driving 
force of stunting is in utero exposure to malnutrition, we should expect that the effects are not 
captured by more acute health measures. In Table 5.8, estimations using weight-for-height z-
score find that the squeeze effects are not embodied in the contemporaneous nutritional status, 
which strengthens our argument that the fetal origins effect is the main driving force behind bad 
child health outcomes.In addition to running separate regressions using positive and negative 
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shocks to check the potential bias of unobserved factors, we also run a falsification test on the 
squeeze effects by lagging the variable on the number of funerals and other ceremonies by one 
year. In other words, in this test the variable labeled “# of social events before birth” actually 
corresponds to the number of social events held in a village two years ahead of child birth, which 
ought to be unrelated to prenatal health status, rather than in the year prior to birth. If some 
unobserved factors instead of the squeeze effect drive the result, we would expect that the 
coefficient remains significant in the falsification test. Results show that all the coefficients for 
the interaction terms in Table 5.9 are statistically insignificant. Thus, the number of funerals in 
years other than the year prior to child birth does not seem to affect child health outcomes.  
Though the timing of social events in three typical villages informs us the general pattern of 
events’ distribution towards December and January, we do not know the exact dates of 
ceremonies in the other fifteen villages. Therefore, we cannot match them with the months of 
mothers’ pregnancies. Instead, we simply count the number of all ceremonies held by other 
families in the home village in the year prior to a child’s birth and use it as a measure of fetal 
exposures to social shocks. This simple procedure may result in measurement errors. For 
example, if a child is born between October and December this year, then ceremonies held in the 
last year won’t directly affect the child’s in utero development. As a robustness check, we 
restrict our sample to those children born between February and September. Children in this 
sample are definitely conceived in the lunar year (between February and the following January) 
prior to their birth, and the feature of social events’ clustering towards the end of the lunar year 
further ensures direct exposures. Table 5.10 repeats the main regressions in Table 5.7 on the 
restricted sample. The coefficients for the interaction terms between the Deaton RD measure and 
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the number of funerals or other ceremonies prior to birth are statistically significant and in the 
expected sign. The findings are consistent with those reported in Table 5.7.  
Although people are familiar with each other within villages, villagers from the same family 
clan are still likely to interact more frequently among themselves than with other clans. If it is 
true, then using villages as reference groups would likely bias the regression results. We classify 
households whose heads share the same surnames as the same network. Households belonging to 
a larger surname network tend to participate in more social events.  
Table 5.11 presents the regression results. The regressions follow the same specifications as 
in Table 5.7 except that we replace villages with surname networks as a reference group. 
Specifications in the upper panel use the number of funerals within villages. The coefficients for 
the first interaction term are largely statistically significant, showing that funerals held in 
surname networks tend to lower the height-for-age z-score and increase the probability of 
underweight for children from lower-status households. As shown by the significant coefficients 
in the height-for-age z-score regression in the lower panel, when using the number of other 
ceremonies as an indicator of social spending, the squeeze effects still show up. It is noted that 
none of the interaction terms between RD measures and the number of funerals or other 
ceremonies after birth is significant. Overall, regressions based on two different reference groups 
yield largely consistent results—prenatal exposures to social event shocks have an unintended 
negative consequence on the health outcomes of children born to lower-status families. 
The literature on fetal origins hypothesis has shown that mortality selection associated with 
extreme natural shocks may mask the identification of long-term negative impact on health (Mu 
and Zhang, 2011). In the event of severe shocks, the most fragile fraction of the population is 
more likely to die first. As a result, the survivor population tends to be healthier than the general 
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population in the absence of shocks. In other words, the presence of mortality selection will 
make it harder to discern the adverse effect of fetal origins.  The population in the 18 villages in 
our sample was not subject to any major natural shocks. The social events, albeit a heavy fiscal 
burden for the poor, are unlikely to lead to excess mortality.  The presence of excess mortality, if 
any, will only strengthen our results as the selection effect tends to trump the scarring effect 
(Pearson, 1912; Bozzoli et al., 2010).  
Another potential selection problem is that children may have moved to cities with their 
migrant parents, thereby leaving behind an unhealthy group of children in the villages. Our 
surveys were conducted right before the Chinese New year when almost all migrants return 
home and children are at home for their winter break.  Comparing the list of respondents’ names 
from the 2006 survey with that of the 2009 survey, we do not find any attrition. Although many 
young people have taken migratory jobs throughout most time of the year, they generally leave 
their children behind with grandparents in their home villages because of the high cost of living 
and discrimination against migrants’ children in urban schools.  
The stunting and underweight cutoff values are based on the WHO standard. The Chinese 
population is on average shorter and lighter in weight than the world average, thereby likely 
implying a cutoff value. The China Center for Disease Control (CDC) publishes its own cutoff 
values for the Chinese population.  In Table 5.12, we report the main results with the same 
specifications to Table 5.7 by replacing the WHO standard with the CDC standard. Both the sign 
and magnitude of prenatal squeeze effects are quite similar to those based on the WHO standard. 
Once again, we do not find a noticeable effect on exposures to social shocks after birth. 
In the above tables, we do not distinguish between the different impacts on boys and girls. 
In the human biology literature, it has been widely documented that boys are more susceptible to 
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adverse nutritional environment than girls in the early life. To examine the potential gender 
difference, in Table 5.13, we run separate regressions on the health outcomes of boys and girls. 
The upper panel reports the results using the number of funerals as proxy for social spending, 
while the lower panel uses other ceremonies to represent social events. We find that boys from 
lower status households who are prenatally exposed to the same number of funerals display 
worse height-for-age z-score than those from higher status families. However, prenatal exposures 
to social events do not seem to affect girls’ health outcomes. The findings are largely consistent 
with the literature that girls are more robust than boys in early life and the fact that unavailable 
ultrasound technology prevents local parents from gender biased resource allocation. 
Finally, since height-for-age z-scores can be both positive and negative, we cannot directly 
take a logarithm on them. Instead, in our main regression, we simply use the original z-scores as 
a dependent variable, although most of the right-hand variables are in logarithmic form.  To 
explore whether this linear-log specification yields drastically different results, following 
Hoddinott and Kinsey (2001) we transform the z-scores into percentiles according to 
international standards and then take the logarithm of the percentile. In general, the results on the 
squeeze effects of in utero exposures to social shocks remain largely the same as using z-scores. 
To save space, the results under this specification are not reported but available upon request. 
 
5.4 Conclusions 
It has been widely noted that the improvement in nutritional status among the poor in developing 
countries lag far behind income growth. Deaton (2010) and Banerjee and Duflo (2007) have 
asked: why don’t the poor eat more with their extra income?  
In this paper, we argue that social spending can squeeze out food consumption, which in 
turn compromises nutritional status. In developing countries, most of the poor live in a close 
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community where they know each other well. Their consumption decisions are shaped not only 
by their own preferences and budget constraints, but also by peers in their communities. When 
peer pressure and relative status are of importance, people tend to spend more on visible goods 
and activities (like social festivals) at the expense of less visible goods, including food. 
Gift exchange is almost a universal phenomenon in developing countries. One important 
feature of gift exchange is reciprocity. In many rural areas, it is a social norm to attend 
neighbors’ weddings, funerals, and other major ceremonies. Because of the reciprocal nature of 
gift exchange and “mandatory” participation, gift-giving places a much heavier burden on the 
poor than on the rich. In order to afford a gift, the poor often have to forgo the consumption of 
meat, eggs, and other food items for weeks after attending a social event. Such a squeeze on food 
intake can extract an unintended long-term toll on the children of pregnant women. In contrast, 
because they have financial slack and food consumption accounts for a small share of their 
budget, the rich do not need to worry about food consumption when engaged in conspicuous 
behavior.  
Using a unique census-type household survey collected in remote mountainous villages in 
China, we are able to clearly define reference groups and empirically examine the impact of 
social spending on food consumption and nutritional status. We find that children born to 
households with lower income status develop shorter and lighter physical stature if their home 
villages held a greater number of social events in the year prior to their birth.  
A question thus arises: given the negative impact of social spending on child health 
outcomes, why don’t the pregnant women avoid attending fellow villagers’ social festivals in the 
first place? There are several possible explanations. First, people may not be aware of the 
negative health consequence of prenatal exposures to social events. To our knowledge, this paper 
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is one of the first papers to provide empirical evidence showing the existence of such an effect. It 
is likely that a more informed mother will be more careful in making a choice between eating 
adequate and healthy foods and attending a neighbor’s social event.   
Second, when rewards for higher status are high and punishment for lower status is grave, 
people, in particular the poor, will intensify their competition in status goods consumption 
(Hopkins, 2010). In China, sex ratios have become increasingly unbalanced (Bulte et. al, 2011). 
As a result, the marriage market competition has intensified greatly over the past several 
decades. Under such a marriage market squeeze, the poor have to vigorously signal their wealth 
through bigger houses, more generous bride price payments, lavish wedding banquets, and active 
participation in social events within their village. In fact, the competition in social spending is 
more intensive among the poor segment of the population in rural China (Brown et al., 2011; 
Chen et al., 2011).  
In this paper, we have focused mainly on child health outcomes. In utero exposures to 
adverse events may also affect education achievement and earning potentials in later life 
(Almond and Currie, 2011). As predicted by the fetal origins hypothesis, people who are exposed 
to a malnourished environment before birth are likely to develop a series of chronic diseases in 
adult life. As a future research project, it is interesting to continue to follow the population in the 
villages over a longer period of time and quantify the impact of in utero exposures to social 
events on education achievement, earnings, and health outcomes in later stages of life.   
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Figure 5.1: Income Level and Funeral Attendance Rate in Local Villages 
Sources: Authors’ Gift record data 
Notes: By each year and each village, all the households are divided into 10 groups by per capita income. The vertical axis represents 
the participation rate of funerals by income groups.  
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Figure 5.2 Average Per capita Gift Expenditure and Number of Ceremonies in a Village 
Sources: Authors’ survey data 
Notes:  The figure is computed based on our three-wave household survey data in 2004, 2006 and 2009 in Guizhou Province. The 
horizontal axis stands for the number of ceremonies at the village level in the three years, while the vertical axis represent the average 
per capita gift expenditure (log) at the village level in the corresponding year.
 242 
 
 
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
S
ha
re
 o
f C
as
h 
E
xp
en
di
tu
re
 o
n 
G
ift
s/
Fo
od
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Relative Status (Measured by Deaton Relative Deprivation Index)
90% CI
Share of Cash Expenditure on Gifts
Share of Cash Expenditure on Food
 
 
               Figure 5.3 Share of Cash Expenditure Spent on Gifts and Food 
 
Sources: Authors’ survey data 
Notes: Deaton index ranges from 0 to 1 with 1 corresponding to the lowest status and 0 standing for the highest status. All households 
surveyed in 2004, 2006 and 2009 are used to generate this figure.  
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Figure 5.4 Number of Ceremonies and Height-for-Age Z-Score by Income Status Group 
 
Notes: The high and low-income groups are divided based on the difference between household income and village median household income in 
the year prior to a child’s birth. Because the income data are only available for three years when surveys were conducted, we use income data in 
2004 to define income status in 2003 and 2004, data in 2006 to match income status in 2005 and 2006, and data in 2009 to infer income status in 
2007. The anthropometric information for children born 2004-2008 are taken from the 2009 survey. The vertical axis represents the median height-
for-age z-score corresponding to the number of ceremonies at the village level between 2003 and 2007.   
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Figure 5.5 Distributions of Social Events by Month 
Sources: Authors’ Gift record data 
Notes: Information on all ceremonies between 2005 and 2009 was collected from all households in three out of eighteen villages in 
rural Guizhou. Weddings and funerals are excluded from the left figure. 
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Table 5.1 Summary Statistics on Major Economic Indicators of Guizhou Household Surveys in 2004, 2006 and 2009 
 Three Wave 
  2004 2006 2009 
Per capita real annual income (RMB) 1404 1817 2855 
Income below poverty line $1.25 per day using 2005 PPP (%) (P0) 71.3 64.1 52.7 
Income below official national poverty line 892 RMB per year (%) (P0) 37.3 36.3 22.4 
Poverty-gap below poverty line of 892 RMB (P1) 14.5 15.0 10.1 
Squared poverty-gap below poverty line of 892 RMB (P2) 7.5 8.3 6.4 
Income inequality (Gini) 43.1 48.2 55.2 
(Mean) Deaton relative deprivation index  0.423 0.432 0.495 
Share of consumption (%)    
    Food 47.8 42.2 35.5 
    Gift and festival spending 7.9 13.9 15.2 
Cash and In-kind Food Consumption (RMB)    
    Grain 312.9 300.9 273.7 
    Condiment (salt, vegetable oil and animal oil) 134.9 138.8 115.8 
    Vegetable, fruit, tea, drink, cigarette and tobacco  134.1 236.1 229.0 
            Vegetable and fruit - 126.9 170.8 
            Tea, drink, cigarette and tobacco - 109.2 58.2 
    Meat, egg and dairy product 76.3 94.9 60.0 
Source: Authors’ survey data 
Notes:   
[1] The 2005 purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rate is at the “China-rural” level http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp . 
The Poverty lines for 2004-2009 are adjusted according to published annual inflation rate in various issues of China Statistic Year Book. 
[2] The poverty line 892 RMB per year in terms of PPP equals $ 0.61 per day. 
[3] Deaton Relative Deprivation Index (Deaton, 2001) measures household-specific relative status in a village. It is valued between 0 and 1. The 
larger the number, the lower the relative status, and the more relatively deprived a household is.  
[4] All items of food consumption have been adjusted for inflation based on China Statistic Year Book published by NBS. All values are in RMB. 
[5] Compared to the 2004 survey, in the 2006 and 2009 household survey more detailed information on subcategories of cash food expenditure 
was collected. 
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Table 5.2 Summary Statistics on Major Ceremonies in Three Villages  
Year 
Female Wedding Male Wedding Funeral All the ceremonies 
Gift giving per 
occasion 
by income group 
(CNY)  
% of 
villagers 
attending 
funerals  
Gift 
size 
(CNY) 
# of 
ceremonies 
Gift 
size 
(CNY) 
# of 
ceremonies 
Gift 
size 
(CNY) 
# of 
ceremonies 
Gift 
size 
(CNY) 
# of 
ceremonies 
bottom 
25% 
middle 
50% 
top 
75% 
 
2004 41.6 0.77 54.1 1.65 41.5 3.19 45.8 9.29 49.8 44.1 45.5 100% 
2005 59.9 0.77 47.8 1.47 40.4 2.03 50.2 9.82 47.9 53.1 47.1 100% 
2006 71.8 0.94 55.7 0.94 30.7 2.13 43.7 12.18 53.4 38.7 43.2 95.1% 
2007 59.9 1.13 41.2 2.06 54.7 4.30 57.9 9.00 63.0 50.2 62.6 99.1% 
2008 60.5 1.31 63.5 1.75 92.5 3.32 71.9 9.38 67.3 75.4 66.1 98.6% 
Source: Authors’ Gift record data 
Notes:   
[1] The gift spending data were based on gift records kept in all the households in three villages collected in the 2009 survey. They 
have been adjusted into constant 2004 price (RMB) using rural consumer price index published in China Statistic Yearbook (China 
National Statistical Bureau, various issues). A household’s income status is based on its income standing in a village at a given year. 
Because the income data are available only for three years when surveys were conducted, we use household income surveyed in 2006 
to proxy income status in 2005, and income data in 2009 to proxy income status in 2007 and 2008. 
[2] The gift books record all the gifts received and the corresponding names of gift givers in different occasions. Based on these 
names, we can compute the participation rate for major events, such as funerals, within each village. 
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Table 5.3 The Effect of Funerals and Other Ceremonies on the Share of Food and Gift Cash Expenditure 
  R1-Food Share R1-Gift Share R2-Food Share R2-Gift Share 
 SUR estimation SUR estimation 
Rd * # of ceremonies -0.068*** -0.010   (0.022) (0.014)   
# of ceremonies 0.031** 0.009   (0.013) (0.008)   
Rd * # of funerals   -0.041* 0.027*   (0.025) (0.016) 
# of funerals   0.022 -0.001   (0.015) (0.010) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Village fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(Pseudo) R2 0.242 0.277 0.230 0.269 
N 1834 1834 2048 2048 
Notes:  
[1] The SUR estimation represents simultaneous regressions on the shares of cash expenditure spent on food and gift.  
[2] The number of ceremonies refers to all major ceremonies excluding funerals held by others villagers in a village in the year prior 
to a child’s birth. The number of funerals refers to funerals held by others villagers in a village in the year prior to a child’s birth. 
[3] Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  The estimations are clustered at the year X village level. The symbols *, **, and *** 
indicate confidence levels at 90%, 95%, and 99%, respectively.  
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Table 5.4 Height-for-age Z-scores, Stunting Rate (%) and Underweight Rate (%) 
Birth 
year 
Total  Boys  Girls 
Z-
score 
Stunting 
(%) 
Underweight 
(%)  
Z-
score 
Stunting 
(%) 
Underweight 
(%)  
Z-
score 
Stunting 
(%) 
Underweight 
(%) 
WHO Standard 
2004 -1.93 45.59 16.18  -2.01 48.72 15.39  -1.82 41.38 17.24 
2005 -2.10 40.39 13.46  -2.16 40.00 13.33  -2.01 40.91 13.64 
2006 -2.23 53.19 17.02  -2.48 56.00 12.00  -1.99 50.00 22.73 
2007 -1.88 33.96 16.98  -2.09 41.38 17.24  -1.58 25.00 16.67 
2008 -2.55 45.00 16.67  -2.38 40.48 14.29  -2.91 55.56 22.22 
 China CDC Standard 
2004 -2.48 55.88 23.53  -2.55 53.85 28.21  -2.39 58.62 17.10 
2005 -2.53 50.00 13.46  -2.60 53.33 13.33  -2.40 45.46 13.64 
2006 -2.53 59.57 19.15  -2.77 64.00 16.00  -2.29 54.55 22.32 
2007 -2.22 47.17 16.98  -2.37 51.72 17.24  -2.00 41.67 16.19 
2008 -2.61 46.67 13.33  -2.37 42.86 9.52  -2.94 55.56 22.22 
Notes: Children’s anthropometric indicators were taken from the 2009 survey. Stunting is defined as height-for-age z-score less than 
two standard deviations (SD) of the WHO standard and the China CDC standard. Underweight is defined as weight-for-age z-score 
less than two standard deviations (SD) of the WHO standard and the China CDC standard.  
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Table 5.5 Ceremony Frequency and Height-for-Age Z-scores by Income Group 
                 Ceremony 
Income Status 
Frequent 
(1) 
Less frequent 
(2) (1)-(2)        Difference-in-Difference 
Birth year: 2004 
Lower 50% -2.89 -1.66  -1.23  (3) 
  0.21  (4)         (3)-(4)= -1.44 Upper 50% -1.04 -1.25 
Birth year: 2005 
Lower 50% -2.41 -1.98 -0.43   (3) 
-0.37   (4)         (3)-(4)= -0.06 Upper 50% -2.01 -1.64 
Birth year: 2006 
Lower 50% -3.06 -2.71 -0.35   (3) 
-0.03   (4)         (3)-(4)= -0.32    Upper 50% -1.44 -1.41 
Birth year: 2007 
Lower 50% -2.92 -0.42 -2.50   (3) 
-0.55   (4)         (3)-(4)= -1.95 Upper 50% -2.12 -1.57 
Birth year: 2008 
Lower 50% -3.27 -2.86 -0.41   (3) 
-0.48   (4)         (3)-(4)=  0.07 Upper 50% -2.66 -2.18 
Birth year: 2004-2008 
Lower 50% -2.87 -1.87 -1.00   (3) 
-0.14   (4)         (3)-(4)= -0.86* (0.48) Upper 50% -1.84 -1.70 
Notes:  
The groups of “frequent” and “less frequent” are defined based on whether the number of ceremonies in a village is below or above 
the median number of ceremonies in our sample for a given year.  The “Lower 50%” and “upper 50%” income groups are defined 
according to a household’s income status compared to the median household income within its village in the year prior to a child’s 
birth. In the last row, all the cohorts born between 2004 and2008 are combined. The standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
                      
 
 250 
 
 
Table 5.6 Exposures to Funerals and Other Ceremonies on Child Health Outcomes by Income Group 
 R1-high R2-low R3-high R4-low R5-high R6-low 
 Height for Age (OLS) 
Stunting 
(Linear Probability) 
Underweight 
(Linear Probability) 
 Panel A: Funerals 
# of funerals before birth 0.421 -0.999* -0.115 -0.056 -0.115 0.126** (0.313) (0.586) (0.095) (0.102) (0.084) (0.051) 
# of funerals after birth 0.39 0.084 -0.041 0.092 -0.178** -0.072 (0.417) (0.407) (0.119) (0.081) (0.067) (0.062) 
(Pseudo) R2 0.371 0.239 0.365 0.314 0.23 0.329 
N 117 117 117 117 117 117 
 Panel B: Other Major Ceremonies 
# of ceremonies before birth -0.11 -1.458*** -0.028 0.255** 0.064 0.073 (0.472) (0.445) (0.146) (0.115) (0.102) (0.069) 
# of ceremonies after birth -0.155 -0.182 0.109 0.042 -0.108 0.08 (0.386) (0.576) (0.122) (0.140) (0.098) (0.090) 
(Pseudo) R2 0.367 0.336 0.259 0.382 0.179 0.31 
N 117 117 117 117 117 117 
Notes: [1] Due to the small sample size, we divide the sample into high income group (R1, R3 and R5) and low income group (R2, R4 
and R6) according to the difference between a household’s income and the median income of households having child aged 1-5. 
[2] The number of ceremonies and funerals refer to the total number of ceremonies (excluding funerals) and funerals held by others 
villagers in a village in the year prior to a child’s birth. The health outcome measures are based on the WHO standard. 
[3] Household level characteristics (ceremony frequency before and after child birth, predicted per capita income, head sex, education, 
cadre status, share of youth, share of the elderly, household size, share of migrants, minority identity, mother’s height, other shocks), 
child characteristics (age dummy, sex, birth order), year fixed effects, village fixed effects and year X village fixed effects are also 
included but not reported here. The estimations are clustered at the year X village level. 
[4] Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate confidence levels at 90%, 95%, and 99%, 
respectively. 
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Table 5.7 Main Results: Exposures to Funerals and Other Ceremonies, Relative Status, and Child Health Outcomes 
 R1-ceremony R2-funeral R3-ceremony R4-funeral R5-ceremony R6-funeral 
 Height for Age (OLS) Stunting (Linear Prob) Underweight (Linear Prob) 
 Panel A: Village and Year Fixed Effects Included 
Deaton Rd * # of events before birth -1.599*** -2.123*** 0.452* 0.541** 0.065 0.445* (0.671) (0.712) (0.269) (0.248) (0.219) (0.230) 
Deaton Rd * # of events after birth 0.838 0.677 -0.296 -0.183 0.050 -0.117 (0.567) (0.581) (0.286) (0.241) (0.144) (0.137) 
(Pseudo) R2 0.382 0.389 0.293 0.302 0.200 0.219 
AIC 592 576 188 239 224 211 
 Panel B: Panel A + Village-specific Linear Time trends 
Deaton Rd * # of events before birth -2.523*** -2.097*** 0.615** 0.443* 0.040 0.348* (0.618) (0.777) (0.279) (0.250) (0.189) (0.204) 
Deaton Rd * # of events after birth 0.712 0.024 -0.404 -0.096 0.093 -0.055 (0.690) (0.530) (0.288) (0.205) (0.121) (0.130) 
# of events before birth 0.525 0.860** -0.205 -0.260* 0.062 -0.161 (0.375) (0.383) (0.143) (0.146) (0.099) (0.117) 
# of events after birth -0.538 -0.020 0.246* 0.055 -0.089 -0.061 (0.389) (0.422) (0.143) (0.144) (0.081) (0.090) 
(Pseudo) R2 0.273 0.243 0.201 0.180 0.112 0.135 
AIC 976 986 332 338 221 217 
 Panel C: Panel A + Village X Year Fixed Effects 
Deaton Rd * # of events before birth -2.627*** -2.241** 0.580** 0.401 0.134 0.377* (0.659) (0.872) (0.288) (0.268) (0.208) (0.214) 
Deaton Rd * # of events after birth 0.863 0.109 -0.439 -0.093 -0.013 -0.066 (0.759) (0.693) (0.320) (0.222) (0.119) (0.163) 
# of events before birth 0.378 0.768 -0.121 -0.230 0.016 -0.170 (0.458) (0.460) (0.178) (0.150) (0.127) (0.112) 
# of events after birth -0.480 0.045 0.214 0.019 -0.008 -0.064 (0.419) (0.469) (0.166) (0.138) (0.083) (0.095) 
(Pseudo) R2 0.287 0.256 0.227 0.231 0.120 0.161 
AIC 986 996 338 345 232 221 
N 234 234 234 234 234 234 
Notes: see notes [2]-[4] for Table 5.6. To save space, Panel A does not show estimation results for # of events before and after birth. 
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Table 5.8 Falsification Test: Main Results using Contemporaneous Health Measure – Weight-for-Height Z-Score 
 R5-ceremony R6-funeral 
 Weight-for-Height Z-Score (OLS) 
Deaton Rd * # of events before birth 0.692 0.571 (1.335) (1.239) 
Deaton Rd * # of events after birth 0.311 -0.010 (0.803) (1.200) 
# of events before birth 0.477 0.762 (0.654) (0.590) 
# of events after birth -0.038 -0.079 (0.455) (0.522) 
(Pseudo) R2 0.206 0.210 
N 231 231 
AIC 1163 1162 
                  Notes: see notes [2]-[4] for Table 5.6. Village fixed effects, year fixed effects and village X year fixed effects are 
controlled. 
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Table 5.9 Falsification Test: The Squeeze Effects of Exposure to Social Events on Early Child Health Outcomes 
 R1 R2 R3 
 Height-for-Age Z Score Stunting Underweight 
 Panel A: Funerals 
Rd * # of funerals before birth -0.408 0.027 0.059 (0.295) (0.059) (0.051) 
Rd * # of funerals after birth 0.069 -0.040 -0.015 (0.183) (0.039) (0.035) 
# of funerals before birth 0.236 -0.033 -0.029 (0.205) (0.028) (0.032) 
# of funerals after birth -0.014 0.013 0.024 (0.118) (0.022) (0.026) 
(Pseudo) R2 0.192 0.213 0.160 
N 234 234 234 
 Panel B: Other Major Ceremonies 
Rd * # of ceremonies before birth -0.437 -0.232 -0.021 
(0.605) (0.164) (0.135) 
Rd * # of ceremonies after birth 0.213 -0.155 0.017 
(0.606) (0.181) (0.107) 
# of ceremonies before birth -0.051 0.337** -0.027 
(0.441) (0.140) (0.088) 
# of ceremonies after birth 0.326 0.016 0.028 
(0.360) (0.092) (0.067) 
(Pseudo) R2 0.385 0.327 0.167 
N 234 234 234 
Notes: The specification is similar to Table 5.7 except that we lag the number of funerals / other major ceremonies for each age cohort 
by one year. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Village fixed effects, year fixed effects and village X year fixed effects are 
controlled. The estimations are clustered at year X village level. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate confidence levels at 90%, 95%, 
and 99%, respectively. 
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Table 5.10 Robust Check: Exposures to Social Events on the Health Outcomes of Children Born Between February and 
September 
 R1 R2 R3 
 Height-for-Age Stunting Underweight 
 Panel A: Funerals 
Rd * # of funerals before birth -3.364*** 0.824** 0.740** (1.064) (0.341) (0.294) 
Rd * # of funerals after birth -0.197 -0.044 -0.140 (0.802) (0.363) (0.202) 
# of funerals before birth 0.723 -0.338* -0.449** (0.571) (0.173) (0.175) 
# of funerals after birth 0.498 -0.035 -0.010 (0.479) (0.206) (0.137) 
(Pseudo) R2 0.246 0.251 0.248 
N 146 146 146 
 Panel B: Other Major Ceremonies 
Rd * # of ceremonies before birth -4.141*** 0.459* 0.863*** 
(0.933) (0.258) (0.269) 
Rd * # of ceremonies after birth 0.351 -0.335 -0.268 
(0.879) (0.239) (0.191) 
# of ceremonies before birth 1.350** -0.189 -0.538*** 
(0.665) (0.181) (0.195) 
# of ceremonies after birth -0.557 0.240* 0.158 
(0.452) (0.127) (0.134) 
(Pseudo) R2 0.277 0.189 0.177 
N 146 146 146 
Notes: The specification is the same as Table 5.7 except that we restrict our sample to children who were born between February and 
September. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Village fixed effects, year fixed effects and village X year fixed effects are 
controlled. The estimations are clustered at year X village level. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate confidence levels of 90%, 95%, 
and 99%, respectively. 
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Table 5.11 Robust Check: The Squeeze Effects of Exposure to Social Events on Child 
Health Outcomes using Alternative Reference Groups 
  R1 R2 R3  
 Surname Networks  
  
Height-for-
Age Z-Score Stunting Underweight  
 Panel A: Funerals 
Rd * # of funerals before birth -2.242** 0.302 0.444*  (1.009) (0.304) (0.238)  
Rd * # of funerals after birth 0.379 -0.088 -0.103  (0.780) (0.239) (0.180)  
# of funerals before birth 0.639 -0.171 -0.170  (0.493) (0.161) (0.116)  
# of funerals after birth -0.047 0.030 -0.057  (0.477) (0.142) (0.099)  
(Pseudo) R2 0.256 0.196 0.166  
N 232 232 232  
 Panel B: Other Major Ceremonies 
Rd * # of ceremonies before birth -2.199*** 0.310* 0.16  (0.623) (0.178) (0.197)  
Rd * # of ceremonies after birth 0.873 -0.409** 0.028  (0.730) (0.200) (0.134)  
# of ceremonies before birth 0.359 -0.09 -0.022  (0.419) (0.124) (0.121)  
# of ceremonies after birth -0.279 0.209* -0.043  (0.383) (0.104) (0.086)  
(Pseudo) R2 0.274 0.257 0.121  
N 232 232 232  
Notes: The specification is the same as Table 5.7 except that we replace villages with surname 
networks as reference groups. Surname networks are confined to the boundaries of a village. 
Village fixed effects, year fixed effects and village X year fixed effects are controlled. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. The estimations are clustered at the year X village level. 
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Table 5.12 The Impact of Fetal Exposures to Social Events on Early Child Health Outcomes (the China CDC Standard) 
 R1-Ceremony R2-Funeral 
R1-Ceremony R2-Funeral R3-Ceremony R4-Funeral 
 Height-for-Age Z-Score Stunting Underweight 
Deaton Rd * # of events before birth -2.615*** -2.089*** 0.965*** 0.509** 0.075 0.242 (0.644) (0.773) (0.292) (0.244) (0.167) (0.192) 
Deaton Rd * # of events after birth 0.971 0.181 -0.322 0.173 -0.303* -0.191 (0.737) (0.635) (0.282) (0.185) (0.153) (0.165) 
# of events before birth 0.332 0.668* -0.323* -0.291** 0.118 -0.042 (0.422) (0.395) (0.172) (0.128) (0.109) (0.111) 
# of events after birth -0.496 0.066 0.061 -0.151 0.061 -0.026 (0.402) (0.439) (0.144) (0.123) (0.095) (0.100) 
(Pseudo) R2 0.299 0.264 0.258 0.222 0.154 0.169 
N 233 233 233 233 233 233 
Notes: Village fixed effects, year fixed effects and village X year fixed effects are controlled. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. The estimations are clustered at the year X village level. 
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Table 5.13 Exposures to Funerals and Other Ceremonies and Child Health Outcomes by Gender 
  R1-Boy R2-Girl R3-Boy R4-Girl R5-Boy R6-Girl 
  Height-for-Age z score OLS 
Stunting 
(Linear Probability) 
Underweight 
(Linear Probability) 
 Panel A: Funerals 
Rd* # of funerals before birth -3.848** 0.14 0.246 0.475 0.329 0.300 (1.703) (1.023) (0.366) (0.397) (0.295) (0.381) 
Rd* # of funerals after birth 1.462 -1.227 -0.232 0.24 -0.147 0.05 (1.202) (1.236) (0.255) (0.515) (0.244) (0.258) 
# of funerals before birth 1.539* -0.568 -0.195 -0.166 -0.148 -0.029 (0.791) (0.511) (0.194) (0.209) (0.157) (0.237) 
# of funerals after birth -1.207* 1.296 0.243 -0.267 0.07 -0.226 (0.676) (0.822) (0.175) (0.271) (0.136) (0.148) 
(Pseudo) R2 0.336 0.392 0.324 0.335 0.233 0.251 
N 138 95 138 95 138 95 
 Panel B: Other Major Ceremonies 
Rd* # of ceremonies before birth -2.903*** 1.307 0.377 -0.047 0.003 -0.045 
(1.065) (1.552) (0.354) (0.685) (0.259) (0.432) 
Rd* # of ceremonies after birth 0.628 -0.227 -0.354 0.358 0.089 0.087 
(1.194) (1.848) (0.330) (0.738) (0.176) (0.343) 
# of ceremonies before birth 0.796 -2.297** -0.058 0.255 0.056 0.315 
(0.660) (0.931) (0.214) (0.425) (0.151) (0.247) 
# of ceremonies after birth -0.799 0.838 0.263 -0.277 0.121 -0.376** 
(0.704) (1.062) (0.173) (0.387) (0.114) (0.183) 
(Pseudo) R2 0.343 0.42 0.336 0.325 0.228 0.252 
N 138 95 138 95 138 95 
Notes: The number of funerals and other major ceremonies refer to the total number of relevant events held by others villagers in a 
village in the year prior to a child’s birth. Village fixed effects, year fixed effects and village X year fixed effects are controlled. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The estimations are clustered at year X village level. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate 
confidence levels at 90%, 95%, and 99%, respectively. 
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Appendix Figure 1: A Map of the Location of Surveyed Region 
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Appendix Figure 2: Height-for-Age Z-Score for CHNS Guizhou Data and Our IFPRI-CAAS Sample 
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Sources: Our IFPRI-CAAS 2009 wave Guizhou survey has a sample size of N=276 in the age range of 1-72 months. To closely match our sample, 
CHNS 2004 & 2006 subsample from Guizhou province is the best option available. The CHNS data comes from an ongoing international 
collaborative project between the Carolina Population Center at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the National Institute of 
Nutrition and Food Safety at the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention, available via http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/china. Both 
waves of survey were conducted in 9 provinces. In total, there are 137 children in the age range of 1-72 months in rural Guizhou. 
Notes: This paper evaluates the impact of prenatal exposure to social events for children between 12-72 months. The patterns of z-score between 
the two datasets after the 12th month are very similar. However, our IFPRI-CAAS survey is of census type, which better represents the 
demographic pattern in China – unbalanced sex ratio. The China 1% Population Survey 2005 indicates that sex ratio at birth in Guizhou province 
is 128:100 (Zhu et al., 2009), in rural Guizhou this number should be even higher. Sex ratio between 1-72 months in the IFPRI-CAAS sample is 
around 139:100, while the ratio is 70:100 in CHNS 2004 & 2006 Guizhou sample. 
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